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Abstract 
 
How do rural regions reframe and reinvent themselves through contemporary modes of high-tech 
innovation and entrepreneurship? How do pushes for rural development prepare the rural to be 
incorporated into technological futures? How does regional culture get taken up in processes of 
economic development? How do regional approaches to innovation break down? 
 
It is the promise for economic growth and transformation, driven by high-tech economies, 
entrepreneurship, and technological innovation, that is the phenomenon at the center of this 
dissertation. This dissertation examines in ethnographic detail how this promise comes at a time 
when regional approaches to economic and civic transformation seek to reframe rural places as 
attractive alternatives to the big city. I focus on the practice of economic development, especially 
that associated with the contemporary high-tech economy, by economic developers, municipal 
leaders, and entrepreneurs to create new opportunities and fulfill promises for growth in the 
Keweenaw Peninsula of Michigan. 
 
I do this by identifying three processes of economization: codifying rural readiness, crafting the 
rural entrepreneur, and zoning rural exceptionalism. Codifying rural readiness demonstrates how 
redevelopment initiatives in the State of Michigan work to digitize rural assets. Through this 
process, initiatives identify the “right” and “wrong” kinds of rural data, reshaping and 
repackaging rurality and rural communities to attract private investment. Crafting the rural 
entrepreneur shows how economic development organizations (EDOs) identify and extract 
cultural assets from rural regions and transform them into a type of rural capital that can be 
leveraged by anyone, whether they are from the region or not. I demonstrate how these same 
EDOs market regional culture to attract the “right” kinds of entrepreneurs and innovators to the 
region. Zoning rural exceptionalism reveals how rural communities are able to leverage 
economic development policy and the corresponding opportunities to differentiate themselves as 
rural players in the new economy. Each of these processes serve to identify and enculturate rural 
 x 
communities into 21st century forms of neoliberal capitalism perpetuated in the high-tech and 
digital economy. 
 
  
 1 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
 
In May of 2020, as American deaths from COVID-19 surpassed 100,000 and the national economy 
steeply declined, policy experts, economic developers, and civic leaders were already speculating 
on whether the global pandemic would provide new opportunities for economic growth. For 
example, Mark Muro, the Policy Director for the Metropolitan Policy Program at The Brookings 
Institution, wrote a blog post (2020) asking, “Could Big Tech’s move to permanent remote work 
save the American heartland?” In it, Muro summarized nationwide statistics showing that only a 
handful of “superstar” metropolitan areas have reaped the spoils of “Big Tech” (i.e., “America’s 
highest-value industries”). With a recent announcement coming from Facebook stating that a large 
chunk of its employees would be working from home for the foreseeable future, and Twitter 
announcing that their employees could work from home “forever,” Muro argued that a transition 
to remote work could finally be the trigger for decentralizing high-tech economies away from 
places like Silicon Valley and Seattle. Specifically, Muro called this out as an opportunity for 
metropolitan areas and small cities throughout “the Heartland”1 to repatriate those they’ve 
historically lost through “brain drain”2 and a lack of regional competitiveness.  
 
Similar articles and editorials were published around the same time by national and international 
outlets (Darbyshire, 2020; Axelrod, 2020), including the United Nations (2020), as well as small-
town regional newspapers (Small and Small, 2020; Smith, 2020). They too argued that now may 
                                               
1 The concept of “The Heartland” is a discursive and geopolitical tool used to describe “Middle America.” The New 
York Times published an excellent article on the history and complexity of “The Heartland” a few years ago (Badger 
and Quealy, 2017).  
2 “Brain drain” is a term used to describe the out-migration of smart and talented young people from a community, 
region, or nation. In American rural communities, the term is broadly applied to mean the process of losing young 
people and the resulting rise of average age, or “aging demographics.” Out-migration due to lack of opportunity is 
broadly seen as one of the major contributors of the decline of American rural communities. For an excellent 
ethnography of rural brain drain, see Hollowing Out the Middle: The Rural Brain Drain and What It Means for 
America by Patrick J. Carr and Maria J. Kefalas (2009).  
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finally be the time that rural places and small peripheral cities in America could see the benefits 
from the high-tech economy that other regions were so accustomed to accumulating. Meanwhile, 
the unemployment rate in Michigan had skyrocketed, the nation’s highest. As of April 2020, 17 of 
the 25 counties with the highest unemployment rates in the United States were in Michigan, and 
15 of those were rural counties in Michigan (Lansing State Journal).3 Remote work was seen as 
promising, as it has been promised as a technologically-driven tool for economic growth since the 
1970s (Grimes, 2000). But what was that going to do for Cheboygan County (41.2% 
unemployment) or Mackinac County (38.1% unemployment), the two counties on either side of 
the Mackinaw Bridge, connecting Michigan’s Upper Peninsula (the UP) with its Lower Peninsula? 
 
It is the promise for economic growth and transformation, driven by high-tech economies, 
entrepreneurship, and technological innovation, that is the phenomenon at the center of this 
dissertation. The promise for economic growth comes at a time when regional approaches to 
economic and civic transformation seek to reframe rural places as attractive alternatives to the big 
city. To understand this promise, I spent 18 months following the work of economic developers, 
entrepreneurs, and municipal leaders in the Keweenaw Peninsula. This work was primarily 
concerned with economic development, and how entrepreneurship and innovation, associated 
largely with the contemporary high-tech economy, get taken up to create new opportunities and 
promises for economic growth and prosperity in communities that often lack both. 
 
Guided by the question, “How do rural regions reframe and reinvent themselves through 
contemporary modes of high-tech innovation and entrepreneurship?” I spent 16 months conducting 
ethnographic fieldwork in the Keweenaw Peninsula of Michigan,4 one of the most remote places 
in the contiguous United States (Van Dam, 2018). During this time, I followed the work of 
economic development organizations and municipal planning and development commissions as 
they sought to attract remote workers and entrepreneurs to the region. I investigated the efforts of 
the State of Michigan and regional granting agencies as they funded the digitization and 
                                               
3 These counties are classified as rural or “micropolitan” in accordance with the Michigan Rural Development Fund 
Act (as of 2019). This designation makes them eligible for Rural Development Funds from the Michigan 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. 
4 I use “Keweenaw Peninsula” and “the Keweenaw” interchangeably to refer to the Keweenaw Peninsula of 
Michigan.  
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centralization of infrastructure data for the purposes of promoting rural redevelopment. I 
embedded myself in organizations working in some of the most impoverished communities in the 
region as they sought to expand Internet access and reimagine what community and economic 
development looked like on shoestring budgets.  
 
Rather than universal success or universal failure of economic development, I found a patchwork 
of initiatives and organizations that broadly fall into line with recommendations made by scholars 
of and policy on rural economic development and place-based innovation. The success of these 
development tactics is largely questionable, as I argue, resulting in the transformation of rural 
communities for new formations of resource extraction. I document three processes of 
economization5: codifying rural readiness, crafting the rural entrepreneur, and zoning rural 
exceptionalism. Each of these processes serve to more actively identify and enculturate rural 
communities into 21st century forms of neoliberal capitalism that are perpetuated in the high-tech 
and digital economy.  
 
During my fieldwork, I made friends and acquaintances, I volunteered with some of the 
organizations I was studying, and I collaborated on projects. I became something of a scholar-
activist, trumpeting the successes of rural America6 while simultaneously working to improve 
governing structures that support rural development in Michigan.7 This complicated my work, but 
also gave me deeper insight into people and organizations who made economic development and 
related policy work happen throughout rural Michigan. What I write about in this dissertation, 
though, is primarily their work; “their” being the economic development organizations and 
municipal leaders and organizations that became central to my fieldwork in Houghton and 
Keweenaw Counties. Before I describe my fieldsite, I’d like to first unpack the contemporary 
media and policy narratives in the United States that have so publicly and purposefully made rural 
places as sites ripe for outside intervention. 
                                               
5 STS scholars Çaliskan and Callon (2009) describe economization as the process through which things, people, 
behaviors, organizations, and institutions become part of the economy.  I describe economization in more detail in 
Chapter Two. 
6 For example, see (Hardy, 2018). 
7 In the Summer of 2019, I joined a group of economic developers from throughout the UP and Northern Michigan 
to advocate at the state level for a new Michigan Department of Rural Affairs and Development. I wrote the policy 
memo that drove the work of the organization. I explain this in more depth in Chapter Two. 
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The Rural Deficit Narrative 
 
Rural communities in the United States routinely face a narrative that I call the “rural deficit 
narrative.” This narrative colors and influences much of what is seen as possible, or probable, with 
respect to rural development. This narrative says that rural communities in the United States are 
falling behind with respect to technological advancement and economic development, that rural 
businesses and industry clusters are unprepared to compete with emerging superstar cities and the 
growth of technologically advanced manufacturing sectors (among other sectors) in small and 
medium-sized metropolitan areas throughout the country. These stories, often told by urban-based 
organizations and people, largely unaware of the realities of rural America, assume that the growth 
at all costs narrative, sold as the key to American economic success, is also the right one for rural 
communities. High unemployment, depopulation, and a stagnation of economic growth become 
key data points that show how rural areas are failing, rather than allowing us to ask, what does 
success look like in rural places to begin with? 
 
“Can rural America be saved?” 
In December of 2018, the New York Times (NYT) published an analysis piece titled, “The Hard 
Truths of Trying to ‘Save’ the Rural Economy” (Porter, 2018). In it, Eduardo Porter, an economics 
reporter for NYT opens with the question, “Can rural America be saved?” Throughout, Porter’s 
on-the-ground reporting in downtrodden rural communities throughout the United States is 
intertwined with key statistics and arguments made by think tanks such as The Brookings 
Institution and the Economic Innovation Group that all, in one way or another, signal to an 
increasing decline of rural people and places. In particular, Porter opens the article with three 
striking data visualizations (see Figure 1.1) that show the decline in median income and population 
as you move from large metropolitan areas down to remote rural communities, and a reverse 
decline with respect to median age. This is meant to show that rural communities are poorer and 
older than urban communities, while also simultaneously losing population. 
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Figure 1.1: Rural disparity visualization from the New York Times.  
 
The statistics from above are deployed alongside the Distressed Communities Index (DCI), created 
by the free market promoting think tank, the Economic Innovation Group (EIG). The DCI uses 
data sources on high school diploma achievement, housing vacancy, unemployment, rates of 
poverty, median income, and fluctuations in numbers of jobs and businesses. Porter uses this 
measurement of distress to argue that rural areas are becoming what the EIG report calls 
“increasingly distressed,” meaning that while the number of distressed areas in urban and suburban 
communities are shrinking, the number of distressed areas in rural America is increasing. Porter 
ties this distress to rural America’s reliance on the manufacturing sector as an important source of 
jobs, second only to the education, health care, and social assistance sector.8. While land-based 
industries are often the face of rural communities, manufacturing employs more people in entirely 
rural counties than agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining combined. Porter argues that the 
continued globalization of manufacturing will see economic distress further concentrate in rural 
communities.  
 
Like so many others before him, Porter argues that the digital economy is likely going to be the 
saving grace of rural people’s livelihoods. But unlike others, such as New Hampshire’s Center on 
Rural Innovation, who argue that federal and state governments should be doing more to build up 
infrastructure to support digital economies in rural areas, Porter takes a contrary stance. He argues 
that place-based responses to rural economic development, which rural development scholars 
                                               
8 Education, healthcare, and social assistance were grouped together in the federal measurements being used. 
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argue are more successful than generic one-size-fits-all models of economic development (Flora 
et al,. 2018), are being wasted on rural communities that are doomed to fail. Rather, he says: 
“Instead of so-called place-based policies to revitalize small towns, why not help their residents 
take advantage of opportunities where the opportunities are?” 
 
And where are these already existing opportunities? So-called “superstar cities” that are popping 
up across the United States. 
 
The new superstar cities 
In its current use, the term “superstar city” originates from a National Bureau of Economic 
Research working paper that documented the growing disparity in income and housing values 
between superstar cities like San Francisco and non-superstars like Buffalo, NY (Gyourko et al., 
2006). Superstar cities were the cities where housing demand exceeded the supply in a low-growth 
housing market, with the resulting increase in price being further driven by the desire of high-
income people to live in that city.  
 
The term was taken up by The Brookings Institution and others (e.g., Florida 2019) to describe 
those metropolitan areas that have the highest concentration of jobs in “innovation sectors.” In 
particular, a December 2019 report from Brookings found that five metro areas were able to 
capture 90% of “innovation-sector growth” from 2005 to 2017: San Francisco, San Jose, Seattle, 
Boston, and San Diego (Atkinson et al., 2019). These places were not only able to grow, but further 
concentrate economic sectors that are both high-tech and high in research and development. In 
other words, the top 10% of metropolitan areas concentrated more jobs in innovation sectors, while 
the bottom 90% lost jobs. The authors argue that this is resulting in intense “territorial polarization” 
that is having detrimental downstream effects such as continued rising real estate prices in 
“superstar cities” that drives low-income people out, the concentration of the highly-educated in 
only certain places, and a talent crisis affecting companies in any cities that aren’t among the 
superstars. 
 
Going beyond simple calls for placemaking to attract companies and workers, the Brookings report 
actually classifies and promotes federal intervention to create eight to ten new innovation hubs in 
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the United States, and they have just the measure to determine who should be next.9 Utilizing data 
on population, university R&D per capita, patents, higher education achievement, and existing 
jobs in the innovation sector, the report proposes their Eligibility Index, that shows which metro 
areas are best positioned to be upgraded to compete with superstar cities in the innovation 
economy. These heartland “growth centers” include cities such as Madison, Rochester, St. Louis, 
and Nashville. Ultimately, the report argues, broader national intervention is necessary to curb the 
disproportionate growth so prevalent in innovation industries which has resulted in a “winner-take-
most” dynamic. 
 
Building up opportunities to spread the wealth of the innovation economy to more geographically 
disparate metropolitan areas is, if we take it at face value, meant to democratize access to the 
technological innovation seen as the driving force of much of the prosperity of the 21st century. 
But, does it not just diversify the concentration of wealth in 20 instead of five places? In fact, by 
relying upon specific metrics of success, metrics that are determined by the already successful, I 
would argue that we are simply reinforcing a binary between so-called “innovative” regions, and 
the backwards, non-innovative regions. In other words, the metropolitan areas with R1 
universities, the large educated populations, and the existing success stories become the basis for 
metrics of success, therefore reinforcing their narrative as the narrative of success. This leaves 
rural areas entirely out of the picture and feeds into economic development narratives that make it 
nearly impossible for rural communities to create future visions for themselves that aren’t dictated 
by the success of largely urban outsiders. 
 
Distress and rural extraction 
In contrast to the work of Brookings to identify and grow new centers for the innovation economy, 
EIG is working to measure the distress of local communities to identify where other interventions 
might need to take place. This measurement of distress was used by Porter (2018) to justify the 
idea that many rural areas might not be worth saving. While this is only one measurement of 
                                               
9 As of May 2020, the Endless Frontier Act was announced: “an initiative to solidify the United States’ leadership in 
scientific and technological innovation through increased investments in the discovery, creation, and 
commercialization of technology fields of the future” (“Young, Schumer Unveil Endless Frontier Act to Bolster 
U.S. Tech Leadership and Combat China”). The Act gives $10 billion to create regional tech hubs, not unlike the 
“growth centers” proposed by Brookings. 
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distress, the work of EIG to quantify who is falling behind has incredibly specific and tangible 
impact in federal government. In particular, EIG is the policy think tank who largely crafted the 
Opportunity Zone policy, which was included as part of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. 
Opportunity Zones are a “community investment tool” that “provide a tax incentive to investors 
to re-invest their unrealized capital gains” into new or growing businesses in certain state-
designated geographies (e.g., neighborhoods, cities, counties) (“Opportunity Zones”).10 In other 
words, while their measurement of distress is just one measurement, it is a measurement that has 
had a profound impact on the communities being measured. 
 
Stepping back and looking at the multiple approaches summarized above on regional intervention, 
we see how rural areas are portrayed as a source of labor for urban places (i.e., Porter’s 
perspective), as places that are seen as a space of distress in need of financial investment (i.e., EIG 
and the Opportunity Zones), and as cheaper alternatives to the big city (i.e., the view of Brookings). 
Each of these perspectives of rural places maintains a vision of rural communities focused on 
extraction. In other words, even when rural places are seen as full of opportunity, they are still 
built up as places in distress and in need of saving. 
 
Critical scholars of development economics have time and again shown how cities, regions, and 
entire countries are transformed into opportunities for intervention, to better connect them to global 
flows of capital (Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1994; Scott, 1998). As Arturo Escobar (1995) argues 
in Encountering Development, development happens once a place has been discursively realized 
and appropriately framed by the right actors as being “undeveloped.” He shows that the process of 
development and the field of development economics were largely created after World War II. 
Newly created development organizations and the countries that supported them used imposed 
discourses of hunger and malnutrition to justify global interventions in countries they deemed 
“undeveloped.” This was done in an effort to indoctrinate the “Third World” into the modern 
capitalist present and continued through the 20th century through increased financialization of 
markets, and later imposed austerity measures placed upon countries who were deemed as falling 
behind in the ambitions of global development. Similarly, rural regions have a long history in the 
“First World” of being made for purposes of economic extraction, through land management, 
                                               
10 See Chapter Five for a deeper exploration of the Opportunity Zone program. 
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natural resource exploitation, and development practices that focus on bringing them up to speed 
with the advances of urban areas, and for the benefit of urban areas and economic growth (Cloke 
and Godwin, 1992; Harvey, 2005). 
 
The UP was one of these places that once had a successful economic past, but regional leaders 
now struggled to position the region in a globalizing economy. I spent much of my life hearing 
about how great the UP used to be. I was born in the UP in 1988 and most of my family has lived 
there at some point in their lives. Growing up, I spent many summers with my grandparents 
traveling around the UP, hearing stories from family members, visiting historic sites, and learning 
about what life used to be like when all of the mines and papermills were still open. Taking the 
discourses described above to heart, many leaders in the UP see the high-tech economy as being a 
potential savior for the region. As a scholar of technology and rurality, I came into this project 
with a lens critical of techno-solutionism and what it offered peripheral regions. But, as someone 
who also wishes for the survival of the UP, the region where I was born and one that I have been 
wary of claiming as home until recently, the need for self-determination among rural communities 
has been something I struggle with in my own research. 
 
While I cannot promise a decisive conclusion to this conundrum, this dissertation is meant to be a 
peak into what happens when we take economic development as a tactic for regional future-making 
seriously. What does entrepreneurship and high-tech innovation as economic development offer 
to rural regions? Who wins and who loses? In other words, part of this project is to understand 
how economic development indeed spurs opportunities for economic growth, but also take 
seriously where it does not create those same opportunities. Following, I introduce my fieldsite 
and its history to situate the interventions I will document throughout the dissertation. 
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Figure 1.2: A map of the Upper Peninsula. Places where the author has conducted fieldwork during his graduate career are 
marked with a red star. See Figure 1.3 for a map of the specific region where the fieldwork in this dissertation was conducted. 
 
The Keweenaw Peninsula11 
 
In August of 2018, I spent a week from hell moving all of my belongings across the UP in the back 
of my Ford pick-up truck. I left a cabin in the woods outside of Manistique, a little town on the 
northern coast of Lake Michigan (farthest east star in Figure 1.2). I was moving to Hancock, a 
town in the center of the Keweenaw Peninsula where I would be conducting my dissertation 
fieldwork (the northernmost star in Figure 1.2). The week I moved was hot and muggy, uncommon 
for the UP. Through a combined lack of planning on my part and downsizing apartments, I wound 
up making the trip from Manistique to Hancock (nearly 200 miles each way) on three separate 
occasions, and two additional trips from Manistique to my boyfriend’s house in Peshtigo, 
Wisconsin (nearly 120 miles each way) to drop off excess belongings. This was not the best way 
to start my fieldwork. 
 
After spending a few weeks getting settled into my new home, I visited my grandparents on their 
property outside of Iron River (the southwest star in Figure 1.2) for a day to help my grandmother 
                                               
11 I chose not to anonymize my fieldsite, as the specific location and its economic history are incredibly important to 
understanding the phenomenon at the center of my research.  
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plant garlic and prep her garden beds for the winter. It was September in the UP, which means the 
first frost is just a few weeks away. After dinner I climbed into my truck to drive back to my new 
home. It was a very clear, late-summer night. About 90 minutes north of my grandparents’ home 
in the middle of the Ottawa National Forest, the two-lane highway veered out of the woods and 
the Keweenaw Bay of Lake Superior came into view. Driving past L’anse up the western shore of 
the Keweenaw Bay, through the tribal lands of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, I saw a 
bright structure pop up on the northwest horizon of my vision. The 25 miles of road between the 
reservation and my new home was all hills, curves, and forests. The structure kept disappearing 
and reappearing, each time getting a little larger as I drove closer and closer. While I tried to 
discern what it was, my attention was frequently diverted to the road in front of me, as late evenings 
in the UP are primetime for collisions with deer. After passing through a little town, whose street 
lamps still had signs up from the strawberry festival two months prior, the highway finally veered 
and pointed directly at the structure that I had been seeing. At this moment I realized the structure 
was somewhere near my new home. But what could be so large and lit up like that, in a place this 
remote, where I could see it from miles away? 
 
I was used to driving around the backwoods of the Upper Peninsula and seeing bright lights 
illuminating the dark night sky, seemingly from out of nowhere. Just the year before while living 
in Manistique, I spent a lot of time driving between my cabin and Marquette, a college town a few 
hours away. I had friends there, a group of younger gay people who I could relate to and who made 
fieldwork feel a little less lonely. Driving from Marquette back to my cabin, I’d pass the Alger 
Correctional Facility, a large prison whose lights were visible in the night sky from nearly five 
miles away. The lit-up structure I saw that late summer night coming back from my grandparents’ 
house wasn’t a prison though, it was a mine shaft. 
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Figure 1.3: The No. 2 Shaft-Rockhouse at the historic Quincy Mine. Picture from City of Hancock website. 
 
The No. 2 Shaft-Rockhouse (see Figure 1.3) sits on top of a large hill overlooking the 
approximately 12,500 people who call Hancock and Houghton home. It is one of the most 
prominent manmade objects in the Keweenaw Peninsula and can be seen from miles away. Built 
in the first decade of the 20th century (“Quincy Unit”), the shaft-rockhouse was the building that 
sat atop the entrance to the underground mining shaft, which carried copper up to the surface. Once 
arriving at the surface, the rock was processed in the same building, creating efficiencies that, 
according to the National Park Service, allowed three men to move approximately 1,000 tons of 
rock in a 12 hour shift at the mine. The shaft-rockhouse was abandoned after the mine closed in 
1946, but is now owned and operated by a non-profit as part of a local National Landmark Historic 
District. 
 
Copper mining in the Keweenaw Peninsula peaked in 1919. The mining industries slow dissolution 
until the 1960s resulted in massive depopulation in Houghton and Keweenaw Counties, and a 
complete stagnation in population growth throughout the UP that has lasted through today. This 
decline has made it so the UP remains very remote and retains its own distinct culture and dialect 
from the rest of the Upper Midwestern United States (Remlinger, 2017). While its economic legacy 
is primarily in mining and logging, the communities in the Keweenaw Peninsula increasingly rely 
on tourism and healthcare to shore up the economic output of the remaining logging and 
manufacturing operations in the region. Tourism initiatives, such as the statewide Pure Michigan 
campaign, and community leaders working towards developing economic opportunity have been 
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relatively successful in diversifying the economic prospects of the region. Though, a new wave of 
initiatives, starting in the late 2010s, sought to capitalize on broader shifts of global labor, 
technology, and wealth to grow the high-tech economy in the Keweenaw Peninsula. 
 
Figure 1.4: A map of the Keweenaw Peninsula. Image from Copper Country Trail website. 
 
Houghton County 
Houghton County12 is located in the western part of the UP and has a population of 36,360 people 
spread across 1500 square miles.13 The population peaked in 1910 at nearly 90,000 people and the 
small towns spread across the county reflect that, with many towns dealing with blight and failing 
infrastructure. Houghton County is home to two universities: Michigan Technological University 
(referred to as Michigan Tech, or just “Tech”), a public engineering university of ~7000 students, 
and Finlandia University, a Finnish-Lutheran liberal arts college with ~700 students. It’s largest 
employment sector, education, reflects that. Education is followed by health care and social 
assistance, accommodation and food services, retail, and manufacturing as the top five industries, 
                                               
12 Not all of Houghton County is considered part of the Keweenaw Peninsula. Some of it is located south of the 
peninsula in the interior of the UP. 
13 Population and economic sector statistics are taken from the 2018 American Community Survey unless otherwise 
noted.  
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making up 65% of employment in the county as of 2017. It is overwhelmingly white, with 94.5% 
of people identifying as white on the 2010 Census.14 
 
The largest towns and only municipalities designated as cities,15 Houghton and Hancock, are the 
economic and civic center of the county, collectively with approximately one-third of the county’s 
population. While the county’s population peaked in 1910, thanks to the influence of Michigan 
Tech, Houghton is currently at its highest population ever recorded (7,934). Similar to the county, 
Hancock’s population peaked in 1910 and is now half of what it once was (4,577). The cities sit 
directly opposite of each other on the Keweenaw Waterway, a canal that splits the Keweenaw 
Peninsula in two.16 Because of their proximity to each other, it is difficult to divorce their economic 
and community influence on each other. There are many organizations that support economic 
development and the high-tech economy located in Hancock and Houghton, though most serve the 
entire county and sometimes the region. See Table 1.1 for list of economic development 
organizations in Houghton and Keweenaw Counties.  
 
About 15 miles north are the neighboring villages of Calumet and Laurium. At its peak in 1910, 
this area had a population of nearly 35,000 people. Now Calumet is home to 748 people and 
Laurium 2,179. Calumet contains the historical commercial district of the area, with brick roads, 
storefronts, and massive sandstone cathedrals and theaters, many of which have been abandoned. 
Meanwhile, Laurium has stayed primarily residential. Through the first 12 months of my fieldwork 
(August 2018-August 2019), I maintained a residence in Hancock, renting a room from a Finlandia 
University professor. 
 
   
 
                                               
14 The overwhelming whiteness of Houghton and Keweenaw Counties is interesting because just across the southern 
border in Baraga County is the tribal reservation of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community. The racial segregation is 
likely a remnant of centuries of settler colonialism. 
15 Michigan designates their municipalities as cities, villages, or townships, which each come with different abilities 
to govern and tax. Townships remain unincorporated, whereas villages and cities are. Villages generally have a 
population of 150 to 2500 and cities generally over 2500. For more information about this, see: 
https://www.mml.org/pdf/charter_revision/chapter1.pdf 
16 The resulting island that constitutes the north half of the Keweenaw Peninsula is colloquially known as “Copper 
Island.” 
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Organization Location Service area 
MTEC SmartZone17 Cities of Houghton and 
Hancock 
Cities of Houghton and 
Hancock 
Keweenaw Economic 
Development Alliance 
City of Houghton Baraga, Houghton, and 
Keweenaw Counties 
Keweenaw Chamber of 
Commerce 
City of Houghton Houghton and Keweenaw 
Counties 
FinnZone City of Hancock Houghton and Keweenaw 
Counties 
Western UP Planning and 
Development Region 
City of Hancock Western UP 
Main Street Calumet Village of Calumet Village of Calumet, Calumet 
Township 
Keweenaw Convention and 
Visitor’s Bureau 
Calumet Township Houghton and Keweenaw 
Counties 
Keweenaw County Economic 
Development Committee 
Unincorporated Eagle River Keweenaw County 
Table 1.1: A list of the economic development organizations located in Houghton and Keweenaw Counties. 
 
Keweenaw County 
Keweenaw County is to the north of Houghton County (it’s only border that isn’t Lake Superior) 
and has a population of 2,130 people spread across 540 square miles. The population peaked in 
1910 at over 7,000 people and, similar to Houghton County, the small towns spread across the 
county reflect that, with many towns dealing with blight and a major lack of jobs. Keweenaw 
County has one incorporated village, Ahmeek (pop. 146) and three unincorporated census 
designated places: Copper Harbor CDP (pop. 71), Eagle Harbor CDP (pop. 100), and Eagle River 
CDP (pop. 84). The county is 98.5% white. 
 
Keweenaw County is incredibly remote and home to many tourist destinations and recreation 
activities. This is reflected in the dominance of the service sector in the county economy. Per the 
American Community Survey estimates of 2017, the sector that employs the most Keweenaw 
County residents is healthcare and social assistance (16% of working adults). A combination of 
retail, entertainment/recreation, and retail sectors employ over 30% of the working adults. Though, 
because nearly 2/3 of working adults commute outside of the county, those numbers are not 
                                               
17 MTEC stands for Michigan Tech Enterprise Corporation, but is not funded by or a part of the university. For the 
duration of the dissertation, I refer to it as the MTEC SmartZone, or just “The SmartZone,” because that is how it is 
referred to in my fieldsite and in their documentation and websites. 
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representative of the types of jobs that actually exist in the county.18 In fact, healthcare and social 
assistance sectors employ fewer than 20 people working in the county itself. Retail, 
accommodation, and food services are the largest employing sectors, with a combination of 138 
employees working in the county.19  
 
There is only one organization located in Keweenaw County that does economic development 
work, the Keweenaw County Economic Development Committee, but there are a handful of 
organizations in Houghton County that do ED work in Keweenaw county (see Table 1.1). While 
my primary fieldwork residence was in Hancock, I routinely went to Keweenaw County for 
interviews and meetings with local organizations. 
 
Conducting Fieldwork in the Keweenaw 
 
I joined “101 Quincy,” a coworking space in Downtown Hancock, in late September of 2018. It 
was something of a home-base for the duration of my fieldwork and was typically where I went 
every morning to “kick off” my workday (see Figure 1.5). While I would leave the space in the 
middle of the day for meetings and events, I frequently returned after to type of my fieldnotes, 
reflect on the day, and keep my eye on local news and events. Over the course of my fieldwork, 
my “coworkers,” who were largely local entrepreneurs and remote workers, also gave me a space 
to learn more about the region, talk about current events, and at times even bounce around ideas 
that were emerging from my data collection. My membership at 101 Quincy also gave me clout as 
someone interested in the growing high-tech scene in the region. I often told new people I met or 
those I was interviewing that I was a member of the space as a way to demonstrate that I was 
indeed connected to the area and could be taken seriously as an insider.  
 
101 Quincy opened up in Summer 2018, just a few months before I moved there, and quickly 
became one of the central places for start-ups and entrepreneurs in the area, hosting monthly happy 
                                               
18 As of 2017, of the 837 estimated working adults in the county, 34.4% worked in the county and 65% worked 
outside the county. 
19 It’s hard to estimate true employment numbers in these small communities because the US Economic Census, the 
body that tracks employment via sector doesn’t list numbers of employees in sectors that have very few employers. 
For example, there is only one employer in Keweenaw county that work in healthcare and social assistance. Because 
of this, the number of employees provided by the census is only a range (1-19 employees). 
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hours and kick-off events for its members new businesses. Founded by two local entrepreneurs, 
including one whose father owned the building it called home, the space soon filled up its small 
office spaces with a handful of local tech businesses and its open work spaces with local remote 
workers who had until that point mostly been working out of coffee shops and home offices.  
 
 
Figure 1.5: 101 Quincy workspace. 
 
During my fieldwork I conducted 30 formal semi-structured interviews, 28 of which were 
recorded, and hundreds of other informal conversations that became essential to understanding the 
region. My interviews were conducted primarily with municipal leaders, staff of economic 
development organizations (EDOs), local entrepreneurs, and remote workers. I conducted 
ethnographic observations at local events hosted by municipalities and EDOs, the official meetings 
of local organizations (e.g., city planning commissions), and in small, opportunistic meetings with 
individuals associated with EDOs. While in some ways much of what I was doing could be 
considered “studying up” (Nader, 1972), the people I spoke with were not hidden behind 
bureaucratic structures like they might be in urban communities and were quick to say yes to my 
requests for interviews. I contribute this accessibility in part due to my institutional affiliation at a 
well-respected university, as well as my perceived expertise on the topic as someone from said 
institution. In fact, a few months into my fieldwork I published a widely circulated editorial article 
related to rural economic development in CityLab, which was brought up on multiple occasions 
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by people who were a part of my study (Hardy 2018). I also believe that my race and gender, as a 
white man, aided in access to many parts of my fieldsite, especially since I was born in the Upper 
Peninsula and could use my familiarity with the region to my advantage during recruitment. While 
I did not ask about the identities of my participants, I believe that the vast majority were white. 
During my fieldwork, I intentionally sought out and successfully interviewed most of the women 
involved in the EDOs of Houghton and Keweenaw Counties. Yet, women still only made up about 
a third of my interviews, and only about half of those were actually staff or board members of 
EDOs. This reality, in part, exposes the very racialized and gendered nature of economic 
development, entrepreneurship, and municipal government in the Keweenaw. 
 
While interviewing people I often kept an interview outline open on my laptop which is also where 
I took notes. For observations, I carried small notebooks with me and wrote jottings (Emerson et 
al., 2011) throughout events and if any ideas popped up in my head during the day. At the end of 
a workday, I usually typed up my jottings and reflections. Starting in late 2017, nearly a year before 
I started my fieldwork, I collected policy documents associated with rural community and 
economic development in the State of Michigan. These included various gray literature produced 
by non-profits (e.g., reports on regional economies), municipal documents for planning (e.g., 5-
year plans for local cities and villages), and documentation and websites associated with regional 
and statewide initiatives (e.g., the Innovate Shore campaign). My work was also continually 
informed by reading and collecting local and regional press on businesses, municipal activity, 
development initiatives, technology, and other relevant topics.  
 
As will become clear in the chapters ahead, much of my time was spent following the organizations 
who did economic development work in the Keweenaw. This included all of the organizations 
listed in Table 1.1 (except for the Keweenaw Convention and Visitor’s Bureau), as well as city 
and county planning commissions in Houghton County. The work of economic development that 
I witnessed ranged from seemingly complex tasks such as running business incubators (i.e., the 
MTEC SmartZone) and coordinating delegations of Finnish high-tech companies visiting the 
region (i.e., the FinnZone), to the more mundane work of assisting municipalities develop planning 
documentation (i.e., the Western UP Planning and Development Region) and conducting site visits 
for local employers (i.e., the Keweenaw Economic Development Association).  
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I began my fieldwork explicitly interested in the work of economic development and the high-tech 
economy at a regional level. I was inspired by the work of Annalee Saxenian (1996) and others in 
critical computing (e.g., Chan, 2013; Irani, 2019; Lindtner, 2020) who showed me how some 
places (e.g., Silicon Valley) became known as bastions of computing, and how other, often 
peripheral places, had once been ignored but were now being celebrated as new spaces for 
technological innovation. I chose the Keweenaw as my fieldsite after a year of living in Manistique 
working on a different, though related, project. During that time, I paid close attention to news 
from across the UP about new businesses, economic development projects, and efforts to promote 
more high-tech start-ups. This is how I learned about a whole host of organizations and initiatives 
that sought to promote regional innovation through high-tech entrepreneurship in the Keweenaw. 
This included: the MTEC SmartZone, a high-tech business incubator based in Houghton-Hancock; 
the Innovation Shore initiative, a group of EDOs working with Michigan Technological University 
in Houghton to promote the region as a uniquely innovative rural place; and the FinnZone, a group 
of EDOs and local universities working to attract Finnish20 high-tech companies to the region.21 
What I witnessed, at first from afar, was a rapidly growing ecosystem of business incubators, tech 
start-ups, and EDOs in the Keweenaw Peninsula that sought to remake the region for purposes of 
high-tech entrepreneurship and innovation.  
 
Within four months of arriving in the Keweenaw, it became clear that the organizations doing 
economic development work in Houghton and Hancock embodied the normative approaches that 
I had read about in policy documents from places like the Aspen Institute and in scholarly literature 
on rural development. This research and policy advocated for tactics such as clustering approaches 
to firm development (Porter, 2000) and the promotion of unique rural assets for talent attraction 
(Mathie and Cunningham, 2003; Flora et al., 2018). While these kind of tactics seemed to be 
working successfully in Houghton and Hancock, I didn’t see many “success stories” in other parts 
of the region. Much of the recent scholarly literature in rural development, at the time, was 
beginning to advocate for regional approaches to promoting rural innovation (Dabson, 2011; Eder, 
2019; Munnich and Schrock, 2016; Naldi et al., 2015). So, after the holiday season, I partially 
                                               
20 The Keweenaw Peninsula has the highest concentration of Finnish Americans in the country. 
21 Chapter Four has more detail and describes the work of these organizations and initiatives.  
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shifted my focus to center organizations who were doing work in the more peripheral areas of the 
region, those that I hadn’t seen many success stories coming out of.  
 
I chose two of these organizations to embed myself in: Main Street Calumet (MSC), based in the 
Village of Calumet in Houghton County; and the Keweenaw County Economic Development 
Committee (the EDC), based in the unincorporated community of Eagle River, but whose members 
lived throughout the County. I attended their meetings, I interviewed board members and staff (in 
the case of Main Street Calumet), and volunteered my labor when asked. Given my background 
researching and working for social media companies, I became involved in the strategic 
communication work of both organizations. In MSC, I worked with their Communications 
Committee to brainstorm and create a branding guide for their organization as they sought to 
increase their online presence to attract remote workers and families to their area. At the EDC, I 
led a workshop with some of their board members to revamp their website copy and strategize 
about what their communication needs were. In both cases, this allowed me added insight into the 
organizations, their goals, and their plans for achieving said goals. 
 
I think of my ethnographic practice as being a mix of approaches from multi-sited ethnography 
(Marcus, 1995) and the anthropology of policy (Shore and Wright, 1997). As Marcus explains in 
his now widely adopted approach (1995), “following” the phenomenon at the center of your 
ethnography is key to understanding its context in the world. While I remained somewhat bounded 
to the region at the center of my dissertation, I followed economic developers and other leaders 
through many meetings, organizations, and policy documents. Whenever possible, I followed their 
ideas and their policies to the state level and beyond. This allowed me to better understand the 
relationships between organizations, their ideas, and their day-to-day work. I also adopted an 
approach of “studying through,” explained by Shore and Wright in the introduction to their edited 
volume, Anthropology of Policy: “tracing ways in which power creates webs and relations between 
actors, institutions and discourses across time and space” (1997, p. 14). Rather than conceiving of 
myself purely as “studying up” due to my focus largely on community leaders, I chose to think of 
my project as one that sought to understand who had what power, and in what situations that power 
(or lack thereof) allowed individuals and organizations to shape economic development and 
policy-building practices. 
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In this dissertation, I focus on where my phenomenon took me as an ethnographer, but it’s also 
helpful to note where it did not take me. In particular, the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community 
(KBIC), a nearby tribal reservation and government belonging to the Lake Superior Band of 
Chippewa Indians22, was absent from the majority of economic development activities in the 
Keweenaw Peninsula. Their absence was notable, particularly because of the tribe’s importance in 
fighting for sustainable energy solutions and watershed protection from pollution throughout the 
region, topics that were important to many economic developers due to the recent flooding and 
skyrocketing electrical utility prices. Though, their absence was not surprising due to the legacy 
of settler colonialism in the United States, and in Michigan in particular. While Michigan has many 
tribal reservations spread throughout the state, during my research, I never saw any collaboration 
between the state and tribal governments on topics related to economic development. In fact, the 
legacy of economic development in Michigan, especially in its logging and mining era, is deeply 
embedded in the theft of land from the Anishinaabeg. As Theodore Karamanski writes in “Settler 
Colonial Strategies and Indigenous Resistance on the Great Lakes Lumber Frontier” (2016): 
“The pine logging frontier was a white-capped wave that washed over the northern Great 
Lakes region in little more than a generation. When it had crested, European American 
settlement to some extent receded, leaving ghost towns and shrunken, economically 
challenged communities in its wake. The Anishinaabeg remained” (p. 46). 
In other words, the waves of settler colonialism that created the conditions for depopulation that 
led to the widespread demands of economic development today, continue to perpetuate the 
exclusion of Indigenous communities in determining what economic futures for the region could 
look like.  
 
As an ethnographer, participant observation and my role as the interpreter of my fieldsite was the 
primary way through which I made sense of economic development at a regional scale. To reflect 
on my own interpretations, and bring them together over time, I frequently turned to in-process 
memoing to guide my data collection. I think of memoing as an explicitly analytical process. As 
Emerson et al. (2011) describe: “while writing detailed, descriptive fieldnotes, ethnographers 
simultaneously begin to pen brief, analytically focused writings to—asides and commentaries—to 
                                               
22 The Lake Superior Band of Chippewa Indians are a part of the Ojibwe (or Anishinaabe). The L’anse Reservation, 
home to KBIC, is the oldest reservation in the State of Michigan. 
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identify and explore initial theoretical directions and possibilities” (p. 123). These memos allowed 
me to step away from my fieldwork for a short while, usually for a few hours, to generate some 
initial analytical insights. I used the resulting memos to feed back into my interviews and 
observations in order to focus and guide continued data collection (Emerson et al., 2011).  
 
Towards the end of data collection, and especially once I had left my fieldsite, I utilized concept 
mapping and qualitative coding to guide my continued analysis and writing. Concept maps are a 
key aspect of situational analysis in grounded theory (Clarke and Friese, 2017). These included: 
1) situational maps, “which lay out the major human, nonhuman, discursive, and other elements 
in the research situation of concern and provoke analyses of relations among them;” 2) social 
worlds maps, “which lay out the collective actors, key nonhuman elements, and the arenas of 
commitment within which they are engaged in ongoing negotiations;” and 3) positional maps, 
“which lay out the major positions taken and not taken...around issues found in the situation of 
inquiry” (Clark and Friese, 2017, p. 366). These concept maps (see Figure 1.6 for an example) 
helped me make sense of the various key actors and their positions in my fieldwork. With the 
themes that emerged from my memos and concept maps, I performed first-cycle open coding 
(Saldaña, 2009) using both a deductive and inductive approach. I was both searching for quotes 
from my interviews that could speak to the themes that were emerging from my data, and unearth 
new themes that hadn’t come forth in my memoing or mapping processes. 
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Figure 1.6: An example of a concept map. In September 2019, I painted one wall of my office with white board paint to better 
facilitate large concept mapping sessions. Photo by author. 
 
Before, during, and after my dissertation fieldwork, I frequently struggled with my insider/outsider 
status. In fact, this struggle has been happening since I began my graduate research in 2014. I was 
born in the UP, my family is from the UP, and I grew up spending a lot of time in the UP, but I did 
not actually live there full-time until 2017. My background gave me something of an insider status, 
which I took advantage of in my fieldwork as I operated under the assumption that people would 
be more candid with me if they knew that I was familiar with the region, rather than just an outsider 
from Ann Arbor. I further unpack how this entered into my own research practice in Chapter Four 
during my discussion of Yoopers.23  
 
I frequently learned about other people’s connections to the UP as well. If it didn’t emerge 
naturally in my interviews, which it did a majority of the time, I often asked where people grew 
up and why they decided to live in the Keweenaw. In what follows, I share an interview with 
                                               
23 Yooper is the demonym of people who live in the Upper Peninsula. 
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someone whose ties to the region had similarly fluctuated, had returned recently, and had brought 
with them a very unique outlook on what regional transformation looked like in the Keweenaw.  
 
Social Contracts and the Promises of Development 
 
By December of 2018, I was in my fifth month of fieldwork and beginning to feel data saturation 
approaching rapidly. I had already interviewed most of the staff from the EDOs in Houghton and 
Hancock and been working at the coworking space for three months. My interviews and 
observations were leading me into an already well-tread direction of research that looked at 
successful adoption of normative approaches to innovation in rural communities (Dabson, 2011; 
Eder, 2019; Munnich and Schrock, 2016; Naldi et al., 2015). But where were those organizations 
and communities that struggled with adopting these approaches? 
 
A couple of people recommended that I reach out to Tim, a recently retired United States diplomat, 
who had moved back to his childhood home in Keweenaw County the previous year.24 Tim had 
been working with some local business owners and regional EDOs to get Keweenaw County’s 
Economic Development Committee (EDC) going again. The EDC was put on hold a few year’s 
prior when the County went non-performing25 on federal loans they had gotten to update the 
Keweenaw Mountain Lodge, a historic county-owned lodge that was built as a public works 
project during the New Deal. While under non-performing status, the necessary matching funds to 
secure grants and loans for economic development purposes would be impossible to get, so the 
EDC had disbanded. Then in July 2018, the Lodge went up for auction and was purchased by a 
private developer from Texas. This purchase allowed for the county to pay off their loans and their 
non-performing status was waived. Shortly after the auction, the EDC started up again. 
 
I emailed Tim for an interview and he obliged, meeting me on a December weekday afternoon in 
the conference room of 101 Quincy. Within the first few minutes of the interview, he began talking 
about how his experience as a diplomat facilitating economic development relationships with other 
countries around the world influenced the way he viewed the Keweenaw. He framed his work as 
                                               
24 All individual’s names used are pseudonyms. 
25 To go non-performing means that the County defaulted, or was unable to pay their loan back.  
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a diplomat within the context of the Washington Consensus, a neoliberal response to developing 
countries whose economies were in crisis that was adopted by the United States and other 
international actors (e.g., the International Monetary Fund). Tim believed that through the 
Washington Consensus, the United States had spent so much time worrying about developing the 
rest of the world so that America could gain market dominance, yet the gains and benefits that 
were realized from this process were not seen by most rural communities in America. As Tim put 
it, “This area was left progressively further behind as the world goes into this age of globalization 
and large parts of America are prospering.” In the Keweenaw, he saw the declining quality of 
education, rising electricity costs, a dysfunctional airport (“worse than Mogadishu”), and growing 
effects of climate change all pointing to a society and federal government that had effectively 
abandoned any chance of progress in rural regions like his.  
 
One major change that had a cascading effect throughout the region, Tim argued, was the 
decreased access to private land in the county. 
“[The EDC] is going to challenge [rural areas being left behind] and we're going to work 
on those issues and see if we can make impact on. An example of one that's specific to my 
County is that it has almost more land that's privately owned than any other County in the 
state. If you take Isle Royale out of the equation, then you know, nobody comes close to 
us. And Isle Royale really isn't, you know what I mean? It's a national park, it's not really 
the County. But the residents who live in, occupy the County, you know, everything's 
private. Now that worked when the, when the C&H Mining Company was there, you know, 
Calumet and Hecla Mining Company, because there was a social contract that wasn't 
written, but you know, everybody bought into.  
 
“C&H would give you a good job for those who want a job. You could rate a good job in 
the sense that you could raise your family on what you were paid. Your children would 
have a chance for a better life than you, you know. My grandfather worked 30 years in the 
mines. He was able to, you know, raise his family, get all of his kids through college and 
you know, pay off his home and have a, have a long retirement, you know, a 20 plus year 
retirement. That was a very satisfying end of his life when he got to connect to all of his 
family and you know, they would also allow people open access to the land. Anyone who 
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wanted to go out and have a camp could have one. At Lac La Belle, my family got one 
when C&H opened up for leases and it was $50 for a year for a 50 year lease. 
 
“You know, you couldn't beat that. And where are you going to get prime, you know, 
waterfront land like that? So, you know, it worked, but C&H has gone. And now you have 
a hedge fund that owns the land that's in Boston that cares nothing about the community, 
knows nothing about the community, doesn't want to know anything about the community, 
doesn't want the community to know anything about it. You try and Google it and look it 
up, there's nothing out there! There's no website that says, ‘This is our corporate ethos, 
we're corporate citizens.’ There's none of that. You know, there's somebody who is 
answering to a bunch of institutional investors who are looking at bottom lines and that's 
what they care about. They’re taking all the value of the land, and they're, you know, not 
worried about access to the land.”26 
 
For Tim, and for many others in rural communities, access to wild, remote, or undeveloped land 
is one of the most important things about living in a rural place. In the case of Keweenaw County, 
the ability to access to private land underwent drastic transformations in Tim’s lifetime. The ability 
to recreate, in particular, was key to living the good life that was so important to the lifestyles that 
made the region an attractive place, and attracted outdoor-oriented professionals. While public 
land, particularly public parks and government-owned forest land, are likely on the forefronts of 
most people’s minds when they think about natural recreation in rural places, private land played 
this role in the Keweenaw. Because of the early privatization of land by large mining and timber 
operations in the late 19th century, most private land to this day was held solely by one proprietor. 
Tim told me about the social contracts that were built up between the early mining companies and 
their employees and neighbors. Access to land for hunting, fishing, and recreating has always been 
important in that region. Because of this, and to ensure the happiness of their employees, 
companies allowed for those types of activities on their lands, and even leased their land to 
employees so they could build cottages, like Tim’s grandfather. 
                                               
26 Quotes from interviews and observations are edited for clarity (e.g., removal of “um,” stutters). I’ll call attention 
to the excessive use of “you know” throughout many quotes. For more information about UP dialect and English/es, 
see Kathryn Remlinger’s Yooper Talk (2017). For a humorous account of Upper Midwestern English, see the 
YouTube video, “Midwest Voice Translator” by comedian Charlie Berens. 
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This way of life, Tim argued, was threatened with the collapse of mining in Keweenaw County 
and the dissolution and purchase of C&H assets by Universal Oil Company (now Honeywell) in 
the late 1960s. The Calumet & Hecla Mining Company had amassed landholdings all over the 
Keweenaw Peninsula in the early 20th century, mostly through buying out smaller mining 
companies. Universal Oil ran up against militant labor unions in the mines they had purchased and 
ultimately closed the mines shortly after buying C&H.27 Since then, the land associated with the 
mines has transferred hands from one far-away corporate entity to the next. Now, massive swaths 
of private land in Keweenaw County are held, and logged, by The Rohatyn Group (TRG), a 
multinational private equity firm. Even though TRG contracts the management and timber 
operations on the land with local companies, Tim and others didn’t see a true connection to the 
community and the land like that which had existed with C&H. There were no longer social 
contracts between a local company and its employees and neighbors. Instead, there were 
anonymous global investors making money off of the land, facilitated by “a hedge fund...that cares 
nothing about the community.”  
 
The transformation of public-private relationships that facilitated land access was just one issue of 
many for Tim related to his home region. As described above, he felt like the Keweenaw had been 
left behind by the federal government. This was compounded by the municipal budget crisis that 
I heard about many times during my fieldwork. The State of Michigan had drastically cut its 
revenue sharing with municipalities during the 2000s (Michigan Municipal League). Revenue 
sharing was the primary way that taxes were funneled back to communities by the state to pay for 
core government services. This placed a disproportionate demand on local municipal budgets, 
already strained due to depopulation, and municipal leaders, who were largely volunteers, to make 
up the difference. Without the right kind of funding and right kind of leadership, Tim and his 
fellow EDC members faced an uphill battle to bring about the regional transformation that seemed 
necessary to save the region. 
 
Regional Transformation 
 
                                               
27 This historical information was gleamed largely from the online finding aid of the “Calumet and Hecla Mining 
Companies Collection” at the Michigan Tech Archives. The finding aid alone is 480 pages.  
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The efforts to transform a region, to bring it “up to date,” to create economic opportunity, are at 
the center of this dissertation. This is not a new phenomenon. Others have studied it in rural 
communities from many different perspectives. For example, sociologist Anthony Winson and 
anthropologist Belinda Leach documented the impact of globalization on rural Canadian 
communities and small cities in the 1990s (2002). Rural sociologists John Allen and Don Dillman 
wrote about the impact (or lack thereof) of the “Information Age” on a rural town in Washington 
State in the 1980s (1994). Others have looked at rural transformation from the perspective of 
environmental shifts (Ashwood, 2018; Sherman, 2009) and technology introduction (Kline, 2000) 
as well. But it is processes of regional transformation that are at the intersection of rural geography, 
culture, and place-based innovation in the 21st century that are my focus.  
 
I situate my understanding of my phenomenon and fieldwork within the continued economic 
changes occurring as a result of neoliberalization and the information economy (Harvey, 2005). 
The decline of manufacturing in Midwestern American cities in the latter half of the 20th century 
signaled a transition from Fordism and the “mass society” to neoliberalism and the “information 
society” (Neumann, 2016). This also signaled an overall shift more broadly in what are called 
“productivist” sectors, those economic sectors that largely focus on the production of physical 
goods (e.g., manufacturing, agriculture). Waves of deregulation, privatization of public goods, and 
the decline of Keynesian welfare policies lead to increased forms of financial speculation, shifts 
in supply chains away from the local, and increasing globalization of market capitalism (Harvey, 
2005). 
 
These same economic changes also affected rural communities in the United States and Western 
European countries, as the supply chain of natural resources and agricultural goods globalized 
(Cloke and Godwin, 1992; Lowe et al., 1993). With these changes came a sorts of identity crisis 
for rural sociologists and development scholars, who had until the 1980s largely relied on the 
primacy of agriculture, natural resource extraction, and manufacturing as the economic indicators 
of rural communities (Cloke and Godwin, 1992; Halfacree, 1993). At the same time, economists 
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and development scholars were beginning to advocate for place-based innovation28 strategies that 
focused on regional development and the promotion of clusters around specialized industries 
(Porter, 2000; Munnich and Schrock, 2016). 
 
In rural regions of developed countries, many communities turned to amenity-based tourism and 
other industries that relied on nature and local culture to respond to their new economic realities. 
The adoption of amenity-based regional economies has since been widely advocated for as a tool 
to promote population growth and rural resiliency (Ulrich-Schad and Duncan, 2018). Rural 
development scholars and professionals saw these changes and a wave of theorization about the 
role of local amenities and unique regional assets began to emerge in the mid-1990s (Flora et al., 
2018; Jóhannesson et al., 2003; Slee, 2005). In other words, new rural economies based on unique 
rural assets emerged at the same time that theories of place-based innovation emerged, largely as 
a result of the upending of global markets and financialization of global capitalism that happened 
in processes of neoliberalization (Harvey, 2005).   
 
This brings us to where we are today, when the creation of regional high-tech economies as a new 
source for successful development are being promoted for regions all over the world, including 
rural America and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. The newest wave of scholarship and policy 
that advocates for rural transformation focuses on the opportunities in the high-tech economy and 
the unique perspectives that rural places can bring to the table (e.g., Aspen Institute, 2019; 
Gallardo, 2018; Muro, 2020). It is this regional transformation that seeks to upend the rural deficit 
that I began this chapter with, to remake rural regions so that they can more readily serve the needs 
of capitalism and economic growth through resource extraction. 
 
Dissertation Outline  
 
In the chapters that follow, I document the many ways that organizations, municipalities, and 
individuals sought to transform the Keweenaw Peninsula, to modernize its economic opportunities.  
 
                                               
28 Place-based innovation strategies (e.g., policies promoting high-tech clustering) emerged in America out of place-
based economic theories of the 1990s, such as the work of Michael Porter on regional competitiveness (Johnson, 
2007). 
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Chapter Two: Rural Transformation, Development, and Innovation is my literature review chapter. 
The chapter serves the primary purpose of situating the phenomenon at the center of my 
ethnographic fieldwork. In the chapter, I look to scholarly literature from the fields of rural studies 
and geography to understand how the rural is represented through social and economic means, and 
how scholars’ understanding of rurality was transformed through the economic shifts of neoliberal 
capitalism and globalization that accelerated at various points in the second half of the 20th century. 
I bring this into conversation with literature from economic development on place-based economic 
development theories that were advanced in rural communities starting in the 1990s. I frame this 
using literature from science and technology studies on economization and financialization, 
situating neoliberal processes that seek to transform people and land to better serve capitalism. 
Lastly, I bring together literature from critical computing, regional studies, geography, and 
sociology to understand how innovation and entrepreneurship have become so central to economic 
development practices in and out of rural communities. 
 
Chapter Three: Codifying Rural Readiness is my first of three data chapters. I look to new 
economic development tactics being adopted by EDOs in my fieldsite, and throughout the State of 
Michigan, to make rural communities more accessible to outside investment. In particular, I 
describe programs that seek to digitize rural assets through mapping initiatives and widely 
accessible data dashboards. I argue that this process works to identify the “right” and “wrong” 
kinds of rural places, in the process reshaping and repackaging rurality and rural communities 
through the “right” kind of rural data to attract outside investment. I call this process codifying 
rural readiness, and I show how new technological tools that are supposed to democratize access 
to development opportunities are actively part of the process to reshape rural communities so that 
they can better serve processes of economization and financialization. 
 
Chapter Four: Crafting the Rural Entrepreneur tackles the role of regional rural culture in talent 
attraction. I follow the work of three EDOs working in the Keweenaw to promote and expand 
high-tech entrepreneurship and innovation throughout the region. I show how these organizations 
go through the process of identifying and extracting unique cultural forms from the region as 
cultural assets, transforming them into a type of rural capital that can be leveraged by anyone, 
whether they are from the region or not. This rural capital is marketed to find and attract the “right” 
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kinds of entrepreneurs and innovators to the region who can provide the “right” kind of 
interventions so that the region can ensure economic growth in high-tech economic sectors. I call 
this process crafting the rural entrepreneur, and through this chapter I show how it has become a 
key tactic for growing entrepreneurship in the Keweenaw. 
 
Chapter Five: Zoning Rural Exceptionalism explores how uneven development happens within a 
region despite the adoption of policies and practices that are supposed to help entire rural regions. 
I unpack examples from my fieldwork to demonstrate how technological opportunity remains 
concentrated in the same communities that are reaping benefits for development. Drawing on the 
work of Aihwa Ong and other scholars of globalization and neoliberalism, I call this zoning rural 
exceptionalism, wherein rural communities are able to leverage economic development policy and 
the corresponding opportunities to differentiate themselves as a rural player in the new innovation 
economy. 
 
Chapter Six: Economization and a “Turn to Assets” in Rural Economic Development serves as 
both the “Discussion” and “Conclusion” of this dissertation. I use it as an opportunity to reflect on 
how regional rural transformation happens and how we can use the framework of economization 
to better understand how this happens in my fieldsite. I unpack a historical moment that I call “the 
turn to assets” in rural development and how this turn has led from the commodification of culture 
and nature through amenity-based tourism to the demands that rural communities focus on new 
intangible assets in the form of innovation and entrepreneurship. I question what “innovation” 
even means when it is demanded of everyone, everywhere, and reflect on what it means for me to 
simultaneously critique and intervene in regional approaches to rural economic development. 
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Chapter Two: Rural Transformation, Development, and Innovation 
 
 
 
“We know there’s a lot of power in the UP, how do we harness it?” 
 
On a cold Wednesday morning in April of 2019, I attended the monthly breakfast of a Houghton-
based economic development organization, held in the Finnish American Heritage Center in 
downtown Hancock. Entering the building, I hung up my winter jacket in the entryway, walked 
through a student art exhibit for the local liberal arts university, and into the Community Hall just 
as breakfast was being served. Grabbing a breakfast pasty,1 I said good morning to a handful of 
familiar faces before sitting at a table towards the edge of the room. The featured speaker for the 
meeting was the Executive Director of a new UP-wide “private sector-led” economic development 
organization. The Director had until recently been the chief of staff for a State Senator from the 
UP and opened his presentation with a description of his typical commute when he worked in 
Lansing, the state capital: slow traffic, expensive parking, and panhandlers asking him for money 
every morning. He immediately pivoted into a series of slides with statistics on the UP, including 
its declining and graying population, stuff everyone in the room (i.e., local business and civic 
leaders) already knew. This was his way of painting the picture of the big, systemic problems that 
the UP faced as a whole. He argued that not only were we, meaning everyone in the room, in a 
position to fix this, but that we were also uniquely situated to provide something that other regions 
cannot: “We know there’s a lot of power in the UP, how do we harness it?” 
 
                                               
1 A pasty is baked hand pie that is a well-known regional food of the UP, though it originates from Cornwall, 
England. Popular legend tells they were first introduced to the UP from Cornish miners who came over to work in 
the iron and copper mines of the UP. 
 33 
His solution? The unique “relational and geographical assets” of the region. In describing 
“relational assets,” he said that we as Yoopers2 had unique relationships with each other and that 
there were region-wide organizational connections that everyone in the room brought to the table. 
He said, “A lot of times we think of our geography as a deficit, but in this case, it’s an asset.” He 
went on to describe how the remoteness of the UP was an asset with respect to cybersecurity and 
other technological capabilities. After speaking for a while, highlighting the work of different 
companies and organizations across the UP that embodied these assets, he closed by returning to 
his commute into the event that morning. He said he didn’t have to battle traffic, pay for parking, 
or deal with panhandlers; in other words, the UP didn’t have the same inconveniences and 
problems as urban areas. He argued that we needed to use that contrast to our advantage to 
transform the region by leveraging our unique assets.  
 
This vignette reflects multiple topics that form the foci of this literature review chapter: (1) an 
effort to delineate and make sense of differences between the urban and rural; (2) a shift in 
economic development policy and practice since the 1990s that has pushed rural communities’ to 
think about their assets rather than their deficits; and (3) a regional approach to economic and civic 
transformation that seeks to reframe rural places as attractive alternatives to the big city. 
 
It is this transformation that lies at the center of this dissertation. I am concerned with rural 
economic development, and how entrepreneurship and innovation, associated largely with the 
contemporary high-tech economy, get taken up to create new opportunities and promises for 
economic growth and prosperity in communities that often lack both.  
 
This chapter situates the phenomenon at the center of my ethnographic fieldwork. In this literature 
review, I call upon academic and policy literature to shape my analytical framework, to offer up 
language and concepts that aid in my analysis and help me give context to the words of my 
interlocutors and the content of my fieldnotes. I first turn to literature from the fields of rural studies 
and geography to demonstrate how the rural is represented through social and economic means, 
and how scholars’ understanding of rurality was transformed through the economic and cultural 
                                               
2 Yooper is the demonym of those who are from and/or live in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. See Chapter Four 
for a more thorough examination of the Yooper. 
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shifts inherent in the expansion of neoliberal capitalism and globalization in the second half of the 
20th century. I then review literature on the place-based economic development theories that were 
advanced as a panacea for rural communities starting in the 1990s; these emerged in response to 
the impact of the aforementioned socio-economic transformations on rural parts of Western 
countries. I then use literature from science and technology studies on economization and 
financialization to situate these responses in the neoliberal processes that seek to transform people 
and land to better serve global capital accumulation. Lastly, I bring together literature from critical 
computing, regional studies, geography, and sociology to trace how innovation and 
entrepreneurship have become central to economic development practices both inside and outside 
of rural communities. 
 
Social and Economic Representations of the Rural and Rural Change 
 
There is something desperately thin about basing an academic endeavor on low population 
density. 
Michael Bell, “The two-ness of rural life and the ends of rural scholarship.” 
 
One goal of this dissertation is to illuminate how representations of the rural, and rurality itself, 
get taken up in processes of economic development, high-tech innovation, and marketing regions 
for purposes of economic growth. The word “rural” is simultaneously a geographic and cultural 
marker that is imbued with social, economic, and political meaning. As a marker, it is applied to 
both very specific places and vast geographies, depending on the viewpoint adopted in a given 
context. It contains meaning for both the people who live in places deemed rural, and for those 
who imagine what rural places are from other places. This results in an ambiguity of meaning that 
must be both wrangled and embraced to make sense, later on, of my own interpretations of my 
fieldwork data. To address this ambiguity, I first turn to the work of rural sociologist Michael Bell 
and his concept of the “rural plural” to outline what is possible when the boundaries of rurality are 
dismantled to give us a sense of the many different ways it exists. Following this, I hone in on 
economic understandings of rurality. In particular, I show here how massive global economic shifts 
of the late 20th century transformed how scholars conceptualized rurality.  
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It is absolutely necessary to have a cognizant and operationalized view of rurality because of the 
how “rural” itself is often framed, with intent or not. In literature and popular culture, the rural is 
constructed through discourses of deficits and opportunities, interventions and extraction. I choose 
“plural” and explicitly economic understandings of the rural to aid my analysis in this dissertation. 
 
The “rural plural” 
In the summer of 2019, I joined a group of economic developers to imagine what state support for 
rural Michigan could look like in the future.3 In the eyes of these developers, the existing Michigan 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (MDARD) was merely paying lip service to 
the “Rural Development” part of its name. The group came together around the idea of lobbying 
for a new state department and position in the Governor’s cabinet. We4 believed that this 
department could unite rural communities across the state and aid in the sharing of resources. We 
thought this unity would also make rural Michigan collectively more visible to urban and suburban 
officials in Lansing, Detroit, and Grand Rapids as valuable contributors to Michigan’s overall 
success.5 I wrote the policy memo that served as the guiding document for this new initiative. This 
memo highlighted the various challenges facing rural Michigan (e.g., population loss, declining 
municipal funding from the state, crumbling transportation infrastructure) and proposed a new 
Michigan Department of Rural Affairs and Development, and a variety of new “opportunities” that 
this theoretical department could undertake as its work. For the sake of continuity, we chose to 
continue using the county-level classification that was created by MDARD as part of the Michigan 
Rural Development Fund Act, which allocated development support to 59 counties in Michigan 
                                               
3 This group was formed because of a conversation that I had with the economic developer from the vignette that 
opened this chapter. I approached him after his presentation and introduced myself, asking to meet with him. He 
called me a few days later and we had a lengthy conversation about rural economic development opportunities. 
During our conversation, I mentioned new government entities being formed in Indiana and Kansas to promote rural 
development. Inspired by our conversation and the idea of doing this in the State of Michigan, he brought together 
this group. It initially included the two of us, an economic developer from Marquette who represented the interests 
of that area, and an economic developer from Traverse City who represented the interests of counties in Northern 
Michigan. 
4 I intentionally use “we” here because I was largely responsible for crafting the narrative of the group. 
5 By framing rural communities through their “value” to the broader economic success of Michigan, we played into 
capitalist notions that places and people must have “value” in order to be considered worth of state intervention and 
resources. My collaborators were largely economic developers on board with this ideology and discourse. 
Throughout my work, I have had to grapple with my own entanglements that perpetuate narratives of value and 
economic success, often at-odds with my own intellectual project.  
 36 
that were deemed rural. These 59 counties would then become the places served by this new 
department. 
 
Shortly after the initiative was announced at an economic development conference in the UP later 
that summer, members of our group were approached by municipal leaders who wanted to be 
included in the group’s efforts. They were from counties that were classified as urban by the state, 
yet whose municipalities were largely agricultural in nature and mostly on the periphery of small 
cities (e.g., Saginaw, Flint), and that had experienced industrial collapse in the latter half of the 
20th century. These local officials saw their communities as rural and facing many of the challenges 
that we outlined in our document. But, by using the state’s existing framework,6 we had excluded 
them from our efforts to propose a state organization that could potentially benefit communities 
like theirs. When my colleagues told me about the concerns of these municipal leaders, I realized 
that we had fallen into the same trap that Michael Bell critiques in the quote that opens this section. 
We had adopted a state-sanctioned definition of rurality that relied upon population density, and 
in doing so had excluded communities that saw themselves as rural, but that the state did not 
recognize as such. 
 
The quote from Michael Bell comes out of his own work theorizing the different ways that scholars 
have defined rurality. He posits a distinction between “first” and “second” rural to make sense of 
the many definitions and the work they do. The first rural is that which is measurable, mappable, 
has boundaries, and is always held in contrast with the urban. The second rural is boundless and 
discursive, inhabiting places of consumption and experience not necessarily always associated 
with a specific rural place. In his words: 
“By first rural, I mean the rural everyone knows as rural, and that we typically regard as 
prior: the epistemology of rural as space, as lower population density, as (at times) primary 
production, as nature, as the non-urban which is so plain to see—the material moment of 
the rural. By second rural, then, I mean the rural we often have trouble knowing, and that 
we typically regard as a secondness, even when we do know it: the epistemology of rural 
                                               
6 MDARD restricted rural development funds to either counties with populations lower than 60,000 or micropolitan 
statistical areas. MDARD is not transparent in their documentation with respect to why these specific numbers are 
chosen. 
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as place, as unconfined to lower population density space, as (at times) consumption, as 
socionature, as meanings which we may never unambiguously see—the ideal moment (in 
the philosophical, not the evaluative, sense) of the rural” (Bell, 2007, p. 408). 
It is this material or first interpretation of the rural, or what Bell later calls the “mater-real,” that 
has substantive consequences. The first rural makes its appearance in the MDARD categorization, 
upon which our group sought to build. In our case, there was an in-group and an out-group based 
on this categorization. Governance, and the funding that governance provided, required a 
boundary. It is the inability or unwillingness to transcend boundaries that separates the first from 
the second rural. Though Bell argues that a focus entirely on the second rural results in a complete 
abstraction of rurality, “politics with no polity, no category to advance or defend” (p. 411). 
 
What Bell arrives at as an analytical middle ground that allows for both perspectives to take hold 
is what he calls the rural plural, “a conception of rural that equally embraces the epistemology 
and ontology of both first and second rural, and as well sees them both as moments in a plural 
dialog, spinning out in time into other rurals—rurals without number or priority—ad infinitum” 
(p. 413). The concept of the rural plural is an arrival at the recognition that both first and second 
definitions of rural are necessary in order for scholars to understand all of the powers and 
possibilities of rurality, within and outside the boundaries that we would normally draw as rural. 
By both acknowledging and breaking down boundaries, following rural and its many relationships 
with power, we can see, like we have done with concepts such as class, gender, and race, that the 
rural is everywhere. I adopt Bell’s approach in my own understanding of rurality. I find that this 
analytic is a good middle place between the social construction of rurality and the material 
consequences of rurality. I believe that we need both to understand the complex production of 
rurality that happens in economic development policy and practice. 
 
Economy and rurality 
There has been much written about the place of rural economies in representations of the rural. As 
Bell argues, economic representations of the rural are a first rural understanding of rurality and 
have broadly relied on the rural’s relationship to agriculture and natural resource extraction as a 
primary means of definition. I now turn to economic understandings of rurality primarily because 
my work engages directly with economic development, but also because rural studies has largely 
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sought to conceptualize rurality within relationships to land, labor, economies, and communities. 
In particular, I show here how massive global economic shifts of the late 20th century transformed 
how scholars conceptualized what it means to be rural. These perspectives are important for me to 
be able to, later on in the dissertation, speculate on what rural means now, in the shadow of the 
high-tech economy. 
 
The decline of manufacturing in American cities in the latter half of the 20th century signaled a 
transition from Fordism and the “mass society” to neoliberalism and the “information society.” 
Fordism took the form of mass production tied to mass consumption, wherein goods were 
produced in high regularity and quantity. This was tied to higher wages in productivist sectors such 
as manufacturing, such that the typical family could afford what they produced (Harvey, 2005). 
Waves of deregulation, privatization, and the decline of Keynesian welfare policies led to 
increased financial speculation, new forms of speculative investment, shifts in supply chains, and 
increasing globalization of market capitalism (Harvey, 2005).  
 
Significant economic changes also occurred at the same time in rural communities (Cloke and 
Godwin, 1992). Until the 1980s, scholars in rural and community sociology in the United States 
and United Kingdom, from which the majority of rural scholarship has emerged, largely saw rural 
areas as being defined and embodied by their agricultural capacity (Cloke and Godwin, 1992). 
Rural areas were seen through a productivist lens, in that they, as a category, were a product of 
their own products. They were defined by what they provided economically: food and other natural 
resources (Lowe et al., 1993). The economic upheavals of the 1970s and 1980s brought 
classifications of rurality into question for many in rural studies, whose view of the primacy of 
agriculture in defining rural society was challenged (Cloke and Godwin, 1992).  
 
Alongside this questioning of the primacy of agriculture was a questioning of rurality as being 
solely defined as its locality (Halfacree, 1993). Rural sociologist Keith Halfacree’s influential 
article on shifting definitions of rurality argued that prior to the post-modern turn in the social 
sciences, scholars largely defined rural using descriptive (e.g., population density, agricultural) 
and sociocultural (e.g., values, behavior) characteristics that, they argued, separated the urban from 
the rural. In other words, the rural was different because it categorically had fewer people, different 
 39 
occupations, and different belief systems compared to the urban. Citing others who critiqued this 
distinct separation as not being wholly true in all “rural” places (e.g., Newby, 1986), and those 
who argued for a type of urban-rural continuum that more readily reflected the changes happening 
in rural communities in mass society (e.g., Pahl, 1966), Halfacree argued that there was a different 
way to think of conceptualizing rurality: through social representation. The inability to reach a 
conclusion on a totalizing definition of rural was “neither desirable nor feasible,” and in turning to 
understanding the rural as it represents space, we can then understand how the “space becomes 
imbued with the characteristics of these representations, not only at an imaginative level but also 
physically, through the use of these representations in action” (Halfacree, 1993 p. 34). In other 
words, by turning to how people represent rural in their own language and discourse, scholars can 
understand the solidification of the concept of the rural through social representation. Then, 
researchers can take those representations and reapply them onto physical space to understand how 
it embodies the rural.  
 
This approach to understanding rurality was the precursor to the interpretations of Michael Bell, 
summarized above. Bringing together these shifting definitions with the shift in the economic and 
productivist framing of rural places, how do we conceptualize the economic changes that inspired 
these conversations to begin with? And how do those economic changes continue today, as is 
evident in the implementation of new forms of innovation and entrepreneurship as part of a 
growing high-tech economy? 
 
Rural studies scholars Cloke and Godwin (1992) argue that because rural studies scholars found 
that rurality is contingent on locality and localness, it has become necessary to bring the 
theorization of economic shifts closer to the communities in question. Their work cautioned 
against the adoption of emerging concepts related to post-Fordism that were, at the time, largely 
being theorized at a nation-state level and in doing so attempting to make broad sweeping claims 
about the economic transformations happening. Cloke and Godwin noted that these claims did not 
respect the locality and different types of societal regulation that emerged at different scales of 
rural economies. Drawing from economic geographer David Harvey’s worked on structured 
coherence, they argue that through examining social relations, the process of their formation, and 
their “spatial form,” we can see how they come together through “differing modes of regulation 
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and societalization strategies that are pursued by the various historic and hegemonic blocs 
dominant within any particular area” (p. 326). They go on to argue that “the ensemble of 
institutional norms, relations and practices that form any particular mode of regulation are actually 
playing a role in constructing and maintaining a localized coherence suitable for the production of 
surplus value” (p. 326). In other words, by looking to different modes of regulation and social 
relations, and to economic processes that facilitate them in specific localities, we can see how 
economic shifts take place in such specific geographies while still maintaining an analytical link 
to broader economic changes.  
 
Cloke and Godwin theorize rural change “as a whole series of movements between the differing 
practices and procedures of various strategies of regulation operating at overlapping scales” (p. 
327). In sum, they argue that we need to understand how local norms of capitalist production and 
economic growth, and the kinds of behaviors and attitudes that support those norms, are shifting 
in the present moment. In so doing, it allows us to understand how rural places are changing within 
a “wider set of changing relations,” instead of trying to unite them under one neat timeline of 
economic transition from mass society to information society, as was typical in the uneven 
development literature of the time. 
 
This is particularly important to note when we think about what it means to be post-productivist. 
The entire conversation I have summarized above among rural scholars was started because there 
were large-scale and visible shifts in the role of agriculture as a defining economic sector of rural 
places in the United States and United Kingdom. Yet, many rural places were already becoming 
post-productivist long before the 1970s. In fact, much of the Upper Midwest region of the United 
States, in which my fieldwork took place, had already expanded to tourism and other forms of the 
service economy after logging peaked in the late 19th century and mining peaked in the early 20th 
century (Shapiro, 2013). This is not to discount the size and scale of the economic transitions that 
rural sociologists and geographers such as Cloke, Godwin, and Harvey wrote about. It is rather to 
note that an increase in service economies are largely seen as evidence of these economic shifts in 
rural places, yet service economies were already prominent in some rural economies before service 
sectors increasingly took hold in widespread ways as part of the “information economy.”  
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Based on what is presented here, I ask: How are understandings of rurality changing in current 
economic landscapes? I intend to return to this question further in Chapter Six.  
 
What I have sought to do here is summarize two different approaches to understanding 
representations of the rural and rural change. Through the work of Michael Bell and Keith 
Halfacree, I show how rurality comes to be understood through both material means and discursive 
or representational means. I introduced Bell’s concept of rural plural, which will be a valuable 
tool for understanding the role of rurality in deciphering who and what is rural in the economic 
development initiatives that I document in this dissertation. Following this, I unpack the post-
productivist shift away from agriculture as the dominant visible economic sector of rural 
communities in the United States and United Kingdom. Using Cloke and Godwin’s work with 
Harvey’s concept of “structured coherence,” I show how it is possible to more readily view the 
realities of rural shifts happening at local levels in the age of neoliberalism. Both of these 
approaches will become important as I seek to understand how rural economic development 
practices become intertwined with entrepreneurship and innovation in the Upper Peninsula of 
Michigan. 
 
The Rural Responds 
 
In a 2018 article in The Journal of Peasant Studies, rural sociologists Jessica Ulrich-Schad and 
Cynthia Duncan proposed that rural America is home to three types of rural places: amenity rich, 
transitioning, and chronically poor. Based on a nationwide representative survey of over 15,000 
people and 179 interviews, the authors document the “economic conditions, demographic trends 
and civic culture” of these three types of rural places (p. 61). The amenity-rich areas represent 
those places that have been able to use their outdoor amenities to make them “attractive to retirees, 
recreationists and ‘laptop professionals,’” largely due to their perceived quality of life differences 
(p. 61). Amenity-rich areas have growing populations and economies, unlike transitioning areas 
(i.e., areas that often rely on natural resource extraction and manufacturing) and chronically poor 
areas. While their method and delineation of ideal types are not representative of all rural places, 
the success of amenity-rich rural areas are indicative of the success in community and economic 
development practice and literature to promote asset-based approaches to rural development.  
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The literature in rural development the past two decades has taken up the call of asset-based 
approaches to economic and community development.7 In this approach, rural communities are 
encouraged to leverage the unique assets of their areas and regions to bolster and expand economic 
growth opportunities for their region. This can take many forms, including natural resource 
amenities (e.g., lakes, mountains) and unique economic opportunities (e.g., special industrial 
capabilities). In this section, I first briefly explain what I mean by rural economic and community 
development. Next, I turn to rural development literature that focuses on the transformation of 
unique rural assets and rural capital for the purposes of rural development and economic growth. 
Finally, I look at examples from the rural development literature to demonstrate how rural culture 
and natural amenities are exploited in practice, closing with a discussion of how all of these are 
indicative of processes of economization and financialization.  
 
Rural community and economic development 
Community development and economic development activities are wide-ranging, from 
distributing resources for low-income residents of a particular community to providing small 
business incubation services. Traditionally in urban areas, there is separation between a 
community development organization and an economic development organization, with 
community development focusing on building up community assets and institutions to serve all 
citizens of a specific community, and economic development focusing primarily on building 
economic opportunity and promoting economic growth and resilience in a particular place 
(University of Wisconsin Extension). To complicate this distinction, there is also “community 
economic development,” which argues for a community-driven approach to economic 
development activity. But in many rural communities, and from my experience in my fieldsite, 
community development and economic development are pursued hand-in-hand, and are often 
driven by the same organization. In addition, some of these same organizations also engage in 
planning activities, such as zoning, land use decisions, and land development. And when each of 
these processes (i.e., community development, economic development, planning) are performed 
                                               
7 I historicize this uptake of asset-based approaches and put it in conversation with other literature in Chapter Six 
when I discuss what I call the “turn to assets.” 
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in a rural community, they fall under the umbrella category of rural development.8 Throughout 
this dissertation, I will frequently use the terms economic development and rural development 
interchangeably to describe all of these activities together.  
 
As an example of a rural development organization that would normatively be solely a community 
development organization in an urban area, but in my fieldsite is all of the above, I will briefly 
describe the work of Main Street Calumet. Main Street Calumet (MSC) is a non-profit organization 
that was formed as part of the national Main Street America program. Main Street America started 
in the 1970s as a way to encourage community revitalization in historic downtowns throughout 
the United States. In the case of MSC, this involves things normally seen as community 
development, such as organizing the local farmer’s market, creating and promoting events for 
Village citizens, and general upkeep of the downtown corridor, including connecting business 
owners to opportunities for façade improvement grants and lobbying for the creation of pocket 
parks where there were once abandoned buildings. But, in addition to this normative community 
development work, the Director of MSC also works closely with the Village Council to enforce 
and alter zoning and planning practices, partners with regional economic development 
organizations to encourage the purchase and revitalization (or removal) of run-down historic 
buildings, implements marketing campaigns to attract new businesses, and many other tasks that 
are typically associated with economic development. 
 
I say all of this because academic literature in community development, economic development, 
and rural development often speaks similar languages and of similar development activities, while 
simultaneously citing and espousing different underlying literature. While my own work pulls 
predominantly from the fields of rural sociology and rural geography as noted above, here I am 
going to turn to a handful of approaches to rural development and community change that are 
central to place-based theories of economic development to show how contemporary 
                                               
8 Rural development has historically focused on the elimination of poverty in rural areas, with rural areas being 
wholly characterized as being resource banks for urban areas that need to be developed and maintained to preserve 
flows of labor and agricultural products. Yet, recent shifts in global economies, travel, and communication have 
pushed researchers and professionals in rural development to rethink how they conceptualize different ruralities and 
the kinds of development activities that are promoted in the name of rural development (Ward and Brown, 2009). 
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recommendations for rural development professionals espouse an asset-based approach to 
development activities.  
 
Asset-based approaches to rural development 
In their influential article describing the origins of asset-based community development, planning 
and development scholars Alison Mathie and Gord Cunningham (2003) argue that an asset-based 
approach to community economic development emerged to resist a largely negative existing 
approach to urban development activities: 
“In the needs-based approach, well-intentioned efforts of universities, donor agencies, and 
governments have generated needs surveys, analysed problems, and identified solutions to 
meet those needs. In the process, however, they have inadvertently presented a one-sided 
negative view, which has often compromised, rather than contributed to, community 
capacity building” (p. 475). 
In other words, a development approach wholly based in a community’s needs largely relies on 
community organizations framing those needs as deficits that need to be solved for the sake of the 
community’s health and prosperity. Organizations are incentivized by the granting structure that 
funds community development by focusing exclusively on the biggest deficits of their 
communities. This, as Mathie and Cunningham argue, results in these communities being seen 
perpetually in a negative light, as full of problems and despair, rather than as full of unique 
opportunities and, as they encourage in their framing, assets.9 
 
Asset-based community development argues that community members are the ones who are best 
positioned to determine what development processes should look like through “identifying and 
mobilizing existing (but often unrecognized) assets” (Mathie and Cunningham, 2003, p. 474). It 
differs from then-normative forms of development in that it focuses more on the social assets that 
result from unique formations of social capital in communities. While not explicitly focused on 
the rural context, asset-based community development has become a popular tactic in rural 
communities, including those in my fieldsite.10 As is seen in the vignette that opens this chapter, 
                                               
9 Scholars in postcolonial studies (e.g., Escobar, 1995) have similarly argued that peripheral communities in the 
Global South were portrayed as undeveloped in order to justify outside intervention.   
10 While it is named asset based community development (ABCD), the approach advocated by scholars of ABCD is 
a community economic development approach rather than solely a community development approach. 
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the language of this approach (i.e., assets over deficits) has been adopted because it helps, at least 
in the case of my fieldsite, economic developers market rurality as being different from, and 
superior to, urban communities.  
 
Another approach to rural community prosperity and change that focuses on the unique assets of 
a community is the “Community Capitals Framework,” popularized by the Rural Communities: 
Legacy and Change book. Originally written to accompany a PBS television series, it is now in its 
fifth edition and is assigned widely in professional programs training people who go on to work in 
a variety of rural development positions (Flora et al., 2018). The book, and associated publications 
(e.g., Emery and Flora, 2006) argue that rural development professionals need to consider seven 
different community capitals: natural capital, cultural capital, human capital, social capital, 
political capital, financial capital, and built capital. For a visual representation of this, see Figure 
2.1 below, taken from Flora et al. 2018 (p. 17).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Flora et al.’s Community Capitals Framework. Taken from their text. 
 
Flora, Flora, and their associated co-authors across two decades of publications argue for this 
holistic approach to understanding rural development resources in order to encourage sustainable 
communities. Similar to asset-based community development, the Community Capitals 
Framework argues that in order to do rural development right, and in a sustainable way that reflects 
the diversity of rural communities, rural development professionals need to consider the multiple 
intersecting, and often intangible, assets of rural places.  
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A third approach that counters the rural as deficit narrative is the rural capitals framework, 
proposed by rural development scholars Gary Bosworth and Roger Turner. In their words: 
“By challenging the hegemony of a ‘rural penalty,’ and seeking aspects of comparative 
advantage that lie within the suite of rural capitals available to businesses, we can think 
about rural businesses as creators of value more broadly, including their contribution to 
community development. Such an approach should help rural business policy to become 
less ‘relational’ in its nature and shift from compensating for ‘not being urban,’ and instead 
becoming more tailored to promoting the opportunities that pervade within rural contexts” 
(2018, p. 9). 
The rural capitals framework is theorized directly in relationship to the role that businesses play in 
the development of rural communities as job providers and sources of economic growth. In this 
framework, rural capital joins the other forms of capital outlined by Flora, Flora, and others, but 
is also framed as a sum of all of those capitals. In their analytical framework, Bosworth and Turner 
(2018) refer to rural capital as a “symbolic capital” in that it is a kind of “rural identity that can be 
conferred to the business” (p. 3). They argue that the most beneficial rural businesses, that 
contribute to community development by actively opposing the “rural penalty” (i.e. rural deficit) 
are those that create products and services which “[draw] value from rural capital” (p. 6).  
 
To bring these three different approaches together analytically, it is useful to think about them as 
being “in response to” the economic shifts that I drew out in the first section of this chapter. Natural 
resource based economic sectors which were largely rural in the United States were devalued 
through globalization and neoliberalism. These economic changes were associated with offshoring 
to cheaper countries around the world that favored increasing profit margins, the increased 
financialization of the American economy in promoting the FIRE sector (finance, insurance, and 
real estate). I will go into this further in the section on economization and financialization. But 
what this resulted in is rural communities being required to come up with new “assets” that would 
prove their worth in economic regimes that require all regions, all communities, and all people to 
prove their worth and how they contribute to economic growth. I will return to this idea of the 
“turn to assets” in Chapter Six, but for now I’d like to quickly summarize how both culture and 
nature were taken up in rural economic development activities as being the “right” kinds of rural 
assets. 
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Cultural and nature-based experiences as the new rural asset 
In a 2015 article, Korsgaard and colleagues make the distinction between what they call “rural 
entrepreneurship” and “entrepreneurship in the rural.” “Entrepreneurship in the rural” is 
entrepreneurial activities conducted in rural communities for the sake of profit that do not 
contribute to the “overall well-being and development of the rural area...[having] only limited 
engagement with the locality as a meaningful location” (p. 11). “Rural entrepreneurship,” on the 
other hand, “engages with its location not primarily as a space for profit but with ‘place’ as a 
location of meaningfulness and social life” (p. 13). In other words, “entrepreneurship in the rural” 
does not need the rural and does not give back to the rural in the same way that “rural 
entrepreneurship” does. I introduce this section with this summary because it is a helpful way to 
frame how cultural and natural experiences have become key to rural development tactics since 
the 1990s. 
 
R.W. Slee’s 2005 article, “From countrysides of production to countrysides of consumption?” does 
an excellent job of documenting the shift from productivist to consumption-based economies in 
the rural United Kingdom. In particular, Slee argues that the shift away from productivism (e.g., 
manufacturing, agriculture) has resulted in a push towards consumption-driven economic sectors 
such as tourism, second-home ownership, and the active shaping of rural amenities so that they 
can be marketed and sold to outsiders. Similarly, Jóhannesson et al. (2003) argue that a similar 
cultural turn in rural development has occurred in Iceland, and the country has responded to 
declines in its fishery-based economy by embracing culture-based ecotourism.  
 
Other scholars in economic development, regional studies, and rural studies have advocated for or 
explained the importance of these consumption-based sectors in developed economies in many 
places, including: the revival of cultural heritage through tourism in Sweden (Ekman, 1999), 
identifying and cultivating Welsh products that can be marketed as unique agricultural products of 
a region (Kneafsey et al., 2001), natural heritage tourism in Scotland (Courtney et al., 2006), the 
promotion of arts-based economies in the rural Midwestern United States (Winkler et al., 2016), 
and the broad success of cultural approaches to entrepreneurship in Norway (Cruickshank, 2018).  
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Returning to the distinction of “rural entrepreneurship” versus “entrepreneurship in the rural” 
(Korsgaard et al., 2015), we can think critically about consumption-oriented forms of 
entrepreneurship and the economic development policies and practices that promote it. In growing 
consumption-based sectors, such as tourism, this turn to cultural and nature-based experiences in 
rural places does a kind of rural entrepreneurship, in that it is frequently in response to broader 
economic shifts that have resulted in some sort of decline in prior rural economic sectors (e.g., 
agriculture, fisheries). In doing so, the attempt is to alter the economic future for the region in 
which it is performed, essentially to save it from the fate that many other rural regions in decline 
have experienced. In other words, there must be a constant creation of new rural assets in different 
regions, so that they may differentiate themselves and offer unique consumptive experiences that 
ensure their survival.  
 
Economization and financialization 
This transformation of rural culture, rural land, and other types of rural assets into something new 
to be exploited for purposes of economic growth can be better understood through the frames of 
economization and financialization, two concepts which have been heavily theorized in 
scholarship in science and technology studies (STS), anthropology, and related disciplines the past 
20 years. The purpose of this section is to introduce these ideas so that I may take them up in more 
depth throughout the dissertation when I seek to show how processes of economization function 
in my fieldsite. 
 
STS scholars Çaliskan and Callon (2009) describe economization as the process through which 
things, people, behaviors, organizations, and institutions become part of the economy.  For 
example, STS scholar Michelle Murphy explores the economization of life, or the ability for 
individuals to produce wealth for a national economy (2017). Murphy says that the economization 
of life is in part, “nam[ing] the practices that differentially value and govern life in terms of their 
ability to foster the macroeconomy of the nation state” (p. 6). One example she explores is the 
creation of GDP. She argues that it was created to track the economy of a nation using 
measurements of population and economic output, among other things, allowing economists to 
construct a world wherein population growth was antithetical to good life and economic growth. 
Using contemporary campaigns that promote behavioral and economic interventions in the life of 
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a girl, she also shows how these campaigns’ goal is to optimize productivity across the lifespan 
using big data, making the girl a more productive member of her nation state. 
 
Critical computing and STS scholar Silvia Lindtner (2020) frames economization within the 
demands of neoliberal technocapitalism that is shifting requirements for development and progress 
to the individual, or “the demand placed on individuals to self-actualize as economic agents made 
responsible for their own survival” (p. 3). One way that she shows this is through investigating 
incubation and accelerator programs that seek to take entrepreneurs and give them access to an 
entrepreneurial toolkit that allows them to “render oneself attractive to logics of investment” (p. 
133). In the tech world, this looks like hardware prototyping, post-it-note walls, wireframing, and 
the sorts of “recipes and techniques...summarized in downloadable PDFs” that are put together 
and made available online to others who want to recreate the open source, technological lifestyle 
that permeated in tech circles in the early 2010s (p. 133). She argues that these tools and the broad 
promises of innovation were crucial in translating the economization of life (Murphy, 2017) into 
what Lindtner calls “entrepreneurial life.” In this way, economization is how people and their ideas 
get subsumed into discourses of technological progress, often in the name of democracy, justice, 
and access to opportunities for self-improvement. It is a process through which people are urged 
to reshape themselves as entrepreneurial so that they are both more in line with dominant narratives 
of technological innovation and more readily accessible to investment capital.  
 
The ability to ready oneself for capital investment can also be thought of through the lens of 
financialization. In this way, financialization is an aspect of economization. Financialization 
represents the transformation of people and assets into goods that can be optimized for investment. 
As economic geographer David Harvey (2005) shows, financialization was directly tied to the 
refashioning of global economies in the 1970s and 80s towards post-productivism and the 
globalization of markets. In combination with decreased regulatory constraints governing financial 
markets, Harvey argued, “financial activity could flourish as never before, eventually everywhere” 
(p. 33). This also birthed new “entrepreneurial opportunities” in markets that emerged to solidify 
and accelerate neoliberalism (e.g., information technology, biotechnology). These new markets 
quickly spawned power players (e.g., Bill Gates) and there was a general diversification of 
business practices, “extending backwards into resource extraction and production and forwards 
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from a trading base into financial services, real-estate development, and retailing” (Harvey, 2005, 
p. 34).  
 
Financialization had far-reaching effects, both on people and other commodities, such as land. In 
his book Rated Agency, cultural theorist Michel Feher documents shifts toward financialization 
that went beyond merely encouraging entrepreneurialism. In fact, he argues that “progressive” 
Western governments of the 1990s (e.g., the Clinton administration in America) took a “third way” 
that was different than purely neoliberal or Keynesian approaches, instead encouraging their 
citizens to frame themselves as individual opportunities for investment: 
“Rather than breed self-reliant entrepreneurs constantly calculating the costs and benefits 
of their decisions, they encouraged their fellow citizens to embrace the condition of 
investees—that is, of men and women capable of earning and maintaining the trust of 
temporary employers, lenders, or venture capitalists” (p. 161). 
Making oneself attractive for investment was key, he argues, to citizens contributing to the broader 
economic success of regions.  
 
In rural communities, timberland and farmland also became increasingly financialized. A 
relaxation of tax codes and an increased demand for stable investment opportunities that would 
result in steady returns resulted in nationwide grabs for rural land (Gunnoe, 2014). This was 
especially true for timberland and farmland, as Gunnoe (2014) documents, “Together these two 
sectors have seen over fifty million acres of land change ownership type in recent decades” (p. 
480). This resulted in a series of investment firms buying up vast swaths of rural land, extracting 
as much value as possible in a relatively short period of time, and then selling it off to another firm 
that would do the same. This has detrimental impacts “on rural communities that rely on land for 
their economic livelihood” (p. 480).11  
 
                                               
11 This process of timberland land grabs occurred in the UP following the collapse of mining. In Chapter One I 
mentioned this as it relates to the Calumet and Hecla Mining Company, which was sold to Universal Oil (now 
Honeywell) in the late 1960s. It’s land, which amounts to thousands of acres, has since passed through the hands of 
multiple private equity firms. 
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STS scholar Alexander Dobeson argues that, like financialization, economization transforms rural 
communities to better fit the demands of neoliberal capitalism. In his research with Icelandic 
fisheries, he reveals: 
“the economisation of the small-boat fishers has furthered the economisation of the rural 
as such, with the rise of a new culture of liberal rural capitalism in which private ownership 
structures, individual entrepreneurship and market performance decide who stays afloat, 
rather than collective belonging, community-based forms of solidarity and redistribution” 
(p. 17). 
In this case, Icelandic fisheries were restructured into a new national lottery structure. The resulting 
processes made it so fishers were freed from their rural locales and no longer had to pool together 
their catch with the other fishers in their communities. Dobeson refers to this process as 
economization, in that it has both “reconfigured not only the ways in which markets change 
practices of harvesting and production, but also the cultural meaning of small boats as former 
paragons of rural independence that traditionally have spread ownership and risk across 
communities” (p. 18).  
 
What I show here is that the transformation of rural assets can be viewed through the lenses of the 
concepts of economization and financialization. In what I described above, culture and nature 
become assets, demanded by asset-based community development and other place-based 
economic development theories, that can ensure the continued economic growth of rural 
communities under neoliberal capitalism. Rather than waste away now that the old ways of 
exploiting the forests, mines, and animals are no longer able to capitalized upon, there are new 
ways to do so. By turning to the unique assets of a community, rural places can find themselves 
enthralled in processes of economization too.  
 
Using the concepts of economization and financialization, I ask how does regional culture get 
taken up in processes of economic development? I specifically turn to this research question in 
Chapter Four where I explore how specific cultural traits become exploited for the purpose of 
attracting entrepreneurial outsiders. 
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Regional Transformation for the 21st Century 
 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines innovation as the introduction of something new. This 
definition, of course, misses much that has come to be bound up in that word. One way that 
economists of the 20th century made sense of innovation was through what Joseph Schumpeter 
(1943/2003) called “creative destruction”: “The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, 
and the organizational development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel 
illustrate the same process of industrial mutation...that incessantly revolutionizes the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (83). 
While entrepreneurship and innovation have often gone hand in hand, there is an increasing 
recognition that they both do not always apply to the business of the invention. In particular, there 
are increasing calls placed upon people and places to make themselves innovative and 
entrepreneurial, even outside the context of business. Discourses of innovation and 
entrepreneurship demand a specific lifestyle and mode of development. 
 
As critical computing scholars Lindtner (2020) and Irani (2019) have argued, innovation and 
entrepreneurship have been transformed and proposed as tactics that individuals can use to 
intervene in broader economic systems. This is in line with the economization of everyday life 
(Murphy, 2017), which demands that people modify and streamline their lives to successfully 
integrate themselves into markets.  
 
Given the topic of my fieldwork, the goal of this section of my literature review is to discuss how 
the rural is being made accessible to the high-tech innovation economy. To contextualize the 
expanse of high-tech innovation and entrepreneurship outside of those places normatively and 
historically associated with high-tech innovation (e.g., Silicon Valley, Boston), I first turn to the 
work of critical computing and STS scholars documenting this expansion. In particular, I bring 
together the literature on regional advantage and entrepreneurial citizenship to characterize the 
geographic and social elements that influence the expansion of the innovation economy. Following 
this, I look to the literature that advocates for specific tactics promoting place-based innovation to 
reveal how scholars in business and economic development claim that rural communities are 
supposed to use their geography to their advantage for the purposes of growing high-tech and 
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innovative companies. Lastly, I turn to the literature on zoning to unpack how geographies are 
transformed through policy and other “zoning technologies” to better serve global flows of capital. 
 
Where is contemporary innovation? 
The widespread growth and dominance of the high-tech industry in media portrayals has made it 
the bastion of what it means to be an innovative economic sector in the 21st century. The high-tech 
industry has gone from the world of software and hardware to including the now-ubiquitous “Uber 
of X” model of business innovation, which frequently takes a particular business model and 
digitizes certain aspects in particular ways to “disrupt” markets and “innovate” on existing models. 
The results of this and the dominance of the high-tech sector are nowhere more visible than recent 
legal rulings in California that sought to regulate employment under companies like Uber, which 
responded to the legal proceedings essentially saying that they are not a service provider, but a 
high-tech platform that facilitates connections (McKay, 2019). 
 
Uber, and other companies seen as being at the forefront of the most recent platform tech boom 
(e.g., Facebook), benefit from a legacy of technological innovation clustered in specific 
geographies. As technology and planning scholar Annalee Saxenian argues in Regional 
Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128, these regional centers of 
innovation and entrepreneurship, embodied by the success of Silicon Valley companies from the 
1970s to the 1990s, exist because of “dense social networks and open labor markets.” The networks 
and markets enable people working in the same or adjacent industries to “[learn] from one another 
about changing markets and technologies through informal communication and collaborative 
practices” (1996, p. 2-3). Saxenian contrasts it to the technological innovation that occurred in 
Boston’s Route 128 corridor after World War Two, but wasn’t able to compete with the new and 
innovative business structures and economic relationships emerging in Silicon Valley at the same 
time.  
 
However, it would be erroneous to believe that Silicon Valley is the only place from which 
contemporary high-tech innovation emerges. Recent scholarship in computing has shown the how 
entrepreneurs who live in so-called “developing” or “peripheral” places are fueling new and 
different types of technological advancement. Moreover, they often do so with a reflexivity that 
 54 
engages with the center-periphery model that dominates the technology sphere (Avle and Lindtner, 
2016; Chan, 2013; Freeman et al., 2018; Irani, 2019). As STS scholar Anita Say Chan notes in the 
Preface to her book, Networking Peripheries, "Such diverse threads unsettle the unspoken 
presumption that a single, universal narrative could adequately represent the distinct digital futures 
and imaginaries emerging from local sites today” (2013, p. xi). The globalization of innovation 
discourse posits the high-tech sector as a savior for the downtrodden; this means that those tech 
centers on the periphery, such as Avle and Lindtner (2016) write about with Accra and Shenzhen, 
are “simultaneously feeding into but also resisting western understandings of what counts as 
technological innovation and design” (p. 2241).  
 
The rapid and increasing demands from governments and corporations to accelerate technological 
innovation, and the resulting institutions that support it (e.g., start-ups, incubators), are creating 
what I am calling an “innovation crisis.”12 This innovation crisis demands an “innovate or die” 
attitude of many places and people throughout the world as the tech sector is seen as a last ditch 
effort to turn around economic prospects in a world that is increasingly designed only for the 
wealthy. This crisis has in part been fueled by the rise of the creative economy in the 1990s and 
2000s. As scholars have noted, the tech start-up and creative Internet boom of the 1990s led to the 
massive casualization of professional labor and normalized risk as an inherent and necessary part 
of being an employee within innovative tech and creative industries (McRobbie, 2016; Neff, 
2012). In a related movement, urban planners and academics advocated deliberate cultivation of a 
“creative class” (Florida, 2002). In turn, governments worldwide adopted this approach as part of  
public policy (e.g., Michigan’s “Cool Cities” initiative started in 2003). Adoption of this approach 
has contributed to and likely accelerated the massive wave of gentrification that accompanied the 
growing knowledge economy that seemed to come to a peak in the past two decades. Even Florida 
himself has come to recognize his role in this current urban crisis: “It became increasingly clear to 
me that the same clustering of talent and economic assets generates a lopsided, unequal urbanism 
in which a relative handful of superstar cities, and a few elite neighborhoods within them, benefit 
while many other places stagnate or fall behind” (2017). The casualization of labor and 
incorporation of risk taking that became an inherent part of the creative and new tech industries 
                                               
12 I am influenced by Janet Roitman’s framing of crisis as a “historical and experiential condition” (p. 2). I explore 
this in more detail in Chapter Six. 
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(McRobbie, 2016; Neff, 2012) worked hand-in-hand with the economic policies to help incentivize 
real estate speculation and the movement of large corporations into downtrodden urban areas. This 
became an extension and accelerant of existing gentrification in urban areas (Neumann, 2016). I 
return to the idea of the “innovation crisis” in Chapter Six of this dissertation. 
 
From technological innovation to the innovation of the everyday 
As is evident here, there are increasing calls upon businesses to take up the banner of innovation 
in a globalizing marketplace, and to set one’s region apart from others. The ubiquity of innovation 
(and its partner entrepreneurship) have seeped their way into the discourse of everyday life, the 
demands of self-improvement, and what Lindtner (2020) calls “self-upgrade.” This is especially 
clear in contemporary shifts to incorporate innovation into the processes of development and 
governance. 
 
Through her research in the design industry in India and America, critical computing scholar Lilly 
Irani proposes the concept of “entrepreneurial citizenship” to make sense of how those working in 
tech and design get caught up in contemporary innovation to monetize their beliefs into labor:  
“The entrepreneur, no longer just a manager, has become an ‘agent of change,’ an ideal 
worker, an instrument of development, and an optimistic and speculative citizen. This 
citizen cultivates and draws what resources they can...into the pursuit of entrepreneurial 
experiments in development understood as economic growth and uplift of the 
poor...Entrepreneurial citizenship promises that citizens can construct markets, produce 
value, and do nation building all at the same time” (2019, p. 1-2). 
What Irani shows through her fieldwork is that contemporary demands for innovation take 
designers, working for development NGOs and others, and divert their desire to change the world 
through development into a need to add value to monetizable design projects. India was a 
particularly interesting case in which to identify this because the country has increasingly shifted 
its efforts from a model of centralized planning for development to adopting private and NGO-
based development (Irani, 2019, p. 9-10).  
 
These high-tech futures, Lindtner and Avle (2017) argue, are being presented as unique and global 
opportunities for empowerment and economic self-sufficiency. Innovation and entrepreneurship 
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engender what they call “tinkering with governance”: “a variety of actors, including government 
officials, policy makers, technologists, designers, and investors, are experimenting with who is 
included and excluded from political processes based on people’s ability to self-fashion as both 
technological and economic actors” (2017, p. 2). In particular, they look to new policies and modes 
of governance in Ghana, the United States, and China that mix up the technological and political 
and make it so that they serve each other, but especially so the increasingly technological “serves 
political interests at various regional, national, and transnational scales” (2017, p. 12). For 
example, in 2015, China’s Prime Minister adopted the approach of “mass entrepreneurship” after 
visiting a grassroots hackerspace and seeing the work of high-tech entrepreneurs there (Lindtner 
and Avle, 2017). Here we begin to see how mandates of innovation through entrepreneurship begin 
to seep out of firms and markets and into the everyday lives of people in and outside the tech 
industry, as well as into policy documents and classrooms (Sims, 2017).  
 
Silvia Lindtner argues in her book, Prototype Nation, that the rise of “making” (as in the 
makerspace movement) was in and of itself a result of neoliberal capitalism, shifting the labor of 
economic transformation and possibility onto the individual in the form of “self-upgrade.” As she 
writes: 
“The historical condition that gave rise to making was marked by a coming to terms with how 
technology had enabled the entrenchment of what is commonly thought of as key 
characteristics of neoliberal capitalism: the economization of the environment, of natural 
resources, and of life itself in the name of progress and development; the demand placed on 
individuals to self-actualize as economic agents made responsible for their own survival; the 
displacement of people and animals in the name of national sovereignty, global 
competitiveness, and security” (p. 3, emphasis added). 
What we see here is how innovation itself became tied to certain types of entrepreneurship that 
were deemed as the appropriate tools for economic intervention. Further, the labor of making these 
interventions was placed upon individuals through policy and governance that included and 
excluded based on the ability to transform oneself for the demands of technological innovation 
(Avle and Lindtner, 2017) and the ability to yourself intervene individually in social problems 
(Irani, 2019).  
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Clustering innovation for rural regions 
What I’ve tried to demonstrate thus far is that regions do not just happen to become known for 
their entrepreneurship and innovation, and people do not just happen to become entrepreneurs and 
innovators, they are made. Rural regions have a long history in the United States of being made 
for purposes of economic extraction, through land management, and natural resource exploitation. 
This is largely done to bring them up to speed with the advances of urban areas, and for the benefit 
of urban areas and economic growth. In particular, I’m interested here in what is called “place-
based economic policy” (Johnson, 2007). In his article, “Place-Based Economic Policy: Innovation 
or Fad,” agricultural economist Thomas Johnson situates a current wave of place-based economic 
policy that has focused on regional clustering: 
“Beginning in the late 1990s, place-based economic policies gained favor with 
practitioners. Cluster development, entrepreneurial programs, incubators, and local quality 
of life strategies rose to prominence. Social scientists responded with the development of 
new theories of cluster development, knowledge spillovers, and amenity-based 
development. They developed cluster analysis tools, entrepreneurial training and 
stimulation programs, and economic impact analyses” (2007, p.2). 
Johnson says that many different things could have influenced this wave of new place-based 
economic policies that have dominated rural economic development the past 20 years. Though, 
we are seeing a clear trend here in: the decline of productivist economies; the increasing demand 
for regions to reinvent themselves through the knowledge, information, and digital economies; and 
the intense marketing that is required of rural places in amenity-based economies that have come 
to replace productivist economies at a wide scale. I speak about place-based economic policies 
here, rather than in prior sections in which I talk about theories of place-based economic 
development (e.g., asset based community development). But the connections between the two are 
clear, and they work in tandem to guide the work of economic developers and others who are 
actually doing the rural transformation on the ground. Specifically, what I look to in this section 
is the concept of “clustering” for the purposes of promoting innovation at a regional level.13 
                                               
13 There are many critiques of how peripheral innovation is evaluated around clustering (Eder 2019). For example, 
Rosenfeld (2009) critiques existing cluster literature in that it largely focuses on quantitative measurements of 
clustering, which are harder to parse in rural areas where the effects of clustering might be seen on a much smaller 
scale (i.e., a few companies clustered rather than tens or hundreds). Further, Eder’s literature review (2019) of 
peripheral innovation questions why peripheral communities should be innovative. Eder finds that this literature 
largely focuses on the notable examples, which usually aren’t even that peripheral in that most have close ties to 
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Discussion among economists and others of industry clusters and region-based agglomeration of 
certain industries (e.g., the auto industry in Detroit) is longstanding (Munnich Jr. and Schrock, 
2016). But, economist Michael Porter’s 1990 book, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, is often 
cited as the text that is responsible for the wide-ranging academic literature and planning policy in 
America and the European Union on clustering. Porter’s theory of industry clustering went beyond 
normative views of clusters at the time in that it incorporated understandings of social capital, as 
well as entrepreneurship and creative destruction, in order to show how successful industry clusters 
can be explained and made (Munnich Jr. and Schrock, 2016).14 
 
Clustering dominates the rural economic development literature and a recent push for rural 
innovation (Dobson, 2011). But industry clustering is inappropriate for rural communities 
(Munnich Jr. and Schrock, 2016). It can easily replicate the “company town” phenomenon, 
wherein a region might have a host of communities, all dependent on one specific business in their 
town that are all in the same industry (e.g., mining towns). Economic development scholars 
Munnich Jr. and Schrock (2016) argue that focusing on the knowledge produced and needed by 
clusters is more informative than focusing on specific industries. They contend that rural 
knowledge clusters “[derive] competitive advantages primarily through accumulated, embedded, 
and imported knowledge among local actors,” (p. 166) and that this is aided by local institutions 
such as universities and the success of clustering is embedded in an understanding of local history. 
They use the example of a cluster of outdoor recreational vehicle manufacturers in Northwestern 
Minnesota as a prime example of a knowledge cluster. The companies there are not too 
concentrated, share knowledge and workers, leverage local colleges and universities to their 
advantage, as well as benefit from being embedded in the local history as it relates to outdoor 
sports. As they see it, rural-specific knowledge could be used in order to create new clusters of 
                                               
nearby urban areas. Also, the vast majority of existing literature on peripheral innovation focuses primarily on 
manufacturing (Eder 2019). This does not reflect contemporary discourses of innovation in popular media that focus 
overwhelmingly on high-tech economic sectors that are likely not going to be considered under the auspices of 
manufacturing in quantitative measurements.  
14 Annalee Saxenian’s work in Regional Advantage makes a similar move, though her concept of regional advantage 
that explains the success of Silicon Valley shows that it had “a social and institutional setting that shapes, and is 
shaped by, their strategies and structure” (1996, p. 7). In other words, the success was mutually constituted.  
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innovative business that leverage the unique nature of rurality in order to participate in shifting 
global economies that are seen as leaving rural America behind. 
 
Yet, there is an increasing awareness that rural regions largely do not cluster naturally, and that 
“the market” will likely not push contemporary innovative economic sectors to most rural regions 
without some sort of intervention. A recent report from the Aspen Institute (2019) argues rural 
regions require what they call “Rural Development Hubs” in order to appropriately promote 
innovative development. The report, titled “Rural Development Hubs: Strengthening America’s 
Rural Innovation Infrastructure,” argues that “innovation is not confined to urban America” (p. 3). 
Rural Development Hubs are “place-rooted organization[s] working hand-in-glove with people 
and organizations within and across a region to build inclusive wealth, increase local capacity and 
create opportunities for better livelihoods, health and well-being” (p. 16). Rural Development 
Hubs, then, act as intermediaries that promote regional innovation and clustering, taking a birds-
eye-view approach to promoting more equitable rural development opportunities in rural regions.  
 
There are two research questions that come out of this literature on contemporary innovation and 
clustering. First, how does the rural region at the center of my fieldwork seek to reframe itself 
through contemporary modes of innovation and entrepreneurship? Second, how do regional 
approaches to innovation break down? I return to these questions in Chapter Five of this 
dissertation. Given that the high-tech and digital economies are largely lacking from studies of 
regional innovation in rural places, I briefly move onto some of the literature on the role of 
information and communication technology in economic development as a place-based innovation 
tactic. 
 
ICTs and place-based innovation 
Contemporary discourse around innovation is centered upon the growth of the high-tech industry. 
Yet, most studies of rural innovation focus on manufacturing (Eder, 2019). Here, I briefly turn to 
literature on the relationship between economic growth, contemporary ICTs, and Internet adoption 
and connectivity.  
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In rural regions, ICTs were built up as something that could revolutionize business. Early research 
and policy work touted the benefits of technology for rural areas, stating that teleworking, 
eCommerce, and the outsourcing of call centers to rural areas would revive and strengthen rural 
communities (Slyke et al., 2001; Tsiligirides, 1993). Others have cautioned against this optimism 
(Grimes, 2000, 2003), and shown that these benefits depend on industry and business relationships 
(Smallbone et al. 1999). Yet, ICTs and the Internet have been trumpeted as silver bullets for rural 
economic decline in the much-lauded “Report to the President of the United States from the Task 
Force on Agriculture and Rural Prosperity” (Perdue, 2017):  
“Reliable and affordable high-speed internet connectivity will transform rural America  
as a key catalyst for prosperity” (p.2). 
While some scholars in rural development have shown that the broadband adoption likely has a 
causal relationship in rural areas to increases in income growth and decline in unemployment 
(Whitacre et al., 2014a, 2014b), the scholarship is contradictory. For example, a recent systematic 
literature review on the role of Internet adoption and availability (Salemink et al., 2017) found that 
“there is a growing consensus that poor rural telecommunication infrastructure hinders rural 
development,” yet policies that promote Internet connection haven’t been successful (p. 367). 
Further, Erdiaw-Kwasie and Alam (2016) found that the rural digital divide prevented successful 
private-public partnerships in rural development.  
 
Despite these barriers and the “rural penalty” in digital development (Malecki, 2003), there 
continue to be pushes for increasing technological innovation in rural regions. With that in mind, 
I ask the following research question: how do contemporary pushes for rural development propose 
the rural to be incorporated into technological futures? I turn to this question in the next chapter. 
Given the importance of policy for place-based economic development and innovation, following 
I turn to the literature on zoning to explain how economic policies and practices shape regions. 
 
Zones and Zoning 
Places, such as cities or islands, that have economic policies and practices that are more relaxed or 
“free” than the norm are nothing new. As architect and urbanist Keller Easterling (2012) 
documents, free ports have existed for over 2000 years. Their economic lineage can be traced all 
the way to the present-day in the establishment of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the 
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1970s.  Despite being created to enable the demands of capitalism, SEZs have come to be seen as 
exemplary of what it means to do free market capitalism, and a model that has been borrowed by 
even the most capitalist countries. In this section, I turn to zones and the process of zoning so that 
I may understand how and why particular kinds of exploitable neoliberal geographies are created.  
 
Zoning technologies in China and India 
Zones are a “dynamic crossroads of trade, finance, management and communication” (Easterling, 
2012), but are diverse in their formation and ultimate functions. As anthropologist Aihwa Ong 
(2004) describes them in the context of China, zoning technology (e.g., Special Economic Zones) 
are used by the Chinese state to create what she calls a “variegated sovereignty.” Variegated 
sovereignty is a name for the multiple systems of power and authority that vary between China’s 
zones and the rest of the country so that certain political entities (e.g., Hong Kong, Macao) can be 
incorporated into a Chinese “axis of trade, industrialization, and gradual political integration” (p. 
70). This system of zoning technologies also enables China to more readily participate in global 
markets and take advantage of foreign investment and trade. Many different types of zones at 
different levels of administration and geography have proliferated in China since the 1970s (Ngo 
et al., 2017). No longer are zones relegated to Chinese border cities, but also include office parks 
and neighborhoods of interior cities. 
 
Following the perceived success of SEZs in China, India created policies to establish its own SEZs 
starting in 2000. Rather than being a space for increased sovereignty, anthropologist Jamie Cross 
(2010) argues that these SEZs rely upon and perpetuate the “informality and precariousness under 
which most economic activity already takes place in South Asia” (p. 358). In contrast to Ong’s 
top-down narrative, a view from the bottom sees private entities in India partnering with large 
landholders in rural and peri-urban area to perform large land grabs that displace farmers and 
further disenfranchise the Indian countryside (Cross, 2010; Anwar and Carmody, 2016). This is 
similar to what Ngo and colleagues (2017) describe as happening at the municipal level of zoning 
technologies in China, that the processes are used for a concentration of power and resources in 
the hands of the few through land grabs and sideways business deals. As Cross (2010, 2014) shows 
in his work, the onus of zoning is placed upon private parties in India. In other words, it matters at 
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what level of governance the zone is created and administered. It also matters how those zones are 
developed and populated with respect to business. 
 
The zone moves west 
The successful adoption of export processing zones (EPZs) in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, 
the same success that lead to the establishment of Chinese SEZs in the late 1970s, served as an 
inspiration for visiting British economists of the time. Economists, Peter Hall in the UK (1981) 
and later Stuart Butler in the US, would argue for the creation of what they call Enterprise Zones 
(EZs). Per Hall (1981), these EZs were envisioned as areas of cities that would be “free of United 
Kingdom taxation, social services, industrial and other regulations. Bureaucracy would be kept to 
an absolute minimum; so would personal and corporate taxation...Wages would find their own 
level” (6). This language of a “free market playground” complete with lax taxation and regulation 
would be brought by Butler to the Heritage Foundation in the United States. 
 
Neither in the UK nor the USA were EZs wholly taken up as originally intended. In their creation 
in the UK, they had a remission of property taxes, reduced capital gains taxes, removal of corporate 
income tax for certain buildings, and relaxed zoning and planning regulations (Hall, 1981). Hall 
argued that without other measures, such as the creation of an actual free port through the complete 
removal of taxes and the elimination of environmental and safety regulations, the new EZs would 
merely attract already existing businesses rather than encourage the creation of new ones. It took 
until 1993 for the USA to adopt federal legislation even remotely resembling the EZs as originally 
proposed. But by the time federal adoption was achieved in the USA, 38 states and the District of 
Columbia had already created their own version of EZs (Gunn, 1993).  
 
While the EZs envisioned and enacted in the UK targeted industrial areas, the EZs in the United 
States largely targeted inner city neighborhoods, and frequently had minimum population 
requirements to assure that they were applied where people were living and working. As political 
scientist Timothy Weaver (2016) documents in his book, Blazing the Neoliberal Trail, the USA 
systematically withdrew its federal support for economic and community development and urban 
revitalization through the 1970s and into the 1980s. The EZs were seen as a way to leverage 
business and other private interests to develop downtrodden urban neighborhoods while 
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simultaneously increasing newly embraced free market ideas by relaxing regulations and taxes on 
corporations who do that work. The zones were so popular among certain states that by 1988, 510 
had been created (Gunn, 1993). 
 
Government reports and academic literature throughout the late 1980s and 1990s were split about 
the effectiveness of the state-created EZs. Those on the pro-EZ side argued that they were mostly 
effective at job creation, but were held back by poor regulation and implementation (Reeder, 1993; 
Watson, 1995). Sceptics argued that EZs were essentially all rhetoric (Wilder and Rubin, 1996), 
with an unplanned mix of tax incentives that were at times geographically targeted to at risk 
communities (Peters and Fisher, 2002). In reality, state-created EZs mostly failed to deliver those 
promises to at-risk communities, but instead become vehicles for delivering basic state and local 
economic development policies and practices. As Turner and Cassell (2007) note:  
“while enterprise zones began as a spatially targeted program designed to address 
geographically concentrated pockets of poverty, they gradually expanded into a set of state 
programs that are currently the largest component of state economic development budgets” (p. 
100). 
And while the creation of federal EZs in 1993, renamed “Empowerment Zones” to signal an 
explicit goal of empowering the urban poor, did open up additional lines of funding that were 
essential in the creation of economic development infrastructure in inner city neighborhoods, they 
were not effective either. Research accounts showed that on the ground, the new policies did not 
result in programs that actually helped poor people and majority people of color neighborhoods 
that they were designed to aid (Ninivaggi, 2011; Gotham, 2013). For example, in Ninivaggi’s 
research in Philadelphia’s Kensington neighborhood (2011), one of the oldest EZs in the country, 
she found that contrary to the rhetoric put forth by the zone, it “tends to exclude minority business 
owners and residents and that political antagonisms and ethnic and class divisions between 
different groups in the community are exacerbated by the structure of the zone program” (p. 281). 
Others similarly argue that the zones weren’t put into place to help poor people and spur small 
business, but to give large corporations respite from corporate taxes and concentrate new business 
growth in places that were already growing (Gotham 2013; Weaver 2016). 
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The discourse of urban revitalization and empowerment is important to highlight, because I revisit 
it throughout this dissertation. This discourse was key to the success of the creation of federal 
Empowerment Zones that only increased the power of corporations in these geographies. Both 
Gunn (1993) and Weaver (2016) argue that the federal creation of EZs went from being a broadly 
conservative fiscal policy in the early 1980s to being an incredibly successful bipartisan measure 
following the Rodney King riots in 1992. In particular, Weaver argues that, “support for the policy 
broadened and deepened over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s despite a burgeoning body 
of empirical evidence that cast doubt on its effectiveness and...business—the ostensible 
beneficiaries of enterprise zones—did not initially promote them" (p. 26). He argues that EZs 
became a set of ideas that were initially pushed by right wing think tanks and intellectuals, but 
through a framing and attachment to ideologies of urban renewal and empowerment, slowly 
enrolled Democrats into the mass creation of neoliberal development policy that has entirely 
changed how the USA’s economic and community development processes function. 
 
What does zoning do? 
I have demonstrated that in the USA, zoning became a process through which the urban and rural 
poor could be increasingly enrolled in global demands for free market policies. The same free 
market policies were the forbearers of the continued urban “revitalization” that lead to the mass 
gentrification of predominantly people of color and working class neighborhoods throughout the 
USA in the 2000s and 2010s. As Weaver says, "The ideological claim that lies at the heart of the 
enterprise zone idea is that high business costs, largely arising from taxation, bear significant 
responsibility for high levels of urban poverty, unemployment, and dereliction and that the solution 
to these ills can be found in lowering these costs” (p. 39). So what zoning shows us in the United 
States, is that through the classification of certain geographies in the name of development and 
empowerment, we can build economic systems that increase the power and capital of large 
corporations. 
 
Returning to what scholars have shown in China and India, we see a different approach to zoning 
that goes beyond merely explaining the neoliberalization of economic processes. Instead, in Ong 
(2004) and others (Cross, 2014; Ngo et al., 2017), we come to understand how governance itself 
changes through the process of economic liberalization. Ong argues that zoning technologies allow 
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China to engage in multiple forms of governance, depending on geographic arrangement, which 
suit their changing economic needs in a globalizing market. These differences result in variegated 
sovereignty which “has created conditions of possibility for circumventing politically inconvenient 
obstacles and for bridging politically divided entities” (Ong 2004, p. 92). But, this increased 
sovereignty has also empowered different levels of government to exploit zoning technologies for 
their own agendas (Ngo et al., 2017) and enabled land grabbing and exploitation through new 
forms of citizenship (Cross, 2010).  
 
In bringing these two sets of literature together, we begin to see why zoning matters for both 
governance and for the broader economic shifts of the late 20th century that support globalization 
and the spread of free market ideology. New zoning technologies in the form of Opportunity Zones 
are dominating the attention of economic developers throughout the USA as I write. The 
Opportunity Zones provide a familiar story, similar to the one I narrated about EZs here: they 
benefit the rich in the name of revitalization and economic regeneration. This dissertation seeks 
not only to understand how zoning technologies like the Opportunity Zones come to operate in 
rural America, but also where they come from and how other types of zones specific to Michigan 
(e.g., SmartZones) do the zoning they intend or are designed to do. 
 
This section of the literature review chapter, “Regional Transformation for the 21st Century,” has 
sought to contextualize the expansion of high-tech innovation and entrepreneurship outside of 
those places normatively and historically associated with high-tech innovation and the adoption of 
these tactics in rural policy and practice. I began with the work of scholars in critical computing 
and STS who investigate the expansive adoption of entrepreneurship and innovation as new 
region-making practices. Following, I turned to the literature that advocates for specific tactics 
promoting place-based innovation to understand how rural communities are supposed to, 
according to scholars in business and economic development, use their geography to their 
advantage for the purposes of growing high-tech and innovative companies. Lastly, I turned to the 
literature on zoning to unpack how geographies are transformed through policy and other “zoning 
technologies” to better serve global flows of capital. What I sought to do here was to demonstrate 
how the transformation of rural regions to fit into discourses of innovation and entrepreneurship 
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is important to contextualize within broader shifts, beyond just independent narratives of rurality 
and economic development. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter served the primary purpose of situating the phenomenon at the center of my 
ethnographic fieldwork. I first turned to literature from the fields of rural studies and geography to 
understand how the rural is represented through social and economic means, and how scholars’ 
understanding of rurality was transformed through the economic shifts of neoliberal capitalism 
and globalization that accelerated at various points in the second half of the 20th century. I then 
looked at literature from economic development on place-based economic development theories 
that were advanced in rural communities starting in the 1990s in response to said economic 
transformations in rural parts of Western countries. I used literature from science and technology 
studies on economization and financialization to situate these responses in the neoliberal processes 
that seek to transform humans and land to better serve capitalism. Lastly, I brought together 
literature from critical computing, regional studies, geography, and sociology to understand how 
innovation and entrepreneurship have become so central to economic development practices in 
and out of rural communities. 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have come to arrive at the research questions that I will explore in the 
chapters ahead. I reiterate my research questions here. In Chapter Three, I ask how do 
contemporary pushes for rural development prepare the rural to be incorporated into technological 
futures? In Chapter Four, I ask how does regional culture get taken up in processes of economic 
development? In Chapter Five, I bring together my findings from the previous chapters to answer 
the question, how does this rural region seek to reframe and reinvent itself through contemporary 
modes of entrepreneurship and innovation? Following that, Chapter Five also asks then, how do 
regional approaches to innovation break down? Lastly, in the discussion, I return to the 
understanding of rurality through economic representations and ask, how are understandings of 
rurality being exploited and/or changing in our current economic landscape? 
 
  
 
Figure 3.1: St. Paul the Apostle Church in Calumet, Michigan. Built using local sandstone, the church is representative of the 
early wealth and prosperity of the region in the early 20th century. Photo by author. 
 
Chapter Three: Codifying Rural Readiness 
 
 
 
The Keweenaw Peninsula is unique in the Upper Peninsula (and the rest of the United States) in 
the amount of snow that it receives. Jutting into Lake Superior and surrounded on all sides but one 
by its cold waters, the Keweenaw sits at the perfect spot in the Great Lakes to be severely affected 
by lake effect snow year after year. In fact, by March 2019, the county airport had already seen 
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170 inches, or over 14 feet, of snow. One snowy afternoon in March, after spending my morning 
working at the coworking space, I drove the 12 miles north to Calumet to meet with Lilith, the 
Director of Main Street Calumet, a local economic development and community preservation 
organization. I had been working with the organization for the past five months, assisting 
intermittently with some strategic communications and social media. My background in studying 
online communities was helpful for the organization, who had just received a small grant to expand 
their marketing efforts to attract remote workers and former residents to the Calumet area. For this 
grant, they needed a Communication and Branding Guide to guide the group’s social media and 
website moving forward. They couldn’t afford to pay anyone, and Lilith was already refusing 
paychecks from the cash-strapped organization. Given my interest in the organization’s work, I 
offered my skills to help them pull the guide together from existing materials they already had. 
The goal of this March meeting was to go through the guide together, but that task was immediately 
sidelined.  
 
I arrived at Keweenaw Coffee Works, a welcoming industrial café that occupied a renovated 
storefront in downtown Calumet, and set up a working station for myself at a big wooden table. 
This wasn’t my first meeting with Lilith at the coffee shop, and as per usual she was late. Arriving 
flustered, she threw her gloves down on the table, “Sorry I’m late, everything’s a clusterfuck out 
there right now.” When I had parked my truck in front of the café I had seen that the street was 
closed a block down but hadn’t thought anything of it. There had been a big snowstorm the night 
before, and I assumed the plow trucks hadn’t gotten to it, so they had closed it down. The village 
was struggling to pay for many of its municipal services, including trash and snow removal.  
 
“What’s going on down there?” I asked, assuming she was talking about the closed road 
downtown. “The Family Dollar roof collapsed last night and I’ve been on the phone trying to deal 
with it all day,” she said, peeling off her winter coat. Sitting down across from me at the table, we 
discussed what had transpired 
 
The old Family Dollar Store building located in the downtown corridor was built in 1948 and was 
once home to a Woolworth’s department store. At some point it had been purchased and 
transformed into a Family Dollar, which after outgrowing it, had opted to build a new building 
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down the road instead of renovating its historic building. By this point in 2019, the Family Dollar 
Corporation still owned the now-abandoned building. Village officials, including Lilith who was 
also the Chair of the Downtown Development Authority, had been reaching out to the corporation 
for months. Family Dollar not only had unpaid tax bills due to the village, but was also ignoring 
phone calls requesting that it remove the snow from its roof and sidewalk. The snowstorm the 
night before had been the last straw and the roof had collapsed. The owner of the neighboring 
flower shop and apartment building had evacuated her tenants, concerned that the collapse would 
affect the physical integrity of her building as well. The Village of Calumet was already so 
overwhelmed when it came to dealing with blight, redevelopment opportunities, and slowing the 
curve of depopulation. Lilith and other municipal officials did not have time to deal with another 
building collapse like this. 
 
In the year that I got to know Lilith and her work in Calumet, it always seemed like there were 
new fires to be put out: building roof collapses, never-ending budget cuts, new village council 
members who wanted to dissolve the village altogether, and the everyday commotion of a rural 
village of 748 people governed mostly by an entirely volunteer village council.1 Alongside these 
events were hopeful interventions being conducted by the likes of Lilith and collaborators at 
Michigan Technological University and regional development organizations. Their hope was to 
highlight Calumet’s historic downtown, its beautiful architecture, and its affordable real estate. In 
doing so, attracting remote workers, former residents who were looking to return to the Keweenaw, 
and Michigan Tech employees who were being pushed out of Houghton and Hancock due to 
increased competition for limited housing. As Lilith often said in meetings and conversations about 
the economic development and growth goals of Calumet, “We’re not looking for 100,000 people 
to move here – we just want 100 families.” 
 
In fact, the State of Michigan had a whole host of programs offered through the Michigan 
Economic Development Corporation and other statewide offices that sought to prepare 
                                               
1 Calumet has a Village Administrator rather than a Village Manager. The Village Administrator position is 
responsible for the day to day paperwork and business of the Village of Calumet, but does not have the decision 
making power of a Village Manager. Instead, the bulk of municipal decision making lies solely in the hands of the 
Village Council. For a variety of reasons, the Village Council in Calumet has difficulties reaching consensus, which 
means that decisions get made very slowly if at all. There is a high turnover on the Council because of this. 
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communities like Calumet, Houghton, and Hancock to compete for and attract redevelopment 
opportunities. While many communities throughout the Keweenaw Peninsula tried to participate 
in the state programs, they were often taken up piecemeal or abandoned by participating 
communities who saw the programs as too difficult and costly to engage in, with little benefit for 
remote rural communities. In this chapter, I turn to two of these programs created by the state: the 
Redevelopment Ready Communities initiative facilitated by the Michigan Economic Development 
Corporation and the statewide Integrated Asset Management framework promoted by the 
Michigan Infrastructure Council. I ask, how do contemporary pushes for rural redevelopment 
prepare the rural to be incorporated into technological futures? 
 
Using development tactics promoted by these two programs, I show how they advocate for the 
digitization of rural assets through mapping initiatives and data dashboards. I argue that this 
process works to identify the “right” and “wrong” kinds of rural places, in the process reshaping 
and repackaging rurality and rural communities through the “right” kind of rural data to attract 
outside investment. I call this process codifying rural readiness, and I show how new technological 
tools that are supposed to democratize access to development opportunities are actively part of the 
process to reshape rural communities so that they can better serve processes of economization and 
financialization. 
 
As I described in Chapter Two, in the face of the decline of productivist economic sectors in the 
second half of the 20th century, contemporary tactics for rural economic and community 
development have shifted. There was a turn to natural and cultural assets as sources of 
entrepreneurship, and, as I note above with Calumet, an increasing push for rural communities to 
figure out how to harness some of the spillover benefits of the high-tech sector by attracting remote 
workers and supporting small tech companies. These changes in regional economics, and the 
movement towards attracting outside real estate investment I document in this chapter, are 
inherently part of contemporary economic shifts that are part of processes of economization and 
financialization. Silvia Lindtner (2020) refers to this as “self-economization,” or, “the neoliberal 
demand that one convert the self into human capital, investing in various aspects of one’s own life 
in order to make the self attractive to the machineries of finance speculation and investment” (p. 
13). What I document here and the rest of this dissertation is how this is done at a regional level to 
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make a region more attractive to outside capital, to remote workers, and to future-building practices 
that dictate rural regions must transform their use so that they can maintain their usefulness for 
others’ enjoyment. 
 
This chapter presents two different approaches to municipal revitalization and maintenance: 
redevelopment and asset management. I argue that both of these approaches work to codify rural 
opportunities for development in specific ways that often fail due to the resource constraints 
inherent of post-industrial rural communities. Building up this landscape of land interventions, I 
will later use it to show how the codification of rural land for the purposes of economic growth 
give us insight into what rural has come to mean in the shadow of the high-tech economy. 
 
Becoming “Redevelopment Ready” 
 
The work of community and economic development in rural areas is often framed as a process of 
“rural development,” but the language of development implies that it is starting from a place of 
being “undeveloped.” Framing the post-industrial rural landscape of the United States as being 
“undeveloped” is incorrect. As Arturo Escobar argues in Encountering Development (1995), 
development happens once a place has been discursively realized and appropriately framed by the 
right actors as being “undeveloped.” He shows that the process of development and the field of 
development economics was largely created after World War II. Newly created development 
organizations and the countries that supported them used imposed discourses of hunger and 
malnutrition to justify global interventions in countries they deemed “undeveloped.” This was 
done in an effort to indoctrinate the “Third World” into the modern capitalist present and continued 
through the 20th century through increased financialization of markets, and later imposed austerity 
measures placed upon countries who were deemed as falling behind in the ambitions of global 
development. 
 
The communities that I present in this dissertation were already once considered bastions of the 
industrial economy in the early 20th century. Calumet, for example, was home to thousands of 
people and was the center of copper mining in the Upper Peninsula for decades. Locals in the 
Keweenaw say that Calumet was such a beautiful and prestigious town that it was considered as 
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an alternative state capitol. Rather, the processes of upgrade and evolution that I discuss in this 
chapter are more appropriately framed as “redevelopment.” A framing of redevelopment allows 
us to understand how post-industrial communities are transformed to serve the new visions of the 
future. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The remnants of the Champion Copper Mill in Freda, Michigan. Abandoned mining infrastructure is widespread 
through the Keweenaw Peninsula. Photo by author. 
 
Tracy Neumann writes about the transformation of large post-industrial cities in the latter part of 
the 20th century in her book, Remaking the Rust Belt. In her investigation, she says that, 
“Contemporary narratives of the inexorable decline of basic industry in North America and 
Western Europe make the postindustrial transformation of national economies and old 
manufacturing centers seem like a historical inevitability, the product of natural business cycles 
and neutral market forces” (2016, p.3). Rather, she argues that the creation of postindustrial places 
is actually an active process that was architected by “political and business elites” (p. 3). The 
process of redevelopment that Neumann traces in places like Pittsburgh brought with it waves of 
public-private partnerships that have worked over the past decades to revitalized inner urban 
corridors and craft economic transitions to service industries, finance, and now the tech industry. 
Redevelopment, then, is not linear with a single or finite end goal. Rather, it is an ongoing process, 
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whose goal posts are moved depending on the most promising industries determined by 
economists, the most up to date municipal planning strategies advocated by urban planners, and 
the clearest path forward as argued by corporate-backed think tanks. 
 
The Keweenaw saw a slower industrial collapse than that which had started much earlier in 
American industrial history in places like Pittsburgh. Copper mining, which peaked in the 
Keweenaw around World War I, was responsible for much of the wealth that created the industrial 
landscape of the region and the villages and cities that were built up around natural resource 
extraction. The slow collapse of the mining industry from the 1910s to when the last copper mine 
closed in the Keweenaw in 1968 resulted in the same kind of issues that other post-industrial places 
faced: massive depopulation and large swaths of abandoned industrial real estate, largely left to 
decay for the following decades when it couldn’t be salvaged or supported by the declining 
population. Yet the past three decades have seen an increase in the adoption by municipal leaders 
and their communities of a whole host of urban planning tactics and associated programs to deal 
with issues related to brownfield sites, downtown revitalization, blight, and abandoned buildings. 
 
Very little redevelopment, as Neumann argues, is done solely by the state (e.g., local 
municipalities, state and federal governments alone). Rather, it is done in partnership with non-
profit development corporations, real estate developers, private equity, banks, and a whole host of 
other partners. To streamline these partnerships and encourage redevelopment, local and state 
governments have concocted a variety of programs that seek to demonstrate to outsiders that 
communities are “open for business” and ready for revitalization.  
 
It is one of these initiatives, Michigan Redevelopment Ready Communities (RRC), that I turn to 
here. I describe the RRC process, which largely pushes rural communities to transform so that they 
can more easily market themselves to outside investors that might otherwise see them as sources 
of unexploited capital, becoming revitalized in the process. While the RRC process is largely 
rejected by low-resourced communities in the Keweenaw as too difficult to achieve, I show how 
these same communities remain enrolled in similar development tactics by regional development 
organizations. 
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Michigan Redevelopment Ready Communities 
The tactics that ready a community for redevelopment come in many forms, including: five-year 
municipal plans that outline development plans for the future, zoning ordinances that make 
construction restrictions more flexible, and local enforcement tactics that legislate and punish those 
whose property falls outside of the bounds of what is seen as desirable to real estate developers. 
The most recent initiative in the State of Michigan that has sought to promote these tactics is the 
RRC, a program administered by the Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC). 
The MEDC is the statewide entity which facilitates economic development grants and 
opportunities for Michigan communities. While it is officially a private non-profit entity, it was 
created by the State for this purpose, its work is almost exclusively funded by appropriations from 
the State, and its largest community development grant is funded by the federal government and 
facilitated by MEDC.  
 
The RRC initiative was started in 2013 and is a certification process that municipalities go through 
to demonstrate that they are “ready for development.” In June 2019, I attended a webinar hosted 
by MEDC in partnership with Crain’s, a business media outlet based in Michigan. Over the course 
of the hour-long webinar, participants heard from MEDC staff who facilitate the certification 
process to become Redevelopment Ready, a public official from a small city in lower Michigan 
who guided their city through the certification process, and a real estate developer whose firm uses 
the initiative to target their investments. At the beginning of the webinar, one MEDC staff person 
described the six key things that municipalities needed to do as part of the certification process: 
• Community plans and public outreach: Communities need to develop master plans, if 
they don’t have them already, and they need to be updated every five years. The public 
must be involved in this process to demonstrate buy-in. 
• Zoning regulations: Communities need to have zoning regulations that are in line with the 
goals laid out in their master plans. The staff made a point to highly recommend a 
simplified set of regulations, as that would lower one barrier to entry for developers. 
• Development review process: Communities must have a process established for 
reviewing development proposals and this must be easily accessible to potential 
developers on the municipal websites. 
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• Recruitment and education: Communities should be actively recruiting and educating 
members on municipal planning and zoning committees so they stay informed of the 
“best practices” for municipal development and planning. 
• Community prosperity: Communities must have a mindset of economic development and 
growth for the future.  
• Redevelopment ready sites: Communities must identify and propose one to three 
redevelopment “sites” (i.e., real estate investment opportunities) that will be marketed by 
MEDC as part of the RRC process. 
The complete process to get RRC certification takes 12-18 months, according to MEDC, and 
involves the municipality working closely with staff and consultants from MEDC to ensure that 
each of the six key pieces are being addressed. 
 
This webinar, and the program writ large, was largely geared towards municipal leaders and 
residents of Michigan’s smaller cities and villages. The vast majority of large cities in Michigan, 
by 2013 when the program was established, already had five-year plans, streamlined zoning 
ordinances, and plenty of ties to real estate developers. A public official from Allegan, a small city 
in Lower Michigan, was part of the webinar to pitch the pay-off for participating in RRC as a 
smaller community: 
“All communities throughout the State of Michigan are competing for funding and 
attention of quality developers. When you have large cities like Detroit and Grand Rapids, 
it’s hard for a city of our size, 5000 people, to stand out. So, the RRC program really allows 
us to stand out, seek the attention of funding sources and developers that know how to 
create projects that will change the landscape of our city. One way it allows us to stand out 
is that it shows we have plans and processes in place so that the state knows when they go 
to provide funding, that the funding will be used to better the community. It also proves to 
developers that might not know that Allegan exists, that city council, staff, and the 
community at large are open to investment and development. There are a lot of 
communities out there that are frankly scared of change and development, as a developer 
they’re not too excited about investing in a town that doesn’t have community buy-in.” 
While the RRC program is framed as an opportunity for rural communities to “change the 
landscape of [its] city,” it does this largely through streamlining and simplifying their internal 
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processes so that they can demonstrate that they aren’t “scared of change and development.” 
Simultaneously, RRC certification is a tool of visibility that calls out to real estate developers, 
“Hey, look at us!” Rather than give rural communities funding to do redevelopment and 
revitalization themselves, the RRC process prepares a rural community to shape itself in favor of 
private real estate development. This reliance on private, rather than public, intervention is key to 
the neoliberalization of redevelopment. 
 
As an example of one of the communities that went through the RRC process, I’ll briefly turn to 
Allegan, which featured prominently in the webinar. After attending the webinar, I made sure to 
keep track of the various development news about the small town. Even though it wasn’t in my 
fieldsite, Allegan seemed to be something of a statewide poster-child for rural communities put 
forth by the MEDC. As part of its enrollment in RRC, it had put out a request for projects in 2019 
for a piece of city-owned property on the Kalamazoo River in its downtown. The real estate 
developer selected for this property happened to be the same one that participated in the webinar, 
and it proposed putting in a boutique hotel on the property. Due to local regulations in Allegan, 
any sale of city property had to be voted on by city residents in the following election. The sale of 
two pieces of city property were on the March 2020 ballot; the potential hotel location failed to 
pass the vote, while the other succeeded. The controversial sale of public park land for private real 
estate investment was not something that city residents endorsed. 
 
One of the things that struck me in the webinar was the way participants spoke about who the 
certification process was for. At one point, the MEDC representative said, “The goal is to provide 
a transparent, efficient, and predictable development experience.” An experience for whom? It 
became clear to me by the end of the webinar that the purpose of RRC was to streamline the 
development process so that private developers had fewer barriers to starting a project and fewer 
hoops to jump through once the project was started. By going through certification municipalities 
were supposed to make many consequential changes: minimize zoning regulations, streamline the 
review process that private development projects go through, actively construct local buy-in that 
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supports private development, and educate council members on the “best practices” for 
redevelopment.2 
 
In other words, the redevelopment process advocated for by the state was for developers, it wasn’t 
for the communities that needed the help. The whole certification process was creating more work 
for already overburdened municipal employees, while clearing as many barriers as possible for the 
better-resourced real estate developers. It then comes as no surprise that none of the cities and 
villages in my field site (and very few across Michigan) had been certified by the time of this 
webinar in 2019. But, this did not mean that the cities and villages in my field site weren’t being 
encouraged to engage in similar discourses and practices around redevelopment. In fact, many 
were still very much invested in the project of building up their communities as being “ready” for 
redevelopment. I briefly return to Calumet, whose blight problem had become something of a pet 
project for a handful of people involved in regional economic development, and show how the 
grooming of poor communities for capital extraction also happens outside state-sanctioned 
channels such as the RRC. 
 
Battling blight in Calumet 
In November 2018, a half-year before the Family Dollar roof collapsed, I attended an event at 
Keweenaw Coffee Works, the launch of a new kiosk that was installed in the coffee shop’s lobby. 
The kiosk (pictured on the following page) would allow local residents to submit their ideas for 
inventions or businesses to Invent@NMU, the innovation and entrepreneurship office of Northern 
Michigan University, located a few hours away in Marquette. Once submitted, the staff of 
Invent@NMU would evaluate the idea for its market potential and provide the aspiring 
entrepreneur who submitted it with resources on transforming the idea into a business.  
 
Sitting down at the table in the center of their lobby, I met an employee of a local bank who also 
happened to be on the board of Main Street Calumet, the new Executive Director of the local non-
profit theatre, and chatted with a handful of familiar people from regional economic development 
                                               
2 The Redevelopment Ready Communities program does not provide tax breaks for developers, but other 
complementary programs in the State of Michigan do (e.g., Renaissance Zones). I will discuss some programs that 
provide tax breaks for specific geographies in Chapter Five.  
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organizations who had traveled up from Houghton and Hancock for the launch. I had never seen 
the coffee shop so packed. It was clear that this was an occasion to be celebrated and that the 
Calumet residents present were excited to see the Village being more incorporated into broader 
regional conversations about innovation and entrepreneurship. The CEO of the MTEC SmartZone 
located in Houghton and Hancock opened up the festivities. Lauding the work of local artists and 
entrepreneurs, she exclaimed: 
 
 “Make all the blocks in Calumet look like the first one!” 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The Invent@NMU kiosk in Keweenaw Coffee Works. Photo by author. 
 
The Village of Calumet was the historic downtown of the surrounding area, including Calumet 
Township and the Villages of Calumet and Laurium. The area, which had lost over 80% of its 
population since the mining boom in the early 20th century (Winkler et al., 2016), had large 
amounts of abandoned property, both residential and commercial. Municipal leaders and economic 
developers in the region saw blight as a major barrier to achieving the goals of economic growth 
they had for the Keweenaw. Blight, and the accompanying local attitudes that local leaders viewed 
as allowing it to permeate, was a liability to potential opportunities for redevelopment for the towns 
in my fieldsite. As one city official I spoke to told me, “It’s been a kind of ‘have your cake and eat 
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it too’ thing with people, because we want all these cool people moving here, but we don’t want 
too many of them because we still want to be able to throw trash in our front yard.” What the city 
official was describing here was the general desire for a growth in the unique amenities in the 
region among the local population, which in his eyes necessitated the attraction of hip, young 
entrepreneurial outsiders. Yet, due to local attitudes towards property maintenance, he viewed 
cultures of blight tolerance as being at odds with the kinds of economic growth and amenity 
creation he believed Keweenaw communities needed. 
 
This was especially relevant in Calumet, whose decades of continued population loss led to large 
swaths of abandoned property. Blight remediation had been an ongoing concern for years, and was 
still a topic in Calumet at the time of my fieldwork. For example, research in the early 2010s by 
Richelle Winkler and others (2016) in the Calumet arts scene documented the work of artists who 
created art to put in the front windows of abandoned storefronts in the Village as an attempt to 
beautify a largely abandoned downtown corridor. In 2016, a local economic developer started a 
taskforce to tackle blight and housing in Calumet, calling it the Bring Back Calumet Taskforce. 
The group sought a combination of public funding from the Michigan State Housing and 
Development Authority (MSHDA) and local counties, along with private funding from local 
banks. Using this funding, they proposed to rehabilitate city-owned blighted properties that were 
deemed as historic and recoverable. In practice, the taskforce was able to rehabilitate the roof and 
foundation of one building in an effort to make it attractive to developers who could redevelop it 
fully once it was purchased. Similar to the tactics proposed by MEDC through their RRC program, 
this property is now advertised alongside two other historic properties on the Village website as 
being ready for redevelopment. It remains empty four years later. 
 
The Village of Calumet was unable to participate in the formal RRC process due to municipal 
constraints including limited staffing and funds. But, it has deployed, via the Taskforce and other 
initiatives, the same tactics that are advocated for by MEDC for redevelopment and revitalization. 
While there were key barriers to participating in these state programs, the intended message was 
clear, and places like Calumet still sought to attract outside developers by using public money to 
rehabilitate buildings to be privatized. To further aid in this process and streamline the Village’s 
ability to combat the at times overwhelming volume of blight, a new blight enforcement measure 
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was passed during my fieldwork. Aided by the Michigan Municipal League, a private non-profit 
that provides municipal education and guidance for normative growth and development purposes, 
Lilith and other Village leaders were able to pass a measure at the Village Council that made blight 
a civil infraction, meaning that the Village could punish property owners if they didn’t comply. 
Further, the same empowered the Village to “stabilize a building and rectify problems” when it 
was deemed as “endangered” (Jaehnig, 2018).  
 
What I aim to show in this chapter is how state entities and local municipalities codify 
redevelopment into their day-to-day economic development work in an effort to transform their 
communities and make them more accessible to external developers.  
 
When cities and villages see the Redevelopment Ready Communities certification process as out 
of their reach, too expensive, and too arduous, I demonstrate how Calumet works to adopt the same 
tactics advocated, but piecemeal. This was happening in many of the towns in my fieldsite, but I 
chose to describe Calumet here because of the severity of their blight problem. As the official from 
Allegan hinted to in the webinar, this process, whether RRC certified or not, is about making sure 
that rural towns are able to “compete” with the larger cities in the State for redevelopment 
opportunities. But, this begs the question, why must these municipalities compete to begin with 
when so many continue to face various impacts of deindustrialization and economic collapse? 
Shouldn’t state and local governments be promoting equitable access to development opportunities 
for all communities, rather than pitting them against each other for the attention of real estate 
developers?  
 
In the next section, I turn to a second state initiative that sought to codify and digitize infrastructural 
assets in low-resourced communities throughout the state as a way to give communities access to 
equitable development opportunities. Yet, as I show, this process has also fallen short of its mission 
and I will demonstrate how it has also been appropriated to serve the needs of wealthy outsiders 
in the name of equitable development. 
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Infrastructure Data and Small-Town Reality 
 
Extensive committee work, documentation, and other knowledge require expertise and time that 
can challenge small governments. 
“A lot of communities want zoning for obvious reasons, but nowadays if you want to have 
legally defensible zoning, you also have to have a master plan. There were new planning 
and zoning enabling acts passed [that made it required], so a lot of communities only have 
a master plan because they need it for zoning. A community is not required to have 
planning or zoning, and a lot of communities around here don’t, but if they have zoning 
they have to have planning. Even if they don’t have zoning, if they had formed a planning 
commission, the planning commission is required to develop a master plan. So, there are 
different intersecting mandates, but a master plan, if a community ends up developing one, 
has to have a capital improvements plan associated with it. And a capital improvements 
plan, in order to really make sense, needs to be based on asset data.”  
This quote, from an interview I conducted early in my fieldwork with the director of the Western 
UP Planning and Development Region (WUPPDR), is demonstrative of the complexity of 
municipal planning and development, and the demand for infrastructural data that drives zoning 
and current pushes for the digitization of infrastructural data that I explore in this section.  
 
In order to promote economic development, a community needs to be appropriately zoned, 
meaning that land needs to be designated as being for specific uses (e.g., residential, commercial, 
industrial). But to be able to enforce zoning regulations in the State of Michigan, a municipality is 
required to have a master plan, which acts as a sort of guide for a community moving forward in 
its land use and growth. Master plans are likely to include ideas for community growth and stability 
like routine infrastructure maintenance of municipal owned utilities, plans for road expansion, 
park/green space expansion, and those types of things that a municipality would do to support the 
day-to-day functioning and health of its community. As the director noted above, these require a 
capital improvements plan which outlines the associated expenses and how the municipality is 
planning on paying for each of them. Based on best practices, these expenditures need to be based 
on asset data.  
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The creation of this asset data is central to the remainder of this chapter and is what I explain here. 
Two things happened in the five years leading up to my fieldwork that would allow me to think 
more critically about the role of infrastructural data in the redevelopment of my rural fieldsite. The 
first was the state-supported expansion of asset management programs for sewer and wastewater 
infrastructure starting in 2013 and ending in 2017. The second was the expanded support for asset 
management through regionally integrated asset management systems that started in 2018 and 
continue through the time of writing by the Michigan Infrastructure Council. 
 
In this section, I describe how the need for asset management became central to efforts to digitize 
rural infrastructure assets in the Keweenaw Peninsula. I show that while asset management is 
supposed to level the playing field for low-resourced municipalities so that they too may have 
access to digitized infrastructure data, this access is not fully realized in the small municipalities 
of my fieldsite. Despite the lack of usefulness, I discovered its use is still being expanded 
throughout the State and my fieldsite. 
 
What is asset management in Michigan? 
Asset management here deals explicitly with the management of infrastructural assets, such as 
roads, sewers, and power lines, that are public forms of infrastructure in which a governmental 
body has made a long-term investment. As Cagle (2003) states, “asset management is embodied 
in knowing the following about the infrastructure: What you have; What condition it is in; What 
the financial burden will be to maintain it at a targeted condition” (p.1-2). Infrastructure is 
evaluated on those types of measures and that data is collected, mapped, preserved, and maintained 
on geographic information systems (GIS). It is often done in a way that standardizes the data and 
allows for interoperability among regional, state, and federal bodies (Baird, 2011). The State of 
Michigan thus far has focused on asset management for road infrastructure and sewer and 
wastewater infrastructure. I focus on the process through which the state supported the exploration 
of asset management for sewer and wastewater (SAW) and its implications for rural 
redevelopment.   
 
In 2013, Michigan implemented state funding for SAW asset management through Enrolled House 
Bill 5673. The bill defined asset management as “the program that identifies the desired level of 
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service at the lowest life cycle cost for rehabilitating, repairing, or replacing the assets associated 
with a municipality’s wastewater or storm water system” and established grant and loan programs 
for local implementation of SAW programs (Enrolled House Bill 5673, 2012). $450 million was 
allocated, and cities, counties, townships, and/or publicly owned utility companies throughout the 
state were encouraged to apply for distribution of funds on a first-come, first-serve basis. The state 
distributed five rounds of support through 2017, and most of the entities in my fieldsite that were 
eligible, applied and received funding. 
 
The overall goal of the SAW grants was to modernize the maintenance of public infrastructure 
through the creation and central interoperable storage of digital data about sewer and wastewater 
infrastructure. In one ideal case from the blog of ESRI (Mann, 2018), the corporation who owns 
the GIS products that are used to visualize the data (i.e., ArcGIS), a township was able to use its 
SAW grant money to digitize its wastewater network so that it could streamline maintenance and 
help it respond to potential emergencies. ESRI’s blog post says that “the new asset management 
system moved [town name] from outdated manual processes to modern automated workflows.” 
The post continued by extolling that township staff now have a mobile app that the team uses to 
more closely monitor its water system and provide contextual data when things do go wrong. An 
important detail about Michigan’s SAW grant program was that funds were only allowed to be 
used to build an asset management system. Recipients of these state grants could hire contractors 
to build out GIS systems, televise water lines to help them evaluate existing infrastructure and 
identify problems, and create the data necessary to populate systems. But they could not be used 
for construction or improvement. In other words, if municipalities found a problem, it was up to 
them to fix it.   
 
“It gives more data, but it doesn’t necessarily make things quicker” 
By the time I spoke to city leaders in Hancock and Houghton in early 2019, both cities had 
completed their grants and submitted their final reports to the State. The City of Houghton used 
the SAW grant to compile an inventory of all sewer system assets, develop its Asset Management 
Plan, and develop GIS for tracking the data. The City’s plan included, 20-year capital 
improvements and expenses associated with creating and maintaining the associated database for 
the data. Through this process, the City was able to televise all municipal pipes and determined 
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that 53% was in “good” condition, 15% in “fair,” and 32% in “poor” condition. In their report, the 
City documents how it intends to “address deficiencies” at a projected cost of $8 million, which 
they currently do not have, by moving forward securing funds from the United States Department 
of Agriculture’s Rural Development loan and grant funding, and through proposed projects by the 
Michigan Department of Transportation.  
 
The City of Hancock conducted a similar process and found that 46% of its main sewer lines were 
in poor condition, and 85% of the pipes surveyed that connect the main sewer to homes and 
businesses were in poor condition. The City estimated that the total costs to address the findings 
would be nearly $10 million, which would be secured using some existing City funds (~$1.5 
million) and borrowing the remainder through municipal bonds. In other words, both cities found 
significant issues with their sewer and wastewater systems, and both would need to borrow heavily 
to resolve the issues. 
 
When I spoke to city leaders in Houghton and Hancock, both told a different story than the 
optimistic one ESRI’s blog described, in which integration of new mapping technologies into day-
to-day work was relatively simple. Both city leaders told me that the adoption of GIS was driven 
more by the needs of the engineering firms they contracted than it was by the actual needs of their 
Department of Public Works (DPW) employees. As one of them said, “The value of GIS is 
oftentimes more for the engineers and not for the municipal DPW crew. Because my DPW crew 
are one main water person and one main sewer person and they know the system. They don’t need 
to look [it] up.” In other words, the GIS was a way of codifying tacit knowledge for contracted 
engineers that already existed in the DPW employees. In the case of these neighboring small rural 
cities (a combined population of only ~12,000), the infrastructure that existed was small enough 
and their employees familiar enough with it, that it was the engineering firms that were the ones 
who largely advocated that the cities request the SAW grants to begin with. Neither city had 
engineers on staff, so it was local engineering firms who were contracted to do any sort of 
engineering work that would be necessary for sewer and wastewater maintenance and construction.  
 
A city leader from Hancock explained to me how he perceived the potential of asset management 
technology and GIS, “would solve, be the cure-all, for efficiency and quick access to hydrants and 
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valves.” He said that in the way it was portrayed by the state, that “if you have a water leak, you 
could immediately get the guys called out and he could, based on his laptop...go right to the water 
break and shut it off.” However, he continued, “it’s not as practical as operationalized.” Rather, he 
explained a complex process and said that it might be possible to identify the locations of the 
breaks quicker, but that the work of the DPW employees would not actually get completed any 
quicker. Rather, the familiarity the employees already had with their small sewer and wastewater 
system most of the time already gave them the tacit knowledge they needed to quickly identify 
where the issues would occur. In his words: “It gives more data, but it doesn’t necessarily make 
things quicker.” 
 
Another city leader, this one from Houghton who went to college to be an engineer, told me that 
his background allowed him to see the benefits in these types of systems. He saw the promises that 
new digital tools could provide small cities like his. But as he noted, it would be impossible for a 
city of its size to hire a staff person that could dedicate their time to facilitating the use of these 
systems, including asset management systems: 
“I look at my budget and that’s $170,000 between the equipment, payroll, benefits, and 
everything else. Where do I get another 8% of my general fund? Where do you want me to 
cut it? Should we not mow the grass in the park in the summer? That’s really what it comes 
down to. Right now, I’m trying to figure out how to get another police officer. It’s like, 
what don’t you want to do? Well I guess we’re not buying Christmas decorations this year!” 
Here we see how it’s not only the usefulness of the system that matters to its potential 
implementation, but its associated expense. In a city with such a small budget, investing the amount 
of money it would take to actually operationalize asset management systems is essentially 
unattainable. 
 
While Houghton and Hancock are the most well-resourced municipalities in my fieldsite with 
respect to budgets and tax-base, they were ultimately only able to build out their asset management 
systems because of SAW grants and guidance from their contracted engineering firms. Despite the 
potential for transforming how municipalities are able to maintain and track infrastructure, the 
systems would not actually be used as they were intended to. Instead, the SAW data sat on laptops 
that had been purchased as part of their grants, only to be used and updated by the engineering 
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firms who used it in their contract work. One major goal of the state’s SAW program, was to use 
asset management to democratize access to digital infrastructure data. What we see here is that it 
largely doesn’t matter if communities have access to the data if they don’t have the funds or needs 
to utilize it. But instead of focusing on funding cities so they could utilize the existing asset 
management systems, economic development organizations, spurred by expanded programs from 
the State of Michigan, saw other promising futures for the infrastructural data that went beyond 
the intended goal of infrastructure maintenance.  
 
Expanding asset management in the Keweenaw Peninsula 
Despite shortcomings in places like Houghton and Hancock, asset management was seen as such 
a positive, data-driven model for infrastructure maintenance and development that the State sought 
to expand its usefulness beyond its existing function for roads and sewer and wastewater. A 
statewide 21st Century Infrastructure Commission was created in 2016 that sought to better 
understand how asset management could be used for all types of infrastructure. Alongside that, 
new asset management funds were made available as part of the state’s Regional Prosperity 
Initiative (RPI). As part of then Governor Rick Snyder’s push to promote economic development 
and growth as much as possible during his tenure, his administration had created the RPI, which 
granted relatively small chunks of money through regional grant clearinghouses, like WUPPDR, 
whose director was introduced at the beginning of this section. While the funding priorities of RPI 
were relatively consistent, promoting economic growth in Michigan, the program encouraged 
certain focus areas each year that were incentivized with extra funding mechanisms. Starting in 
the 2018 fiscal year, and continuing until the RPI was dismantled in 2020, the initiative made 
funding available for what they called “integrated asset management.” 
 
Over the course of my fieldwork, I spent a lot of time familiarizing myself with the work of 
WUPPDR’s project manager, Brent, who oversaw the expansion of asset management work 
throughout their six county service region. Brent’s work to get integrated asset management off 
the ground was incredibly demanding and complex. The goal of the integrated asset management 
program was to compile regionwide data about as many public assets as possible. As Brent told 
me in our first interview, “the demand for a product like an asset management system is driven by 
someone [because] it’s more useful to make economic decisions when you have access to data 
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rather than not.”  Beyond water infrastructure and road infrastructure, this project was intended to 
get data about sidewalks, land parcel data including zoning, electrical infrastructure, hospitals, and 
schools. While this might seem like relatively standard work in the world of large city urban 
planning, this undertaking in the Keweenaw, which was still in its very early stages in 2018-2019, 
was massive. Some of this work, beyond water and road infrastructure, had already started. But as 
I demonstrated with Houghton and Hancock, the actual process of creating asset management data 
was expensive and much of the data creation would be very difficult to bring to fruition.  
 
In Calumet, for example, a Michigan Tech professor had secured grant funding to do a public GIS 
program in which his lab hired local high school students and trained them in infrastructure data 
capture and mapping. As Brent described it, “You can send anyone out with the GPS unit or a 
smart phone and as long as you have a pre-established rubric for grading these things out, it’s 
pretty straightforward.” The purpose here was both to map a community’s assets so they could be 
accessed digitally and therefore be interoperable with other asset management systems in ArcGIS. 
By taking a public GIS route, the project hoped to democratize the ability to make data-informed 
decisions on infrastructure planning while training local students in useful digital skills in the 
process. Yet, this piecemeal process of creating bits of asset management data here and there in 
different communities was not going to meet the expectations of a broader integrated asset 
management program, much less improvements in the physical condition of the assets themselves. 
 
One of the major problems that Brent and others ran into while doing this work was the lack of 
digital documentation of infrastructural assets. Either the data was incompatible because it was too 
old, or didn’t exist to begin with. “Some of our communities in Ontonagon County for example, 
they’re all still using old paper-based maps. They don’t have their parcels digitized at all,” he said. 
Another township, where he lived in Houghton County, only had light poles and roads to worry 
about. The roads were digitized as part of the state’s earlier push to create asset management 
systems for all federally funded roads, but the light pole data didn’t exist: “We have a really good 
relationship with the township supervisor there...theoretically someone could go out and map that 
and it would probably be a really quick and simple project. But they don’t have it because they’ve 
never had the in-house expertise or resources to do it.” The top goal for Brent with region-wide 
integrated asset management was the ability to establish “an even playing field” for communities 
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all over the region, even if they didn’t have the resources. Yet, the problem remained as it did in 
Houghton and Hancock: how do municipalities pay for the issues they discover in these 
infrastructure mapping processes? Integrated asset management is essentially about mapping 
infrastructure, not funding it. And the State of Michigan, and the federal government at large, have 
been promising infrastructure funding for years, with limited systematic results. 
 
What I have shown here is the growing importance of asset management among municipalities 
across the State of Michigan, and how the State has built up grant programs to facilitate that 
growth. The need for these kind of programs became acutely important after the Flint water crisis 
started in 2014. But as I’ve shown here, asset management data in the Keweenaw benefits the local 
engineering firms that municipalities hire, rather than the day-to-day use by city employees who 
actually maintain the water infrastructure. The SAW grants were seen as a capacity building tool, 
one which would allow lower-resourced municipalities to start to develop a fluency with new 
digital tools that would put them on an “even playing field” with other communities that had these 
tools at their disposal.  But, in reality these tools did not deliver the promises that were initially 
offered. Despite this, asset management programs are currently being expanded across the region, 
to all types of infrastructure. But, as I demonstrate in the next section, asset management data has 
become another tool to attract outside real estate investment. 
 
From Infrastructure Maintenance to Investment Firms 
 
Developing an “even playing field” of digital infrastructure data was key because of the diverse 
ways that integrated asset management systems could be used, according to Brent. In particular, 
one of their goals was for it to be used for streamlining access to development opportunities, 
similar to the Redevelopment Ready Communities initiative. 
“We're seeing from our end oftentimes when it comes to the development opportunities, at 
least this is what we're hearing from other economic development officers in the state, that 
individuals that wanted to come in and do development projects and specific communities 
are searching, they're using tools online. Usually they're not looking at a specific 
geography, [but are] looking nationally if you will. So, there they have a limited amount 
of site characteristics that would make for a good development project for them. And when 
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you're looking at potentially thousands of different sites, you know, if you do can't check 
off all the boxes, you know, that meets their criteria, then they're just gonna move on to the 
next community... so having something in a GIS database, we could use that as a 
promotional tool if you will, for development opportunities for individuals looking for 
those development.” 
While the data was supposed to identify problems and priorities for infrastructure maintenance, it 
was actually in practice becoming very expensive public relations material. As part of their push 
for an integrated asset management system in the Keweenaw, Brent and the staff at WUPPDR 
were pushing local cities, counties, villages, and townships to adopt open data policies. The open 
data policies, paired with a push for the expansion of digital infrastructure data, meant that 
WUPPDR would be able in the future to create regional GIS systems that include diverse data, 
including parcel data with zoning, infrastructure that runs to property, and other data that might 
influence a development opportunity (e.g., roads with necessary weight allowances for shipping, 
nearby schools, access to rail).  
 
Here I turn to this transformation of purpose for asset management systems, from something that 
was originally presented as granting equitable access to infrastructure data to help municipalities 
of all sizes make data-informed decisions, to something that could build on opportunities to attract 
outside development firms who are searching nationwide for investment properties. I exemplify 
and unpack this through a conflict in Keweenaw County between WUPPDR, the county 
government, and the county’s economic development committee, in order to open up parcel data. 
I show how outside investment is framed as both a necessity for improving the future of a region 
and something that should be avoided at the same time. Following, I turn to nationwide rural data 
dashboards created by the Center on Rural Innovation to show how this push for open municipal 
data in rural regions is directly tied to investment potential. 
 
Open data in open country 
The Keweenaw County Economic Development Committee (EDC) reformed in 2018 after a two-
year hiatus. In one of its earliest meetings it identified five priority areas to frame and guide their 
new work moving forward. These were: 1) broadband development and communications; 2) 
establish a small business revolving loan fund; 3) 100 good paying jobs; 4) land use issues; 5) 
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workforce development. As part of their work on land use issues, the idea of a centralized and 
publicly available GIS database was floated in one of their early meetings as something that would 
be helpful for their work, but they ran into issues with existing data that stymied this effort. There 
was confusion among county officials related to zoning, land easements, and what buildings and 
land were actually available. While the board focused on working with the county and community 
members to fix these data issues, the committee’s focus on GIS waned. In March 2019, after an 
inquiry from Brent, the committee picked back up its interest in GIS and invited WUPPDR to 
present on the topic the following month.  
 
Before the following month’s EDC meeting, committee members brought the issue to the County 
Commission, a board of elected officials who are responsible for county governance and oversee 
the county’s small staff. At the March 20 County Commission meeting, the EDC members were 
the last item on the agenda. The EDC members asked if it was possible to share the GIS data 
openly. A county staff person in charge of the data said that the county makes enough money 
selling it to maintain it, and a little extra that on top of that. She thought that opening up the data 
would be a bad idea because it would mean a loss in revenue. The county, she mentioned, gets 
$1/parcel when realtors and others ask for it, and $1250 for the entire set. Further, there was a side 
conversation at the meeting about potential privacy concerns sharing people’s names associated 
with parcel data. While that information was already available if someone paid the county, they 
were concerned about making all of that available to anyone out on the Internet. The board declined 
and the matter seemed settled before Brent and the folks at WUPPDR were able to make their case. 
 
The next EDC meeting was a few weeks later in April. Brent and the Director from WUPPDR 
gave an extensive presentation on GIS and data sharing. They referred to the county’s existing 
model as the “pay to play option,” and told the EDC that it was “not in the county’s best interest.” 
They believed there were new economic development benefits that could be realized with what 
they called “open access,” which outweighs the potential risks, such as the loss of revenue, privacy 
concerns, and the potential for wrong information to be shared publicly and become a liability. 
The suggestion was that Keweenaw County was behind the times because the expectation was that 
parcel data would be openly available anywhere that was wanting to attract economic 
development. By the following month’s EDC meeting, there had not been any movement from the 
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County, but EDC members reiterated in their conversation that the “lack of data sharing could be 
costing the county” and that it could be affecting the county’s ability to expand broadband, improve 
healthcare access, and provide educational opportunities for its citizens.  
 
While I was not privy to the conversations that happened privately between county commissioners, 
EDC members, and WUPPDR employees, Brent had earlier revealed to me that these kinds of 
situations are generally resolved with individual commissioners outside the meetings, so that 
WUPPDR could build a consensus before making it official with the county. They had essentially 
gone about it the wrong way this time and the EDC was too quick to jump the gun before getting 
buy-in from commissioners. Fortunately for WUPPDR and the EDC, these later conversations 
worked, and in the June County Commission meeting, a county staff person announced that 
Keweenaw County would be making the requested parcel data available, but without any owner 
data. This would support the economic development goals of the county, while preserving the 
privacy of its citizens. 
 
What we see here is how economic developers are able to appeal to the needs of rural and remote 
civic leaders. The County was generally suspicious of too much growth. Keweenaw County as a 
governmental entity was worried about its ability to balance economic growth with the “wilderness 
characteristics” it had. Take for example, this quote from the County’s “Blueprint for the Future”: 
“Growth is important for Keweenaw County, but if it is not balanced and sensible; the County 
will pay a high price and ultimately lose the intrinsic value that makes it unique. It is important 
to remember that Keweenaw County is a rural county with unmatched wilderness 
characteristics, and maintaining this character is a vital component of this plan. It is also 
important to consider that all the lands of the County contribute to the economic prosperity 
of the area, although contributions toward quality of life, heritage, wildlife habitat, water 
quality and open space protection may be difficult to quantify.” 
In this case, WUPPDR was able to address some of the growing concerns of county officials, 
specifically access to broadband, healthcare, and the education of its citizens. This led to a 
contradiction of sorts, between what redevelopment and economic growth are supposed to look 
like (e.g., outside investment) and how the county in reality wants to avoid much of that in favor 
of recognizing the intrinsic value that its “wilderness characteristics” provide.  
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This is just one example of attempts by WUPPDR and other organizations to build up the data 
available for their integrated asset management plan. At the time of my fieldwork, Brent and 
colleagues were very early in the process, mostly just trying to get access to data if it existed, and 
identifying where they might need to support the creation of new data. In other words, this is only 
the beginning stages of the work to create a centralized data repository for targeted economic 
development. However, other organizations have already been working to collate nationwide data 
on rural communities to streamline real estate investment opportunities and make rural data more 
accessible. Next, I briefly turn to one of these organizations and their maps that hope to funnel 
investors to rural communities, particularly ones located in Opportunity Zones. 
 
Rural data dashboards 
The Center on Rural Innovation (CORI) is a self-proclaimed “action tank” started in 2017 in rural 
Vermont. It works to promote innovation hub strategies in rural communities throughout the 
United States in order to encourage participation in the digital economy. Its most recent initiative 
is called The Rural Opportunity Map.3 The Map, which is actually a portal with multiple different 
maps, collates and filters a variety of national level data and allows users to filter this data in 
different ways. According to the initiative, the Map “was born out of the need for a new framework 
to understand opportunities in small town America in the 21st century” (“The Rural Opportunity 
Map”). The initiative is sponsored by the Mastercard Center for Inclusive Growth, Walmart, and 
Reid Hoffman (former COO of PayPal, and co-founder and former CEO of LinkedIn), among 
others. The Map is portrayed as a tool that empowers rural communities that wouldn’t normally 
have the expertise to present these data in a usable fashion to connect to outside investment 
opportunity. In particular, this initiative situates itself in response to the recent federal Opportunity 
Zone program. Opportunity Zones, many of which are in rural areas, are geographic areas in which 
investors can take the gains they’ve realized on a past investment and reinvest them into a new or 
growing business. If they keep their money invested in the company for long enough, they no 
longer have to pay taxes on the gains that they invested.4 Here I unpack CORI’s Rural Startup 
                                               
3 https://ruralopportunitymap.us/ 
4 I return to Opportunity Zones and their role in attracting investment to rural communities in Chapter Five. 
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Scout Map, the very first map they made available, to better understand what are seen as desirable 
metrics to attract outside investment in a data-driven decision making process. 
“There are tech startups across rural America prime for Opportunity Fund investments. Use 
this map to discover rural Opportunity Zones with robust or emerging tech sectors” (“The 
Rural Opportunity Map”). 
This is the language that encourages users to try out the Rural Startup Scout map, one of the 
multiple maps that are on the map portal. Navigating to the map, users are asked to pick states or 
regions (e.g., the Midwest) to explore. Once you have selected a geography, the map is generated 
with yellow and purple areas highlighted (see Image 3.2). Digging deeper, you learn that the yellow 
areas are Opportunity Zones and the purple areas are areas in which fiber broadband exists. The 
dashboard provides many filters, which I will go into some detail here. At the very top of the 
dashboard is the ability to filter based upon definitions of rural used by a variety of federal 
agencies, including the United States Department of Agriculture and the Census. When users select 
a community on the map, a “Community Summary” pops up with a link to the Wikipedia page 
about the community and a “Federal Grants” button, which takes the user to a list of federal grants 
that the community in which the Opportunity Zone sites has received since 2017.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: The Center on Rural Innovation’s Rural Startup Scout Map 
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Below that is a variety of data with attached filters that can be applied to find communities that 
have similar or different characteristics. For example, below how each community applies to 
various definitions of rural is what they call “stacked government incentives” (See Image 3.5). 
This shares how much of the community is part of an Opportunity Zone and how much is eligible 
for New Market Tax Credits, a tax credit program administered by the Department of Treasury. 
Below that is various data about broadband availability, followed by proximity to institutions of 
higher education, patent activity, venture capital investment, STEM talent metrics, job data, and 
finally socioeconomic data.  
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Figure 3.5: Data filtering options on the Rural Startup Scout Map. The data provided in the images is about Keweenaw County. 
 
What do the displayed data categories tell us about the perceived priorities of Opportunity Zone 
investors? What we see here is how opportunity for investment is tied to explicit kinds of 
knowledge about rural communities, including the ability to fall in line with normative 
expectations of innovation through access to fiber broadband, patent activity, and venture capital 
activity. Navigating the data dashboard for the Opportunity Zone that occupies all of Keweenaw 
County (see images above), we see a very rural place, with low access to Internet, no patent 
activity, and no venture capital activity. While we get a sense that there are a growing number of 
jobs, it doesn’t tell us what industry they are in.5 We also see that incomes are declining, the 
population is declining, and there is little opportunity for young people. It paints a rather bleak 
picture for the kinds of “opportunity” that something like this map can provide for the people of 
Keweenaw County.  
 
This data and this map are likely different from what is being called for by the State of Michigan 
in their push for integrated asset management and the work of WUPPDR in their push to gather 
all public land and infrastructure data into a centralized database for the purposes of attracting 
outside development. My purpose here isn’t to show that there are certain kinds of data that are 
better for rural communities to find investment, or to demonstrate that maps are useless for places 
like Keweenaw County. Rather my purpose is to show the variety of ways that asset data and other 
                                               
5 Based on American Community Survey data documented in Chapter One, I would estimate that these job increases 
are only in service economy jobs.  
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data is utilized to lobby for specific kinds of futures. What I want to show is how land, people, and 
data judgements that portray them as the right or wrong kind of rural get codified into new systems 
for managing data that will make it easier to realize investment potential. In the case of asset 
management systems, it is the ability to demonstrate that certain land has the right kinds of 
infrastructure assets in order to facilitate redevelopment and economic growth. In the case of The 
Rural Opportunity Map, it is the ability to parse and find rural regions based on their ability to 
conform to normative expectations around financialization and capitalism that say that patent 
activity, STEM talent, venture capital, and broadband are the best ways to realize the innovation 
potential of a place.  
 
In doing this, both the movement towards integrated asset management in Michigan and the ability 
to discover hidden rural tech talent in an Opportunity Zone portray access to data about a place as 
a major barrier to the development potential of a rural region. By packaging the right kind of data 
about a rural place in an appealing enough way and presenting it publicly on the Internet, both of 
these initiatives advocate that investment potential will be realized. But, there are no questions 
asked about why certain places have the right kind of data and other places do not. Rather than 
build up data dashboards that portray rural regions that need the most assistance, as Opportunity 
Zones are intended, these forms of data dashboards only portray where the most “opportunity” is 
using a particular framework of what is successful investment. As I will show in Chapter Five, 
access to tools and programs like these are arguably concentrating new resources in the already 
better-resourced rural communities, who fit into the normative narratives of what it means to be a 
progressive, innovative, and future-driven society.  
 
Codifying Rural Readiness for Digital Futures in the Keweenaw 
 
In this chapter, I show how redevelopment and asset management initiatives are largely predicated 
on the contemporary idea that access to data is one of the major barriers to rural redevelopment. I 
have shown how the adoption of asset management tools is facilitated by state programs that seek 
to create an equal playing field for municipalities of all sizes, but that these new tools do not have 
the same applicability to rural areas. Instead, I show how they introduce certain tactics and 
behaviors to rural economic development organizations and civic leaders that are selectively 
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picked up and deployed in communities in an effort to prepare rural communities for outside 
investment. Rather than become tools for making infrastructure maintenance more efficient, data-
drive asset management systems and other digital mapping platforms become digital homes for 
the kinds of data that are seen as being the most effective in attracting outside capital. In other 
words, having and sharing data is a sign of readiness. 
 
I see processes of asset digitization and the portrayal of rural regions as being ready for investment 
as what I call codifying rural readiness. By codifying rural readiness, I mean the process through 
which data about rural regions, including land, people, and infrastructure, are transformed, or 
codified, in a way that makes their perceived value more easily extractable. This process is done 
in the name of establishing an even playing field, through democratizing digital civic data for the 
future. The underlying, though often unspoken goal, is to bring these communities up to date, so 
that they may compete with the big urban centers that already have access to all the data they need. 
 
Even though this is done in the name of redevelopment, codifying rural readiness is unable to be 
performed at a scale that allows for the equitable access to redevelopment for all communities. 
Rather, this process encourages competition between disadvantaged rural communities that should 
be cooperating. Similar to “smokestack chasing,” where communities compete for industrial 
manufacturing opportunities, often through the process of providing tax breaks and shelling out 
precious community resources for a few hundred jobs, the competition aspect of redevelopment 
exposes disparities in contemporary approaches to redevelopment.  
 
Returning to the formations of rurality that I unpacked in my literature review, we can see this 
emerge in how redevelopment and asset management programs work to codify specific aspects of 
rural places in an effort to make them more consumable for the purposes of digital dashboards. 
Public infrastructure is visualized connected to undeveloped and underdeveloped land in an effort 
to portray it as ready for investment. In the case of the Rural Opportunity Map, federal definitions 
of rurality based on population size and proximity to metro areas are literally mapped alongside 
data points that seek to fit rural areas into narratives of economic progress in the innovation 
economy. On these maps, rural places that do not embody stereotypes of being left behind, opiate 
ridden, and technologically backwards are visually drawn to the forefront through filtering 
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techniques in order to make them more readily accessible to global capital investment. What they 
do not show is what is special or valued by rural residents, such as tight knit communities, natural 
beauty, a slower pace of life, or proximity to wilderness, such as described in Keweenaw County’s 
“Blueprint for the Future.” 
 
What I show here is that new forms of innovation and economic development are reshaping what 
the “right” and “wrong” kinds of rural are for new digital futures. The right kind of rural is easily 
accessible through GIS, ready for investment, and ready to jump at the drop of a hat to lay out the 
red carpet for outside developers, while simultaneously recognizing the specific assets that it can 
provide as a rural place to attract the right kinds of entrepreneurs to make this work possible. The 
wrong kind of rural is one without broadband, without the right kind of local legislation that 
eliminates blight, without infrastructure, and without digital data that can translate this to the 
outside world. What we see from organizations like the Center on Rural Innovation is actively 
reshaping what it means to be rural in the age of multinational investment firms and global flows 
of innovation. In the following chapter, I unpack exactly who are the rural entrepreneurs who can 
assist in doing this work, where they come from, and the tactics they use to enroll the specific parts 
of my rural fieldsite in capitalist visions of high-tech innovation.  
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Chapter Four: Crafting the Rural Entrepreneur 
 
 
 
Every year in December, the neighboring cities of Houghton and Hancock hold a joint City Council 
meeting. The purpose of the meeting is to recognize the interconnectedness of the towns and reflect 
on the past year. When it occurred during my fieldwork, in December 2018, it also doubled as a 
retirement ceremony of sorts for Clarissa Maki, then CEO of the MTEC SmartZone, a local self-
described “nonprofit entrepreneurial support center” that provides business incubation and 
accelerator services in the two cities. At the beginning of the meeting, each council passed an 
official resolution in appreciation of Clarissa’s work. She proceeded to give a speech to the joint 
councils, in which she described the history of the organization, which had started in 2003, with 
her taking the helm in 2011. She spoke about their SmartStart program as her primary legacy, the 
incubator program that works to bring potential entrepreneurs from initial idea through business 
plan. Extolling the work it takes to make a company successful, she applauded the region for its 
support of “risk-takers,” though noted that the Keweenaw was limited in the kinds of expertise it 
had: “The people who fund a company bring in expertise we don’t have in this community.” The 
ecosystem of support to make Houghton and Hancock a successful hub for entrepreneurs was 
provided from sources both internal and external to the region. Applauding this success, she closed 
her speech: 
 
 “Rural America is dying and we are not.” 
 
The regional exceptionalism that Clarissa claimed, Houghton and Hancock were thriving while 
other rural regions were dying, was embedded in the region’s ability to support entrepreneurs while 
simultaneously accepting help and expertise from outside the region. In other words, the 
Keweenaw had the potential, but it needed outside intervention in order to realize this potential. It 
is this relationship, and the resulting tension, between internal promise and external intervention, 
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that I turn to in this chapter. I document the tensions between insiders and outsiders; the tension 
that existed between the region’s unique cultural aspects that made it a place ripe for “risk takers” 
and the demands of contemporary economic development practices that promote economic growth 
models that are often at odds with the same regional culture.  
 
In this chapter, I ask, how does regional culture get taken up in processes of economic 
development? I look at the work of three economic development organizations (EDOs) working 
in the Keweenaw to promote and expand high-tech entrepreneurship and innovation throughout 
the region. In this case, I am in some ways “studying up” (Nader, 1972) as I am interested in how 
cultures of authority understand and carve out figures of entrepreneurship in this region. These 
experts innovate on new methods and technologies to produce a new rural entrepreneur subject, 
different from the Yooper identity that has come to represent everyday citizens of the UP. I show 
how community leaders and EDOs go through the process of identifying unique cultural forms 
from the region as cultural assets, rejecting the parts that are not in line with their entrepreneurial 
visions, transforming them into a type of rural capital (Bosworth and Turner, 2018) that can be 
leveraged by anyone, whether they are from the region or not. This rural capital is marketed to 
capture the “right” kinds of entrepreneurs and innovators to the region who can provide the “right” 
kind of interventions so that the region can ensure economic growth in high-tech economic sectors. 
I call this process crafting the rural entrepreneur, and through this chapter I show how it has 
become a key technique for growing entrepreneurship in the Keweenaw. Before I move into my 
data, I briefly return to literature on rural assets and capitals to situate this chapter. 
 
Recall the various literature in rural planning and development that I discussed in Chapter Two. 
Scholarship in asset based community development (ABCD), the community capitals framework, 
and rural capital all, in one form or another, advocated for different approaches to rural 
development that utilized uniquely rural forms of assets or capital. In the case of ABCD, Mathie 
and Cunningham (2003) argued that following a development approach entirely based on the needs 
of a community required that community groups frame needs as deficits to be solved for the sake 
of said community’s health and prosperity. This approach, they argue, portrays communities 
primarily in a negative light, and they propose an assets based approach that presents opportunities 
that arise out of the unique assets of rural communities. The community capitals framework, 
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developed by Flora, Flora, and colleagues (2018), argued that there are unique forms of capital 
that can be identified and leveraged in rural development processes to ensure successful 
community economic development, including natural capital, cultural capital, and others. The rural 
capitals framework (Bosworth and Turner, 2018) challenged the idea of a “rural penalty,” that 
rural places are inherently at a disadvantage for the growth of business in comparison to urban 
areas. They argue that rural communities need to stop “compensating for ‘not being urban’” (p. 9), 
and instead focus on the unique contributions that rural capital provides to businesses and other 
economic actors. Each of these approaches hinge on the ability for rural communities to identify 
and articulate, often in a branded and marketed way, the unique aspects that make them rural and 
worth investing in. 
 
The need to identify and leverage uniquely rural aspects of the Keweenaw came up frequently in 
my interviews. For example, in an early interview with John, the Director of a regional EDO, he 
told me:  
“There’s a lot of assets in the region. There’s a strong recognition of it...The key is how do 
you capitalize on those things in your respective areas as well as regionally...We have over 
300,000 people spread out over 15 counties. We are a small city...it’s how we really should 
look at ourselves if we want to change how [others see us], perception is everything... If 
we started to change how we looked at ourselves, we can now change how the rest of the 
world thinks of us, versus you know, Yoopers in Podunk nowhere in an economy driven 
by just tourism...” 
What John is suggesting here is also what is broadly advocated by rural community economic 
development in practice and in the scholarship above: the transformation of rural economic 
development from a focus solely on expected economic sectors (e.g., tourism) to one that breaks 
open the idea of what rural amenities, assets, and opportunities really are. Furthermore, John 
understands that part of this development will require not only others to change their perception 
of Yoopers, but also changing how Yoopers think about themselves and what they do in 
Keweenaw. The shift in view of both economic development and culture is wide-reaching and 
involves the remaking of the entire region. The goal is, in part, a cultural transformation of what 
and who the Yooper is today. 
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While research on ABCD, community capitals, and rural capital demonstrate that there are many 
different types of capital or assets that can be utilized for purposes of community and economic 
development, I focus in this chapter on a particular cultural asset: the Yooper. In the following 
pages, I demonstrate how the Yooper as a regional cultural form is identified as a unique rural 
asset. I show how certain aspects of the Yooper related to “grit” and “determination” are identified, 
negative aspects are rejected, and the remaining positive traits are marketed to capture the “right” 
kind of prospective entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs, who embody normative approaches to 
entrepreneurship and innovation that have come to dominate the high-tech sector, are seen as the 
ones who can truly spur the economic growth necessary to ensure the Keweenaw’s survival.  
 
Culture as Asset, Culture as Roadblock 
 
In this section, I turn my eye to the Yooper. I first explain who the Yooper is, where the cultural 
form emerged, and the valuable traits that the Yooper embodies. I then demonstrate how economic 
developers and community leaders portray the Yooper as lacking the right kind of ideas or skills, 
rejected as being antithetical to normative forms of economic growth that ensure the Keweenaw’s 
success in future high-tech capitalist economies. 
 
Embracing the Yooper 
I was sitting in a Detroit bar this guy he says to me 
You must be from Canada, Newfoundland maybe 
No, I said, you’re slightly off, as I pointed with my beer 
I’m from up above the mitten, this place over here 
I still wear my swampers and I drive my beat up truck 
I go up to Witch Lake every year to get my buck 
When I get back to Detroit all the guys they laugh at me 
Two weeks at the deer camp and I’m speaking Yoopanese 
 
I’m a Yooperman from Yooperland, you’ll find us everywhere 
I come here for the paycheck, but I miss that UP air 
I’m a Yooperman from Yooperland, I’m not down here by choice 
My heart is back in Yooperland but my ass is in Detroit 
 
My wife is from Mt. Clemens, she’s a troll from down below 
I dragged her up to Yooperland, she didn’t wanna go 
But when she saw the colors and she smelled that UP air 
Now she wants to quit her job and go to live up there 
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I work hard for Henry Ford I never miss a day 
I don’t like the city but I sure don’t mind the pay 
My kids were born below the bridge but their roots they can’t forget 
We head north to Yooperland every chance we get 
 
I’m a Yooperman from Yooperland, you’ll find us everywhere 
I come here for the paycheck, but I miss that UP air 
I’m a Yooperman from Yooperland, I’m not down here by choice 
My heart is back in Yooperland but my ass is in Detroit 
 
- Da Yoopers, “The Transplant Song” (1991) 
 
The passage above are lyrics from a song by Da Yoopers, a traveling comedy show and polka band 
that formed in Ishpeming, a town in the central UP, in the 1980s. The song tells the story of a man 
from the UP who works for the Ford Motor Company and lives in Detroit, but still feels a deep 
connection to the UP. The narrator of the song reminisces about the things he misses about the UP 
and how, when he returns downstate from trips to the UP, his Yooper dialect returns with him. 
With the slow economic decline of the UP through the 20th century and the opening of the 
Mackinac Bridge in the 1950s also came the increased migration of Yoopers downstate to find 
steady employment in automotive and other manufacturing industries. This contentious, but often 
necessary, relationship between the UP and downstate is nearly universal in families from the UP. 
Indeed, my own family had a partial exodus, with all but one of my mother’s siblings leaving the 
UP at some time or another to move downstate or out of state to pursue new careers. 
 
As sociolinguist Kathryn Remlinger (2017) argues, “Yooper not only defines the variety of English 
spoken in the UP, but it also symbolizes a regional identity” (p. 79). The regional identity of the 
Yooper signals both where one is from, but also the possession of the authentic country accent that 
Remlinger argues is attributed to a unique mixing of immigrant and Native American dialects in 
the UP in the late 19th- and early 20th-century. It’s important to note that it’s both the dialect and 
associated vocabulary (“swampers,” “troll”),1 but also the kinds of activities in which one engages, 
such as going to deer camp and driving a beat up truck. Remlinger argues that the Yooper dialect 
coalesced in the mid-20th century, and while the actual named cultural form of “Yooper” did not 
                                               
1 Swampers are “rubber boots worn by Yoopers in the spring during a muddy season” (Da Yoopers Glossary). Troll 
is the nickname given to people that live in the Lower Peninsula because they are “below” the Mackinac Bridge, 
referencing the classic children’s story, “Three Billy Goats Gruff.” 
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appear in print media until 1979, it was circulating in vocabulary prior to that date. But once it was 
named in that way, both the dialect/vocabulary and the related country culture of the UP began to 
be commodified by the tourist industry (for example, see below), and was helped along by popular 
figures in the UP like Da Yoopers. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Example of UP English. Photo by author. 
 
In this way, the image and cultural object that is the Yooper became something that could be 
leveraged by the tourist economy and related industries in the UP. Culture and language were 
transformed into pamphlets, bumper stickers, roadside stands, and other tools that business owners 
and locals could leverage to promote their local economy. In other words, Yooper culture went 
from being an immaterial cultural form to a tangible (and commodified) asset. 
-- 
The politics of who is actually a Yooper are complex and I have my own complicated relationship 
with the term that I hope will shed some light. I was born in the UP, but my immediate family 
moved downstate when I was still a baby. My mother’s side of the family is from the UP. Most of 
my father’s side of the family moved to the UP in the 1990s, making me the only member of my 
father’s family who was actually born in the UP. Growing up, my grandfather would always tell 
me, “You’re a Yooper, boy!” but I didn’t really feel like a Yooper. I didn’t have the accent and I 
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didn’t live there, I was just born there. It wasn’t until I moved back to the UP in 2017 that I felt 
more comfortable claiming the term for myself. Some people believe that the term only applies to 
those who grew up in the UP, meaning that transplants don’t get to claim it. Others believe that 
it’s a catch-all term for everyone who lives in the UP, no matter where you grew up. The latter is 
how it’s often used by civic and business leaders, as a term that represents all “citizens” of the 
UP.2  
-- 
In addition to the UP-wide dialect, vocabulary, and behavior that was attributed to the Yooper, 
some sub-regions, such as the Keweenaw, had additional ethnic tropes that were embraced as being 
a part of Yooper-ness. One that emerged in my fieldwork and became a central marketing tool for 
entrepreneurship and innovation initiatives is sisu.  
 
“Sisu” is a Finnish culturally constructed ethnic trait that has been widely adopted in the 
Keweenaw and neighboring regions with a high concentration of Finnish Americans.3 It has many 
interpretations, including: “the ability of individuals to push through unbearable challenges” 
(Lahti, 2019, p. 62); inner determination that is “likened to qualities such as perseverance, 
determination, courage and guts” (Lucas and Buzzanell, 2004, p. 280); and “guts, courage, 
determination, with just a trace of Finnish stubbornness” (Stoller, 1996, p. 154 quoting a 
participant). Derived from the Finnish word sisus, or the “internal organs of a human or animal 
body,” (Lahti, 2019, p. 62), it doesn’t have a direct translation into English, but as presented here, 
is broadly about pushing forward in the face of adversity by using one’s own perseverance and 
determination.  
 
In their research with Finnish American miners, Lucas and Buzzanell (2004) argue that “sisu” as 
a discursively constructed cultural trait is, “not a word or quality reserved for only Finnish miners 
but transcended ethnic heritage by its association with occupational values” (p. 281). In other 
words, “sisu” applied to miners no matter their ethnic background because of the kind of 
perseverance and determination that was required of work in a mine. In the Western UP, and 
                                               
2 The UP, at times, has had an antagonistic relationship with the rest of Michigan. There have been multiple 
unsuccessful secession movements, most recently in the 1980s (Binder, 1995) 
3 According to the 2000 US Census, Houghton and Keweenaw Counties, and four neighboring counties in the 
Western Upper Peninsula, were the only counties in the United States where Finns are the largest ethnic group. 
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particularly in the Keweenaw, “sisu” is similarly divorced from being exclusively applied to 
people of Finnish descent. Rather, it is a trait that is applied to Yoopers in the region more broadly, 
who must fight through long, cold winters year after year, who are often working class, and who 
have ingenuity and determination in making things work, even when they live in such a remote 
place with limited resources. In other words, while not all Yoopers have “sisu,” many of them do, 
and “sisu” has become part of this broader cultural form that represents the hard-working, 
backwoods Yooper. 
 
Throughout my fieldwork, I saw “sisu” and its characteristics being adopted by various initiatives 
promoting innovation and entrepreneurship in the region.4 For example, Innovation Shore, an 
initiative promoting the Keweenaw Peninsula as a unique region for rural innovation, described 
“sisu” in their profile of a Director of Engineering at a regional manufacturing facility: 
“The U.P. region has a legendary work ethic. There’s even a local word for it: sisu – the 
Finnish word for resilience and determination. [Director] says, ‘The U.P. is built on a work 
ethic that I’ve not seen anywhere else. Up here you’ll find the best and brightest, but also 
some of the hardest working people anywhere.’” 
The profile goes on to describe the UP as being in opposition to the “fast paced corporate world” 
of the likes of Google or Apple. Rather, innovative work in the region provides a work-life balance 
which is a direct result of the culture of hard work and perseverance that is at the central to the 
emic trait of “sisu.”  
 
While this is just one example, of which I will explore more later in the chapter, it demonstrates 
how certain aspects of the Yooper are taken up by innovation and entrepreneurship initiatives in 
order to market the region. In portraying “sisu,” and the determination, perseverance, and gutsiness 
that it represents, in this way, it became a source of a labor and self-reliance (Lindtner, 2020) that 
entrepreneurs and innovators could ensure would be available to them if they were located in the 
Keweenaw. But, not all aspects of the Yooper were seen as a positive contribution to the work of 
                                               
4 One limitation of this work is that I focused primarily on representations of the Yooper and “sisu” by community 
leaders and EDOs. This makes it so I am unable to contrast what Yooper and “sisu” mean to everyday Yoopers with 
how these traits are leveraged by the initiatives I describe in this chapter. 
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entrepreneurship and economic growth that was desired by community leaders and EDOs in my 
field site.  
 
 
 
Cultural roadblocks to economic growth 
While rural culture and community can be seen as a key tool for promoting economic opportunity 
and growth (Flora et al., 2018), as described above by John, it can also be a detriment to the “right” 
kinds of economic growth. Here I turn to interviews with civic leaders and a vignette from a 
statewide summit on the role of forests in the bioeconomy to show how Yoopers are portrayed as 
too nostalgic and anti-growth, failing to fit into narratives of economic growth that are so important 
to contemporary pushes for entrepreneurship and innovation. 
-- 
When you meet a new person in the Upper Peninsula, especially in places like Houghton and 
Hancock where there’s a lot of in- and out-migration, there is often a back-and-forth that happens 
early on in the meeting in which you tell a new acquaintance about your relationship to the region. 
This could be short, “I grew up in the Sault [short for Sault Ste. Marie] and moved to Houghton 
for college,” or could be a lengthy explanation depending on the conversation and the kind of 
posturing necessary to thoroughly explain your connection to the region.  
 
At the beginning of each of my interviews, I regularly had to convey my own relationship to the 
UP, usually some variation of, “My mom is from Manistique and my dad was stationed at K.I 
Sawyer [a former Air Force Base in the Central UP].” But in one interview with a local city leader 
I stumbled and said that I was born in Gwinn, the village adjacent to the former Air Force Base, 
rather than the base itself. He exclaimed, “So you’re a Gwinnbilly! I’m from Mohawk.” Both 
Gwinn and Mohawk are towns on the edge of influence from the larger towns in the UP: Gwinn 
(pop. 2000) about 30 minutes from Marquette (pop. 21,000), Mohawk (pop. 1100) about 30 
minutes from Houghton and Hancock.5 Both Gwinn and Mohawk have a reputation for being 
                                               
5 Gwinn is not a suburb of Marquette, nor is Mohawk a suburb of Houghton and Hancock. Rather, my use of “edge 
of influence” is meant to denote they are the closest big town and where places like Walmart are.  
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towns that reinforce some of the negative stereotypes associated with Yoopers (e.g., rednecks with 
backwards attitudes). 
 
Later in that same interview, we were talking about how EDOs attract business to the UP and we 
turned to the Yooper stereotype: 
“It’s so difficult [to combat negative rural stereotypes]. That’s one of the things that we 
seem to battle against. I think it was last summer, [he starts an aside] I still have my 
Mohawk accent. I know that. And you should hear me when I get with my peeps. It really 
gets thick. [he returns to his thought] But there was, the News or the Free Press or MLive 
or somebody had this article about the ghost towns of the U P. And I'm like, ‘Doesn't this 
enrage anyone else?’ You know, that seems to be consistently [pause], we don't get articles 
in Crain’s6 or anything else about the great things going on. You know, the most popular 
article this summer is, you know, about some toothless redneck, you know, who picks cans 
for a living, you know... we're kind of to blame. Yoopers are to blame for that a little bit 
because we embraced that whole, you know, Yooper [said in deeper accent] culture. And 
it was those damn guys in Ishpeming, they started the whole thing.”7 
The city leader here was lamenting how, in his view, the Yooper stereotype contributed to negative 
perceptions of the region that were reproduced in statewide news. The article in question (pictured 
below) was a longform piece in the Detroit Free Press, documenting the few remaining residents 
of the ghost towns scattered throughout the Keweenaw Peninsula. The article opened with a story 
of a man who lives in one of the towns describing where he lives and why he lives there, including 
how he spends most of his time fishing and cutting wood to sell. The article goes on to highlight 
other residents of some of the regional ghost towns, their businesses, and narrations of their 
connections to the region, often driving their desire to stay in the ghost towns.  
                                               
6 Crain’s is a business news publication out of Detroit. 
7 This is a reference to Da Yoopers, the band whose lyrics open up this section.  
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Figure 4.2: Media representation of UP ghost towns. Screenshot captured by the author in March 2018. 
 
These lifestyles were seen as embodying the negative parts of the Yooper cultural form; Yoopers 
were portrayed as living in the middle of nowhere, surviving off the land, and nostalgic for a 
specific kind of past where the mill town or mining town was still thriving.  This nostalgia of 
extraction economies, remoteness, and land-based economies are the bad stereotypes that were 
most often picked up by the press, rather than the “sisu” described earlier. The city leader from the 
previous quote was able to shed the Yooper backwardness of Mohawk, along with some of the 
accent, and was able to improve himself. He took offense at the way Yoopers would be stereotyped 
because of the Free Press article. The negative portrayal sat in contrast to the kinds of innovative 
rural futures that entrepreneurs, city leaders, and economic developers were trying to build in 
places like Houghton and Hancock. It is this kind of anti-growth and nostalgic depictions of the 
Yooper, with its own history and engagement in the U.S. resource extraction economy, that city 
leaders, entrepreneurs and developers actively avoid in favor of a hard-working and determined 
figure that can be readily understood across the U.S. as a “risk-taker.” Following, I describe my 
experiences attending a statewide summit on the role of forests and timberland in the growing 
bioeconomy that took place in 2018. I show how Yooper cultural attitudes are seen as antithetical 
to high-tech futures envisioned for the region.  
-- 
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I pulled into the guest parking lot near Michigan Tech’s student union on a very cold October 
morning. A young undergraduate student, wearing far too little gear for how cold it was outside, 
waited at the gate to the lot and handed me a guest parking pass. I hung the pass up in the rearview 
mirror of my truck, signaling that I was an attendee for the special campus event that day: the 
Michigan-Finland Summit on Forest Bioproducts. The summit was the result of a collaboration 
between the FinnZone and the Michigan Forest Biomaterials Institute, a statewide non-profit 
research institute that grew out of research at Michigan Tech on the role of timber as a sustainable 
energy source and replacement for plastics. The summit brought together researchers, economic 
developers, foresters, and representatives from natural resource corporations throughout Michigan 
and Finland.  
 
The FinnZone, which was the primary driver of the Finnish delegation’s presence at the summit, 
is an initiative that combines the efforts of multiple EDOs, local universities, and civic leaders in 
Houghton and Hancock that were working together to attract Finnish companies to open satellite 
offices in the region. The FinnZone was started in 2018, with its website calling the organization 
“a soft landing and commercial launchpad...for Finnish companies seeking to establish a presence 
in the U.S. and access the large markets of North America” (“FinnZone”). The effort is housed in 
the Jutila Center at Finlandia University, a small Finnish Lutheran liberal arts college located in 
Hancock. The Jutila Center is a former Catholic hospital, which was abandoned and then sold by 
the City of Hancock to Finlandia for $1 in the early 2000s. The university converted the hospital 
to administrative offices and a variety of spaces, including incubator space, for small businesses. 
The FinnZone is led primarily by representatives from Finlandia University, the Finnish American 
Chamber of Commerce (headquartered in Hancock), and the MTEC SmartZone. Its leaders 
routinely take trips to Finland in an effort to recruit potential Finnish high-tech companies to the 
Keweenaw Peninsula. While its efforts have yet to cause a surge of investment in the region from 
its Finnish cultural connection, it has, as of April 2020, hosted two delegations of business leaders 
from Finland in two years.  
 
 111 
 
Figure 4.3: FinnZone website. The welcome message is transposed over an image of The Powerhouse, one of the SmartZone’s 
facilities. 
 
The summit was held on the top floor of the student union, a floor entirely made up of generic 
institutional banquet rooms, the ones with the movable walls and doors. I checked in to the 
registration desk and entered the first banquet room, which was dotted with tall bar tables occupied 
mostly by old white men in old suits drinking coffee provided alongside some bagels and fruit, the 
standard university event fare. I recognized a handful of people who were associated with local 
EDOs. At the time, my fieldwork was still in its very early stages, so I was nervous and didn’t 
introduce myself to anyone, opting to walk past the group, nodding politely, and entering the 
second banquet room. This banquet room was where the two days of talks and panels would be 
taking place. It wasn’t a very large room, only holding nine circular tables and a small platform 
with a projector for the presenters. It would be an intimate two days. 
 
At 7:55am, people started filtering into the second banquet room and sitting down at the tables, 
mostly with the people they arrived with. The only person to sit at my table in the back corner, a 
spot I thought was most conducive to note-taking, was Veijo Komulainen, the Senior Specialist 
on International Trade for the Consulate General of Finland in New York. He had come as part of 
the Finnish delegation, which included government leaders like himself, along with researchers 
and business leaders. By the time everyone was seated, it was already obvious who was from the 
UP and who was a part of the delegation from Finland. While I was used to these sorts of university 
gatherings – always in 1990s corporate looking banquet halls serving burnt coffee and unripe fruit 
– it seemed like the men sitting at the table next to mine were not accustomed to events like this. I 
heard one of them say as they got seated, “This is fancy.” I’d later learn that he was the local 
operations manager there to present on behalf of a Chicago area corporation that was building a 
biofuel refinery in Ontonagon County, about 60 minutes southwest of where we were sitting. 
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Kicking off the two-day summit was a parade of important officials who wouldn’t stick around, 
but were there primarily to welcome the Finnish delegation and demonstrate institutional buy-in. 
The first person to speak was the Vice President of Research at Michigan Tech who drove home 
the often-repeated talking point that the Keweenaw had many similarities with Finland. Next up 
was Tom Casperson, then State Senator for the Western UP, who also owned a log trucking 
company. Casperson’s short speech focused on the connections between the timber industry and 
the people in the UP: 
“We have wonderful opportunities and we’re in the right place. The problem we’re going 
to face is a cultural problem.” 
Casperson went on to describe that in the UP, when people think of forest industry, they think of 
lumber. This was an antiquated view of the possibilities that forests and timber provided as a source 
of capital. He went on: “When you talk about biomass, they think immediately of wood.” The 
difference between “you” and “they” here is key. “You” was meant to refer to the people in the 
room who were researchers, business leaders, and economic developers invested in developing out 
new high-tech opportunities for the forest economy. “They” referred to everyday Yoopers and 
people working at the mills who processed the lumber. 
 
Casperson’s speech encapsulated a view of forest industries I would become familiar with during 
the summit, that there were very different geographic relationships to timber and innovative 
approaches to leveraging forest bioproducts. The UP’s timber industry was leaps and bounds 
behind Finland’s, which had, for example, multiple companies already producing cosmetics 
packaging, bags, and other types of reusable containers from byproducts that were derived from 
waste during the lifecycle of their regional timber industries.  
 
What Casperson was implying with his comment about a “cultural problem” was that Yoopers 
were part of the reason that the industry was behind the times. He spoke about the lack of 
connection between the advances in the timber industry and those living in communities in the UP, 
even those working in papermills. How I interpreted this was that the Yooper culture of the UP 
was and remains to be very tied to its legacy in natural resource extraction, particularly logging 
and the downstream value-added businesses. Throughout the UP, paper mills were major 
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employers for many towns until the end of the 20th century. Casperson, and others, saw the 
nostalgic aspects of Yooper culture as to blame, at least partially, for the lack of progress that the 
region has had in its ability move forward with progressive and innovative uses of bioproducts, 
like those that were presented at the summit by Finnish delegates.  
 
There were a handful of presentations from UP representatives at the summit that fell more in line 
with the desire to expand the forest economy’s reach into more technical areas, such as biofuels. 
But, if we are to take seriously the comments made by Senator Casperson and the city leader above, 
the relationship that Yooper culture has with natural resource extraction and labor needs to shift. 
In order for there to be community support for the changes that Casperson desires, there will also 
have to be changes in nostalgic attitudes toward logging by everyday Yoopers.  
 
Later in my fieldwork, this nostalgia would continue to rear its head at various points, especially 
when people whom I interviewed brought up the regional relationship to mining. One city leader 
told me: 
“We still have a lot of people wishing, you know, for, ‘Oh, well there’s all kinds of copper 
up in Keweenaw County. We should mine it’ Yeah, that’d be great. Except, you know, you 
start talking about just the logistics. Is there a social license to do that anymore? And do 
you want to, you know, do you really want to, for lack of a better word, shit in your own 
nest?” 
There was a continual and often intense tension between the kinds of economic growth that were 
seen as positive by civic leaders and economic developers, and the way these same people talked 
about the desires of everyday citizens. In other conversations and observations I had throughout 
my fieldwork (and in my own personal experience as a resident elsewhere in the UP), the “reopen 
the mine” folks were a relatively small, albeit vocal, minority of people. Yet, that nostalgic image 
and that discourse was latched onto, not only by leaders who used it to stereotype Yoopers as 
broadly against new kinds of economic growth, but in statewide perceptions of what the UP was 
like and who lived there.  
 
Take for example, this quote from an interview with an employee of a statewide small business 
support organization: 
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“There are businesses [in the region] that have been really, really good at what they do. 
But they don’t want to service people outside the area. And it’s sad because they could 
grow and they’re happy not to grow. I’m told that’s the genuineness behind being a local 
Yooper, you know, they’re not really in it to [grow]. They’re in it to make a good living, 
provide for their families, and enjoy life. The idea of growing just scares them to death. 
Being a service provider outside the area is like, ‘No, we got in business to help Joe down 
the street.’” 
In this quote, and the cases above, the cultural form of the Yooper becomes a sort of scapegoat to 
attach many of the obstacles that normative forms of economic growth face when they are 
attempted in a place like the Keweenaw. Yooper attitudes were presented as nostalgic, as obsessed 
with natural resource extraction that is damaging to the earth and the communities in where it 
occurs (i.e., “shitting in your own nest”). The Yooper was considered antithetical to opportunities 
for progress envisioned by researchers at local universities, economic developers, and ultimately 
executives at timber companies who were out to ensure their business models would evolve to 
ensure profits in the future as more sustainable forms of natural resource extraction were being 
demanded by markets.  
 
What I’ve shown in this section is how culture is simultaneously an asset and a roadblock to 
economic growth and development that seeks to develop entrepreneurship and high-tech 
innovation in the region. I explained how the Yooper was taken as a package of vocabulary, 
dialects, and regional behaviors, and packaged into a tangible commodity for the tourism economy. 
I then demonstrated how certain aspects of the Yooper are extracted for purposes of promoting a 
specific approach to labor in the region. I will return to this (i.e., “sisu”) in more detail in the 
following section. Finally, I dwelled on the various ways that the Yooper is seen as antithetical to 
normative forms of economic growth promoted by the likes of economic developers in the 
FinnZone and regional civic leaders. The Yooper is portrayed as being nostalgic, as anti-growth, 
and as not having the right kind of skillsets or outlooks on life to truly engender the kind of change 
that is needed for the region. 
 
But the question remains, if the Yooper is not in a position to be a leader for economic growth and 
high-tech innovation in the UP, then who is? In the following section I turn to this question and 
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show how aspects of the Yooper that I have just explored are taken up and used to market the 
region to outsiders who are considered better suited to intervene in the regional upgrades that are 
desired to make the Keweenaw a place for high-tech innovation. 
 
If they can’t innovate, then who can? 
 
Much of the recent social history of innovation in the high-tech industry is dominated by the likes 
of Silicon Valley. But as scholars such as Silvia Lindtner, Seyram Avle, Lilly Irani, Anita Say 
Chan, and others have argued, this discourse often ignores the unique and geographically specific 
local innovation and possibilities for technology that can and do emerge elsewhere. The insider-
outsider relationship in the technology industry, where it was once seen as necessary to have an 
office in one of only a handful of tech hubs in order to be successful, that is being broken down 
and exposed in international conversations as actually not the case. Those I list above have already 
written about emerging tech and start-up scenes all over the globe that wish to compete with or 
offer an alternative to the dominance of Silicon Valley. Meanwhile, others are just looking for 
their piece of the pie in the growing digital economy.  
 
It is the searching for the right piece of the pie that I saw emerging in my fieldsite, where economic 
developers, entrepreneurs, and rural cities and villages were trying to understand where they might 
fit in the high-tech economy. While some regions have turned their attention inwards to see what 
endemic technological innovation can look like, important leaders in my fieldsite have rejected 
local Yoopers as backwards and anti-growth. Instead, as I will show here, the entrepreneurship 
and innovation initiatives at the center of economic and high-tech development in the Keweenaw 
turn their eyes outwards to find and attract people to the region whom they believe have the skills 
and ability to “turn it around.” To do this, I first turn to the role of the TOOT, or “Tech out of 
Towner,” in providing opportunities for technology transfer in the area surrounding Houghton and 
Hancock. Following, I turn to one innovation initiative in particular, Innovation Shore, and show 
how it extracts and markets certain aspects of Yooper culture, transposing “sisu” onto potential 
entrepreneurial outsiders.  
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Tech transfer and the TOOT 
Technology transfer, the process of spinning off technological and research innovations from a 
University to external entities who are then able to monetize the innovation, is a key aspect of 
developing high-tech regional economies (Saxenian, 1996). This is especially important in rural 
regions fortunate enough to be home to research universities (Trauth et al,. 2015). Connected to so 
many things at the center of my fieldsite, Michigan Technological University is not only important 
for tech transfer, but for the population it brings to the region in its staff, faculty, and students. In 
this section, I turn to the “Tech out of Towner,” or TOOT, and how they are portrayed as playing 
a pivotal role in supporting high-tech innovation and entrepreneurship in the Keweenaw.  
 
Michigan Technological University (e.g., “Tech”), founded in 1885 as the Michigan Mining 
School, is the lifeblood of Houghton. With approximately 7000 students and 1500 faculty and 
staff, in a city of only 7900 people, the vast majority of people living in Houghton, and many of 
the people living in neighboring communities, are there because of the university. They are either 
directly affiliated with Tech, work in a business that mostly serves people from Tech, or work for 
a company that was created by a Tech affiliate. A recently-commissioned report on the university’s 
economic impact showed that Tech’ output had a net economic impact of $130.5 million in 
Houghton County for the 2016 fiscal year. 
 
The prevalence of TOOTs in the region is not without contention. There is fairly tangible 
TOOT/Yooper divide, with many native Yoopers not considering TOOTs to be one of them. This 
results, from my observations, in social and business circles that are often more insular, with 
TOOTs socializing mostly with other TOOTs, and Yoopers socializing mostly with other Yoopers. 
While there is, of course, some crossover, the TOOT/Yooper divide was especially noticeable in 
the entrepreneurship and innovation initiatives active in my fieldsite. Those initiatives were deeply 
embedded in Michigan Tech and the world of the TOOT. 
 
Entrepreneurship and innovation initiatives, and the EDOs that promote them, focused much of 
their attention on supporting and promoting companies and business models that were a result of 
technology transfer from the university. Technology transfer, in this case, involved the university’s 
Office of Innovation and Commercialization, which, in their words, “supports campus innovators 
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working on discoveries resulting from their research activities by providing an array of expertise, 
services, and initiatives including assistance in pursuing funding opportunities for late-stage basic 
and applied research and development, hosting training and education programs, preparing and 
negotiating licensing agreements with established companies as well as start-ups” (“Innovation 
and Commercialization”). 
 
During my fieldwork, the research administration at Tech, and even higher-ups such as the new 
President of Tech, were sure of the potential of the Keweenaw as a source of rural high-tech 
futures. As soon as he started at Tech in 2018, the new President started an initiative called “Tech 
Forward.” The initiative spawned a series of campus and community conversations over the course 
of a semester that were “designed to position the University as an internationally recognized 
academic thought leader in the Fourth Industrial Revolution” (“Tech Forward”). The conversations 
and program were guided by the question, “How will Michigan Tech influence and adapt to five 
disruptive forces?” These forces included the growth of “autonomous and intelligent systems” 
(i.e., artificial intelligence) and “data revolution and sensing” (i.e., big data).  
 
Much of the fanfare about the possibilities of high-tech innovation in the region had started after 
a handful of successful engineering firms were spun out of the Keweenaw Research Center in the 
1990s. The Keweenaw Research Center is a Tech research facility that focuses primarily on vehicle 
testing in deep snow conditions, largely funded for commercial and military purposes. The 
company that was sort of seen as the “godfather” of high-tech companies in the region was 
ThermoAnalytics, a thermal imaging software company that got its start at the Keweenaw 
Research Center working on projects funded by Ford. Many of the companies that came about the 
past decade as a result of Tech’s tech transfer were all clients of the MTEC SmartZone 
 
The Michigan Tech Enterprise Corporation (MTEC) SmartZone, colloquially known locally as 
just “the SmartZone,” is a non-profit corporation that promotes and facilitates the creation of high-
tech businesses in Houghton, Hancock, and the surrounding region. The MTEC SmartZone has 
three facilities spread across Houghton and Hancock, offering incubation services, low-cost office 
space, and other resources to companies that fit their mission. One of the most visible programs 
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they offer is their SmartStart program, designed to get potential local entrepreneurs’ ideas out of 
their heads and give them the space and resources to explore business opportunities. 
 
The MTEC SmartZone is one of 21 SmartZones spread throughout the State of Michigan. Each 
SmartZone is tasked with promoting economic development, primarily through business creation, 
that is regionally responsive. In other words, the goal is to promote economic development that 
deals explicitly with unique strengths of the region in which it is housed. All SmartZones are at 
least partially funded by local tax capture from the municipality in which they are housed; this 
adds a kind of responsibility to respond to the needs of the places that they are supposed to serve. 
Given the proximity to Michigan Tech University, the MTEC SmartZone focuses a lot of energy 
on developing the business ideas of students, faculty, and staff of the university. At the time of 
fieldwork, the focus and growing interests of the SmartZone was in high-tech industries aligned to 
the work of the Tech Forward initiative, particularly advanced materials, bioforest products, cyber 
security, and aviation. 
 
As a business incubator and entrepreneurial support office tasked by the State of Michigan with 
building up the high-tech industry in Houghton and Hancock, the MTEC SmartZone was deeply 
embedded with the work of Michigan Tech. Its main administrative office was on the first floor of 
the Lakeshore Center, a building owned by Tech which also houses much of the research office of 
the university, including its Office of Innovation and Commercialization. The placement was 
intended to streamline relationships between the entities. In fact, the website for the Office of 
Innovation and Commercialization touts the SmartZone as a major resource for their faculty who 
wish to commercialize their research: “as a means to facilitate transfer of technologies developed 
on campus, we partner directly with the MTEC SmartZone and other organizations in active and 
direct support of researcher-led startup businesses” (“Innovation and Commercialization”). 
 
While it’s duty was to Houghton, Hancock, and the surrounding communities, much of the efforts 
of the SmartZone went towards supporting the work of Tech and TOOTs. In fact, through my 
observational data and interviews, I witnessed organizational pivots at the SmartZone signaling to 
me that it saw limitations in continuing its primary focus on supporting endogenous business 
creation among community members. 
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Let’s return briefly to the departure of Clarissa Maki, the CEO of the SmartZone who led the 
organization from 2011 until 2018. During her speech at the joint City Councils meeting that I 
documented at the beginning of this chapter, she applauded the region for its support of “risk 
takers,” but also said that outside expertise was necessary in making sure that the region was able 
to flourish in the future. The new CEO, Jay Teeling, had a solution for this. A few months after he 
started, I reached out to Jay and met with him at the SmartZone’s conference room in the Lakeshore 
Center. I asked him about his plans for the organization and how he envisioned the future of the 
region among various economic changes, and the strategic shifts of the University. He confided in 
me that he saw their existing work as producing lots of ideas, but very few entrepreneurs:  
“We need to get away from the concept of incubators and we definitely need to stop using 
the term entrepreneur and invention because inventions and entrepreneurs aren’t available 
in sufficient quantities. You’ll find a unicorn up here faster than you’ll find a real 
entrepreneur...” 
With such a close connection to tech transfer at Michigan Tech, there were a ton of “innovators” 
with great ideas in Jay’s mind, but there weren’t the right kind of people to transform the ideas 
into successful business practices. The researchers at Tech could innovate all day, but when it 
came to financing and business planning, the ideas fell apart as the “innovators” weren’t actually 
entrepreneurs. 
 
This attitude of too much innovation but not enough commercialization was compounded by the  
views held by community leaders and economic developers that I discussed earlier in the chapter. 
The economic potential of local Yoopers was not oriented towards the kinds of economic growth 
that were seen as necessary to push the Keweenaw into the future. In an awkward paradox, the 
region was seen as having simultaneously too much innovation, but not enough of the right kind 
of entrepreneurial spirit to exploit that innovation. Instead, Jay told me, the plan for the SmartZone 
was to increase their focus on second stage businesses that were already well-established in the 
region and had demonstrated the ability to grow. But, the SmartZone still needed to maintain 
something of a community-driven entrepreneurship façade, so it began to experiment with new 
programs that sought to bolster the extraction of ideas from the local community (i.e., the kiosks 
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discussed in Chapter Three), while also working to attract former TOOTs and other entrepreneurial 
former residents back to the region. 
 
Shortly after the launch of the idea kiosks in Calumet, the MTEC SmartZone held their first 
“Return North” event. This event was part of their ongoing work to help develop and support the 
growing high-tech sector in the Keweenaw. Starting in late 2018, the Return North event has been 
held the day after Thanksgiving in Houghton. It was designed to be a networking event to bring 
together people who live elsewhere or are returning to the region to visit family for the holidays. 
The goal of the event was to connect former residents and people with family ties to the region to 
high-tech employers or plug them into the entrepreneurial services that the SmartZone provides. 
In other words, the goal of Return North was to find those that have managed to build up the “right” 
kind of high-tech skills and entrepreneurial mindsets in their time outside of the region, and 
convince them to come back so they can contribute to the growth of the Keweenaw.8  
 
What we see in the work of the SmartZone is very much in line with the work of typical high-tech 
business incubators: they offer cohort-driven education and programming, support the creation and 
financialization of local innovation, and offer networking and other opportunities to attract the 
“right” kind of people to their entrepreneurial ecosystem. Yet who they do it with allows us to see 
exactly the kind of person they deem as the “right” kind of innovative and entrepreneurial to help 
them build their vision for the region. This person is not your everyday local Yooper. They are the 
engineers and scientists (i.e., TOOTs) working in the labs of Michigan Tech, imported from other 
places, as well as those Yoopers were deemed smart enough to escape and build up the right kind 
of knowledge elsewhere. What we see here is the beginning stages of the creation of a unique rural 
entrepreneur that leverages the uniqueness of the region, but doesn’t actually include the local 
Yooper. 
 
 
 
                                               
8 This is similar to other national projects that support the education of citizens in other places where they might 
access skills they couldn’t at home, in hopes that they would return and contribute to further development 
(Abraham, 2014; Irani, 2019). 
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Sisu and the Innovation Shore 
The SmartZone’s Return North program was not the only initiative that sought to attract 
entrepreneurial outsiders; the Innovation Shore campaign did this as well. The Innovation Shore 
is an initiative based at Michigan Tech that seeks to promote the Keweenaw Peninsula, and the UP 
broadly, as a unique place for innovative businesses and people. It is largely a marketing initiative 
that takes stories from local successful entrepreneurs in high-tech industries and situates them 
discursively within assets of the region that have deemed attractive to the right kinds of 
entrepreneurs and innovators. The initiative was birthed out of a focus group held by the University 
of Michigan Economic Growth Institute as part of their facilitation of the Defense Manufacturing 
Assistance Program.  
 
By the mid-2010s, defense spending was at the lowest it had been since 9/11. Two long wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with military intervention in many other places had ballooned the 
budget of the Department of Defense (DoD), which relies heavily on American manufacturing 
contractors. A declining budget meant declining opportunities for contracting, and many 
manufacturers that built up their business around DoD contracting were left without clients and 
wound up closing. This had an outsized impact in the Midwest, where manufacturing still plays a 
large role in the regional economy, particularly small-scale manufacturing that has cropped up 
since the decline of mass manufacturing beginning in the 1970s (Markusen et al., 1991).  
 
To combat this decline of available contracts, the DoD funded the Defense Manufacturing 
Assistance Program, or DMAP. It was a funded partnership between multiple research universities 
in the Midwest that worked to identify and fund economic development initiatives related to 
manufacturing in communities that had been affected by the decline in DoD contracting in the 
recent past. Innovation Shore was a project that emerged out of the DMAP project.  
 
Empowered by DMAP, the University of Michigan Economic Growth Institute conducted a focus 
group with community leaders from the Houghton and Hancock area in 2017. During this focus 
group, a series of potential projects were proposed that could address some of the shortcomings in 
the decline of regional small-scale defense manufacturing. What was determined as having the 
most promise was “Innovation Shore,” a regional marketing campaign that sought to leverage the 
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position of Michigan Tech and the resulting high volume of local tech transfer and associated 
entrepreneurship to frame the region as particularly innovative and to “grab the attention of 
Lansing,” the capital of the state of Michigan.9 A local marketing firm was chosen to gather stories 
of local entrepreneurs, develop a website to be the home of the campaign, and create and distribute 
a brand guide that could be used by partners of the initiative in their own marketing material. In 
July 2018, one month before I arrived for the start of my fieldwork, a branding guide and “talent 
attraction” manual were launched on the Innovation Shore website, joining the SmartZone and 
FinnZone trumpeting the innovative potential of the Keweenaw Peninsula. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Innovation Shore’s Talen Attraction Manual. Screenshot captured by the author. 
 
The “talent attraction” manual of Innovation Shore, pictured above, framed the UP, the individuals 
who live there, and therefore the individuals they were trying to attract in a familiar language: that 
of “sisu.” The manual opens up on the very first page with, “U.P. STEM professionals ooze grit & 
determination...We crave adventure and fresh air – its [sic] fuel for our innovation.” The manual 
positions this “grit & determination” alongside access to nature, safe cities, and local successful 
entrepreneurs as selling points for the region. It’s essentially saying, “You too can have all these 
things if you innovate here.”  
 
                                               
9 The Innovation Shore moniker was proposed as part of the efforts to expand the work of the MTEC SmartZone to 
Marquette with the creation of a new SmartZone. The two SmartZones were to become a part of what they called 
“Innovation Shore.” I found this information in a 2014 document from the Marquette Local Development Financing 
Authority: http://www.marquettemi.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/smartzone_development_tif_plan_2014.pdf. I 
was not able to trace the idea any further back than that, but from my understanding, it didn’t gain much traction as a 
discursive tool until DMAP funded it in 2018. 
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The talent manual is only one of the initiative’s tools that frames the region in this way. To 
highlight the quality of the local innovators, Innovation Shore crafted a handful of profiles of 
people who work in tech sectors of the Keweenaw. One of those profiles was summarized above 
in the section on “sisu,” but I’ll return to it briefly here in more depth. Recall, the profile 
highlighted an engineering director at a local manufacturer that made printed circuit boards. The 
profile used narratives of rugged individualism to describe her, traits that we are used to hearing 
in stories of the American entrepreneurial spirit. But this narrative was crafted in a way to exploit 
unique aspects of Yooper culture, in doing so framing Yooper culture as being an essential piece 
of what it means to be an innovator in the Keweenaw. 
“The U.P. region has a legendary work ethic. There’s even a local word for it: sisu – the 
Finnish word for resilience and determination. [Name] says, ‘The U.P. is built on a work 
ethic that I’ve not see anywhere else [sic]. Up here you’ll find the best and brightest, but 
also some of the hardest working people anywhere.’ 
The U.P. has a sense of community that is hard to find elsewhere, and that’s important to 
[name]. She appreciates living in the kind of place where, if you see someone stopped by 
the side of the road, you don’t drive by – you get out and help. She describes her work and 
personal relationships alike as ‘very genuine, unlike in the fast-paced corporate world 
elsewhere where they seem very situational.’ She loves that the U.P. is a kind of throwback 
community, where people don’t have to lock their doors or their cars. [name] explains, ‘I’m 
not worried about my daughter’s safety when she’s walking down the street. It’s a very 
insulated part of the country where the people are nice and they look out for you.’ 
‘In the UP you’re not a number – you’re a unique individual who’s exploring a unique land 
where you’re surrounded by very strong independent folk. In California when you join the 
rat race, what distinguishes you from the person next to you? Essentially nothing.’” 
What we see here is how discourses of unique cultures of rural rugged Yooper individualism and 
dedication in the form of “sisu” and unique attributes of rural society (e.g., safety, familiarity) are 
bound together to create a unique rural entrepreneur that can find a home in the Upper Peninsula.  
 
Alongside the work of Innovation Shore, there was a general desire to attract a very certain kind 
of outsider. Some referred to them categorically as “nesting Millennials.” Others referred to them 
as mountain biking engineers, who could take advantage of the outdoor amenities of the region 
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while still holding well-paid jobs in the high-tech sector, and ultimately contributing more tax 
dollars locally with that well-paid job. What we see in all of these efforts, by Innovation Shore, 
Return North, and broadly among the people I spoke to, was how certain cultural and regional 
qualities were leveraged as rural capital to market the region to outsiders, marketing those same 
characteristics that were native to the Yooper as ones that could also be held by those coming from 
elsewhere. In the following section, I explain how this happens in more depth. 
 
Crafting the rural entrepreneur 
 
In this chapter, I took a regional level view of three economic development organizations (i.e., 
FinnZone, SmartZone, Innovation Shore), civic leaders, and a local university, working in the 
Keweenaw to promote and expand high-tech entrepreneurship and innovation throughout a remote 
rural region. I showed how these organizations go through the process of identifying and extracting 
unique cultural forms from the region as cultural assets, transforming them into a type of rural 
capital (Bosworth and Turner, 2018) that can be leveraged by anyone, whether they are from the 
region or not. This rural capital is marketed to find and attract the “right” kinds of entrepreneurs 
and innovators to the region who can provide the “right” kind of interventions so that the region 
can ensure economic growth in high-tech economic sectors. I call this process crafting the rural 
entrepreneur, and through this chapter I showed how it has become a key technique for growing 
entrepreneurship in the Keweenaw. 
 
Before I further unpack the process of crafting the rural entrepreneur, I’d first like to further 
explore the ideas rural entrepreneurship and rural capital. In a 2015 article, Korsgaard et al. make 
the distinction between what they call “rural entrepreneurship” and “entrepreneurship in the rural.” 
“Entrepreneurship in the rural” is entrepreneurial activities conducted in rural communities for the 
sake of profit, and does not contribute to the “overall well-being and development of the rural 
area...[having] only limited engagement with the locality as a meaningful location” (p. 11). “Rural 
entrepreneurship,” on the other hand, “engages with its location not primarily as a space for profit 
but with ‘place’ as a location of meaningfulness and social life” (p. 13). In other words, 
“entrepreneurship in the rural” does not need the rural and does not give back to the rural in the 
same way that “rural entrepreneurship” does. Bosworth and Turner (2018) use rural capital to 
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understand what aspects of rurality become a part of the different kinds of capital that a business 
or entrepreneur deploys in their work. Similar to the Community Capitals Framework (Flora et al., 
2018), Bosworth and Turner argue that rural capital is made up of unique aspects of physical, 
natural, financial, human, social, organization, cultural, and symbolic capitals. For example, they 
describe cultural capital as, “heritage, rituals, events, stories, and traditions” and symbolic capital 
as “rural identity that can be conferred to the business” (p. 3).  
 
Using the rural capitals framework (Bosworth and Turner, 2018) and the distinction made between 
entrepreneurship in the rural and rural entrepreneurship (Korsgaard et al., 2015), I argue that the 
exploitation of rural capital is key to the process of crafting the rural entrepreneur that embodies 
the aspects of “rural entrepreneurship” as described above. What I’ve shown in this chapter is how 
entrepreneurship and innovation initiatives identify key rural assets and rural capital, reject the 
parts that do not fall in line with narratives of what is “right” for economic growth, and market 
unique cultural aspects of a region that fall in line with the desired entrepreneurial narratives, all 
in an effort to capture the “right” kind of rural entrepreneur. I see this as a process that is key to 
the successful economization of rural regions for the purposes of furthering neoliberal forms of 
entrepreneurship and innovation. In framing this as a process, rather than a site specific 
phenomenon, I also show how the desired “rural entrepreneur” can change depending on the 
unique assets and rural capital that a rural region has. What I present in this chapter is only one 
example of this process. I will unpack this process further. 
 
 126 
 
Figure 4.5: Crafting the rural entrepreneur diagram. 
 
First in this process is identifying key rural assets and rural capital. While the cultural form of the 
Yooper had existed for a while beforehand, Remlinger (2017) argued that it was able to come 
together as a commodified media object and tool to promote tourism in the late 1970s. In this, the 
Yooper was an already-existing commodified asset that entrepreneurship and innovation initiatives 
were able to easily enroll in their project. The hard-working aspect of the Yooper, the notion of 
“sisu” that came from Finnish-American culture in the Keweenaw, became the key rural asset in 
what I’ve documented here that these initiatives were able to leverage. 
 
Next, it is necessary to reject the parts of the rural asset that are undesirable for achieving the 
desired aims. The aim here was for a specific kind of economic growth, one that focused on 
“growing the pie,” expanding the pool of wealth in the community, not necessarily redistributing 
existing wealth. This economic growth narrative was seen to be at odds with Yooper culture that 
was seen as anti-growth and too nostalgic. As the representative from the statewide small business 
support entity said: 
“...it’s sad because they could grow and they’re happy not to grow. I’m told that’s the 
genuineness behind being a local Yooper, you know, they’re not really in it to [grow]. 
Identify key rural 
assets and rural 
capital
Reject parts outside 
of desired narrative 
for economic growth
Market unique 
cultural aspects of a 
region that fit desired 
entrepreneurial 
narrative
Capture the "right" 
rural entrepreneur
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They’re in it to make a good living, provide for their families, and enjoy life. The idea of 
growing just scares them to death.” 
The desire to just make a good living and provide for families and communities, rather than 
constantly seek out more profit and growth, was not going to be compatible with the needs of 
entrepreneurship and innovation initiatives. Instead, they had to turn to elsewhere to find those that 
would be compatible with their desire for economic growth. 
 
Looking to external sources required these initiatives to market the unique cultural aspects of the 
region that fit their desired entrepreneurial narrative. “Sisu” became a tool through which anyone 
could attach their entrepreneurial ambitions. The marketing tactics of the Innovation Shore 
initiative and its partners sold the “grit” and “determination” of the Yooper as something that could 
be applied to anyone if they moved here to pursue their entrepreneurial dreams. To counter the 
decline of manufacturing in the region, the goal was to increase the number of entrepreneurial 
citizens (to borrow a term from Lilly Irani, 2019) in the region. This would help deal with the 
limited number of entrepreneurs, as noted by the CEO of the SmartZone:  
“We need to get away from the concept of incubators and we definitely need to stop using 
the term entrepreneur and invention because inventions and entrepreneurs aren’t available 
in sufficient quantities. You’ll find a unicorn up here faster than you’ll find a real 
entrepreneur...” 
The overarching goal of this whole process was to capture the “right” kind of rural entrepreneur. 
This entrepreneur would enable the organizations at the center of what I’ve documented here to 
expand their work in promoting normative forms entrepreneurship and innovation in a region that 
they saw as being ripe for these interventions, but was failing to cooperate appropriately. This 
would enable them to maintain their call: “Rural America is dying and we are not!” 
 
But this has implications beyond just this region. Rather, an application of this process can be 
helpful for understanding what makes a place meaningful and deserving of recognition within the 
context of building up region-specific entrepreneurship. While I speak about “sisu” and the Yooper 
in this chapter, it can be about many other traits or cultural forms. Further, while I have focused 
mostly on the traits that are captured, I haven’t dwelled much on those traits that are rejected. This 
is a weakness of the current approach and deserves more attention. Clearly anti-growth sentiments 
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and blight tolerance don’t disappear, they are still barriers to the project of economic development. 
Future work could look at this intersection between what remains and what gets rejected, and how 
they both play a role in this process. 
 
Conclusion 
I started this chapter by asking, how does regional culture get taken up in the process of economic 
development? To answer this question, I looked to the work of three economic development 
organizations working in the Keweenaw to promote and expand high-tech entrepreneurship and 
innovation, as well as the city leaders and others who support their work. I showed how these 
organizations go through the process of identifying and extracting “sisu,” a unique cultural form 
from the region, as cultural assets and transforming them into a type of rural capital that can be 
leveraged by anyone, whether they are from the region or not. This rural capital, I showed, is 
marketed to find and attract the “right” kinds of entrepreneurs and innovators to the region who 
can provide the “right” kind of interventions so that the region can ensure economic growth in 
high-tech economic sectors. I explained how this culminates in a process I call crafting the rural 
entrepreneur. In the following chapter, I turn to how the efforts of these organizations are 
concentrated in particular places in the region, largely centralizing the positive effects of their work 
in regional cities that are already the most well-resourced.  
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Chapter Five: Zoning Rural Exceptionalism 
 
 
 
In the summer of 2018, shortly after moving to Hancock to begin my fieldwork, the Michigan 
Department of Transportation installed new sensors on all five traffic lights in Houghton. The 
sensors, a type of V2I or vehicle to infrastructure sensor, provide autonomous vehicles with 
contextual data about traffic and road conditions, and allow for communication between 
autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles. The project that installed the sensors was funded by 
an earmark from the 2017 Michigan State Legislature for autonomous vehicle research. As the 
home of Michigan Technological University, the only public research university in the Upper 
Peninsula, and one with a fleet of autonomous vehicles, Houghton was chosen for these upgrades 
despite its very remote and rural location. In fact, this part of the country, with its long winters and 
nearly 250” of snow every year, is arguably an ideal place to test technological infrastructure in 
extreme conditions.  
 
Only a few months earlier, in June 2018, Houghton County was struck by horrendous flooding 
that destroyed many local homes and businesses, causing over $100 million in damage. In the 
particularly hard hit area of Franklin Township, an unincorporated community east of Hancock, a 
12 year old boy died. Most of the catastrophic impact of the region’s flooding, and the resulting 
landslide that caused the boy’s death, was blamed on crumbling storm water infrastructure. Much 
of the storm water infrastructure in unincorporated townships across the region was built in the 
early 20th century during the copper mining boom, was never replaced, and rarely maintained.  
 
These two examples, the new street light sensors and the catastrophic flooding due to 
infrastructural decay, point to a complex and growing problem in the world of economic 
development and municipal management: it is often much easier to find funding for opportunistic 
and flashy technology projects than it is for essential infrastructure repair. This is especially 
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apparent in rural communities with shrinking populations and shrinking tax bases that are often 
left waiting to fund essential infrastructure fixes until they break. A handful of rural communities 
have bucked this trend, weathering post-industrial collapse and population loss. They have 
transitioned to new economic opportunities through a combination of leveraging state and federal 
resources, local institutions such as universities, and robust and flexible local economic sectors 
that were able to diversify before the impacts of globalization and neoliberalism were felt in key 
rural economic sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing. For example, by the 1970s, 
Houghton already had a medium-sized state university, local manufacturers, a diverse retail base, 
and a growing tourist industry.  
 
It is this disparity that I turn to in this chapter: between the rural haves and have-nots, between 
communities that in many cases are able to flourish and others that continually fall farther behind. 
I return to the overarching question of this dissertation: How does this rural region seek to reframe 
and reinvent itself through contemporary modes of innovation and entrepreneurship? I have thus 
far documented four primary tactics through which organizations reframe and reinvent the 
Keweenaw for purposes of technological innovation and entrepreneurship: (1) revitalization 
efforts; (2) successfully capturing grants and leveraging policy mechanisms to signal municipal 
progress; (3) technology transfer from universities to the surrounding community; and (4) through 
culturally-situated tech industry growth and talent attraction. I briefly summarize these tactics here 
before returning to the literature on rural growth in regions with amenity-based economies. 
 
In Chapter Three, I documented two tactics that I see as contributing to the ability to reframe and 
reinvent regions through technological innovation and entrepreneurship: revitalization efforts and 
leveraging grants and other policy mechanisms. Revitalization is a primary pathway through which 
rural redevelopment tactics were framed. For example, initiatives such as Michigan’s 
Redevelopment Ready Communities promote revitalization through attracting outside real estate 
investment opportunities. This process, as I argue in Chapter Three, is aided by digital mapping 
and open data initiatives that seek to make rural communities and their infrastructure more readily 
observable for external investors (e.g., real estate developers). The ability to successfully capture 
grants and leverage policy mechanisms to signal municipal progress is also essential to reframe 
and reinvent regions. I described this through the Redevelopment Ready Communities program 
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and the asset management programs. These were ways, both formal and informal, for communities 
to signal that they were “ready” for investment, and particularly that they had the required digital 
assets and know-how.  
 
In Chapter Four, I documented two other tactics: technology transfer and culturally situated high-
tech industry growth / talent attraction. Technology transfer is essential in aiding regional 
development efforts in rural regions that are fortunate enough to have large universities, such as 
Michigan Tech. In the case of Houghton and Hancock, additional economic development 
organizations were built up to exploit and enhance technology transfer (i.e., the SmartZone). 
Scholarly literature in community and economic development has argued that rural places are well 
situated to leverage unique rural culture and rural capital in their development practices (e.g., 
Bosworth and Turner, 2018). I saw this occurring in the adoption of regional cultural tropes by 
innovation and entrepreneurship initiatives who used it to promote the growth of high-tech sectors 
and attract the right kind of rural entrepreneurs to the region. 
 
The efforts I summarize above were largely concentrated in the neighboring cities of Houghton 
and Hancock. Returning to the literature on the economic progress of rural communities in the 
United States, we can begin to see why. In their 2018 article in The Journal of Peasant Studies, 
Jessica Ulrich-Schad and Cynthia Duncan propose that rural America is home to three types of 
rural places: amenity rich, transitioning, and chronically poor. The amenity-rich areas represent 
those rural places that are able to utilize, market, and exploit their unique rural assets in ways that 
have made them “attractive to retirees, recreationists and ‘laptop professionals’”(p. 61). These 
rural places maintain growing economies and populations in comparison to transitioning and 
chronically poor places which largely do not. The ability to attract high-tech professionals and 
maintain robust and diverse regional economic sectors that support each other is also essential to 
the work of rural development literature and think tanks that argue a regional development hub 
strategy is key to rural regional prosperity.  
 
But, as I’ve begun to unpack above, each of the development tactics that I saw used in the 
Keweenaw largely resulted in a concentration of development opportunities in already well-
resourced communities (i.e., Houghton and Hancock). They do not usually result in region-wide 
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development opportunities. Because of this, I ask, how do regional approaches to innovation break 
down? In this chapter, I turn to three examples from my fieldwork to demonstrate how 
technological opportunity remains concentrated in the same communities that are reaping benefits 
for development: (1) through the failure of federal investment policy to consider the needs of the 
most remote and low-resourced rural communities; (2) through models of economic success that 
prescribe growth over sustainability; (3) when communities reject the technological advancement 
that they are “supposed” to be embracing.  
 
Drawing on the work of Aihwa Ong and other scholars of globalization and neoliberalism, I draw 
out one particular effect of innovation breakdown I call zoning rural exceptionalism. Zoning rural 
exceptionalism is a process wherein rural communities are able to leverage economic development 
policy and the corresponding opportunities to differentiate themselves as a “rural player” in the 
new innovation economy. What I document here is not a simple story of uneven development. 
This is a story of rural development initiatives that seek to create regionwide wealth and prosperity, 
but fail by concentrating opportunity and progress in already well-resourced communities. I first 
turn to the new federal Opportunity Zone initiatives created in 2018. 
 
Finding Opportunity in an Opportunity Zone 
 
Federal policy in support of economic development is complex, ever-changing, and comes from 
many different sources. The most recent large-scale intervention at the federal level comes in the 
form of the Opportunity Zone designation, regulated by the United States Treasury and Internal 
Revenue Services (IRS). The Opportunity Zone program was established in 2017 by the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act and based on proposals from the Economic Innovation Group, a neoliberal public 
policy think tank. In its inception, the program was touted as being an economic development tool 
for low income urban and rural communities (Tankersley, 2018). The act gave certain agencies in 
each state the power to nominate specific geographic areas, usually at the census tract level, to 
become “Opportunity Zones.” These zones are areas in which investors can take the gains they’ve 
realized on a past investment and reinvest them into a new or growing business located, and doing 
business, in an Opportunity Zone. If the investors keep their money invested in the company for 
long enough (10 years at the time of research), they no longer have to pay taxes on the gains that 
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they had invested. If the investors keep it in for even longer, then some of the taxes on the gains 
that result from the new investment are also waived.1 
 
The tactics of the Opportunity Zone program are nothing new. It is similar to many tax breaks 
programs that are used to encourage economic development in the United States and elsewhere. 
For example, the Enterprise Zone program popularized in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s 
also designated special geographies as Zones and had dedicated tax concessions and incentives for 
businesses, and sometimes residents, in those places. Similarly, Michigan’s Renaissance Zone 
program gives tax incentives to businesses and residents in certain places for purposes of 
revitalization and economic growth. 
 
In December of 2018, I attended an information session about Opportunity Zones in the UP. It was 
at the Michigan Tech Lakeshore Center, the same building that had the offices of the SmartZone 
and Michigan Tech’s Innovation and Industry Engagement program. As of late 2018, the 
designation of Zones in Michigan was recently announced and most of the City of Houghton and 
all of Keweenaw County were declared Zones. The atmosphere in the room before the meeting 
started was jovial and friendly. Everyone knew each other, and they all seemed excited to learn 
about new opportunities for investment that were supposed to amount to potentially millions of 
dollars in the region. This was lauded as phenomenal opportunity for the Keweenaw. The 
facilitator, the Director of a regional economic development organization, opened up the meeting 
and dialed in two people on teleconference: a representative from the Michigan State Housing 
Development Authority (MSHDA) and an analyst from Plante Moran, a large accounting and 
wealth management consultancy based in Michigan.  
 
Over the course of the next hour, the two men on the phone at the center of the large conference 
room described the various opportunities that were possible for Opportunity Zones in the State of 
Michigan and the UP. The MSHDA representative emphasized that the purpose of the Zones was 
to increase population and business activity in low-income communities, “the goal is investment 
in community instead of Wall Street.” The financial analyst was less “blue sky” about his pitch, 
                                               
1 The exact specifics of the Opportunity Zone program have been modified since it first started. What I describe here 
is how the Zones benefited investors as of attending an information session about them in December 2018.  
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noting that, “this program is not going to make a bad deal a good deal,” that “unlike a loan, it goes 
beyond preferred return,” and that “additional tax benefits are not going to make up for losing 
money.” In other words, the new or growing business being invested in was going to have to be 
incredibly lucrative and essentially guarantee high returns for Opportunity Zone investors in order 
for the whole process to be successful. There’s one major problem though: businesses that generate 
such high returns are few and far between in the UP. 
 
By the end of the information session, the energy in the room had changed dramatically. The 
question and answer session was short, with two people asking if there would be an opportunity 
for public comment on the program. The tone in their voice and the question indicated that there 
were necessary changes in order for it to be relevant to the region. As the call ended and 
conversation erupted in the room, an economic developer from a nearby county turned to me: 
 
“It’s for rich people.” 
 
Opportunity for who? 
Policies like the Opportunity Zone initiative are arguably incompatible with many rural 
communities, especially those that in more remote areas of the country, away from the influence 
of metropolitan areas (Besser and Miller 2013; Hardy 2019). In their research, Besser and Miller 
(2013) find that remote rural entrepreneurs are more motivated by push factors rather than pull 
factors for starting and expanding a business. Push factors are external motivations that push 
someone to start a business, such as “the inability to find suitable employment, or undesirable 
working conditions in a given location accompanied by the desire to remain in that location and/or 
the high cost associated with changing locations” (18).  Pull factors are internal motivations that 
pull someone to start a business, such as “the desire for wealth, personal growth and independence, 
or the drive to implement creative ideas” (18). In other words, entrepreneurship in remote rural 
communities is motivated more by providing for family and offering community resources than 
by generating large profits. 
 
I talked about this at length in the previous chapter. I showed how the cultural form of the Yooper 
was simultaneously seen as an opportunity for economic growth through tourism and leveraging 
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“sisu” to attract entrepreneurial outsiders, while many working class Yoopers were seen as 
backwards and anti-growth. This jockeying for outside investment is also clearly key to the 
successful implementation of the Opportunity Zone program. In other words, this was just one 
other way that outside investment was prioritized as a potential solution, rather than the 
endogenous work of communities. Instead of investing in community-based resources and efforts, 
state and federal government efforts focused on a places ability to attract outside investors.  
 
It is difficult to get reliable data on existing Opportunity Zone investment. The Michigan Economic 
Development Corporation (MEDC) and MSHDA have their own website2 that provides resources 
for potential investors, Zone communities, and lists completed projects. At the time of writing in 
May 2020, the website only lists three completed projects: two in Detroit and one in Lansing. All 
three are new construction multi-unit real estate. OpportunityDb3 is another website that tracks 
Opportunity Zones state-by-state, but most of the investment opportunities listed in Michigan were 
submitted by MEDC and are not necessarily attached to existing funds or projects.  
 
In my searches on these and other sites, I did not find a single fund or project in the Upper 
Peninsula. In a handful of interviews, I was told that there was interest in starting Opportunity 
Zone Funds to support development work, but that it hadn’t come to fruition yet. Shortly after I 
stopped data collection in December 2019, the City of Houghton announced that it was going to 
be working with a real estate developer based in Marquette to redevelop a large portion of the 
waterfront where there was currently a city-owned parking deck. I tried to determine if this project, 
which is located in an Opportunity Zone, was going to be looking for fund investment, but was not 
able to secure that information.  
 
While I was unable to gather evidence of Opportunity Zones having an impact on economic 
development processes in the Keweenaw, what I demonstrate here is that even the potential for 
intervention is opportunity in and of itself. In this way, new and different ways to incentivize 
redevelopment continued to accumulate in Houghton, even more so than neighboring Hancock. 
This is because of a continued focus on economic growth opportunities as models for success, and 
                                               
2 miopportunityzones.com (Accessed May 28, 2020) 
3 opportunitydb.com (Accessed May 28, 2020) 
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the various resources that already existed in Houghton and made it a place that was ideal for 
intervention. In this way, federal policy that is supposed to be enhancing opportunities for at-risk 
communities is in fact drawing potential investment away and concentrating it in an already well-
resourced community. This results due to the failure to consider the needs of the most remote and 
low-resourced rural communities.  In what follows, I turn to two different broader pushes to further 
technological advancement and opportunity in the region and how it too is concentrated in 
Houghton and neighboring Hancock. 
 
Remote Work as Rural Savior 
 
Remote work, also known as telework, telecommuting, or “work/ing from home,” has been widely 
lauded since the 1970s as a flexible work arrangement that allows workers, often professional, 
white collar, and/or self-employed, to work full- or part-time from an atypical office setting. At 
the time of writing, COVID-19 has rapidly transformed many work places, particularly office-
based jobs, as millions of people have transitioned to working from home. This has resulted in a 
whole host of think pieces and op-eds that argue this could (finally) radically transform the kinds 
of work that are done in peripheral cities and rural areas (e.g., Axelrod, 2020; Richardson, 2020). 
For example, Mark Muro, Senior Fellow and Policy Director of the Brookings Institute’s 
Metropolitan Policy Program, published a piece about the ability of remote work to “save the 
American heartland” (Muro, 2020). Writing in response to announcements from Facebook and 
Twitter that a large portion of their workforce would likely be working from home for the next 
few years, Muro describes how this could be a catalyst for breaking up high-tech agglomerations 
that have concentrated on coastal cities. He writes:  
“The announcements could also forecast a degree of tech decentralization across the 
continent that no amount of real estate appreciation, pleas from heartland leaders, and 
promises to open branch offices have been able to achieve” (emphasis his). 
What Muro is referencing here is the perceived failure of peripheral cities and rural communities 
to attract high-tech companies in the face of widespread rural brain drain, despite widespread 
efforts to expand remote work. He and many others are hoping that this could finally be the trigger 
convincing high-tech companies that agglomeration in places like Silicon Valley are no longer 
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necessary. But this isn’t the first time that these sorts of triggers appeared that were supposed to 
decentralize such industries. 
 
Before COVID-19, remote work was often touted as an opportunity to radically alter rural places. 
Seamus Grimes, a critical geographer, writes about this in his 2000 article, “Rural areas in the 
information society: diminishing distance of increasing learning capacity?” He argues that the 
promises of techno-solutionism in rural communities, particularly the promise of telework, 
ultimately failed in Europe. This failure happened despite millions of Euros being invested by the 
European Union (EU) to heavily expand Internet infrastructure in the 1990s. This happened 
alongside the widespread LEADER program also funded by the EU, which sought to expand rural 
development opportunities. As he argues, “Teleworking, which has been widely hyped as 
providing the greatest scope to the periphery for exploiting ICTs, has evolved mainly as an urban 
or suburban form of decentralization. Only a small minority of highly skilled professionals, 
possessing well-established market connections, has been in a position to sustain economic activity 
in remote areas” (p. 20). Like many solutions that were supposed to revolutionize rural areas (Kline 
2000), it also ultimately failed to do so in the expected timeline, despite there being the 
infrastructure and government support in many places to support the process. 
 
Despite the missing outcomes from remote work, economic developers in the United States 
continue to pursue it. Attracting remote workers remains a goal for small cities and rural areas 
nationwide, with some states in the recent past developing statewide campaigns to attract high-
tech remote workers. The opportunity and promise of remote work was especially tangible in my 
fieldwork, which is what I turn to in this section. I document the regional support and 
social/business infrastructure that sought to prepare the region for growing opportunities for 
remote workers. I then turn to efforts in Calumet to attract remote workers and the barriers they 
faced in their work.  
 
Regional support for remote work 
Remote workers often need a support infrastructure to work successfully, such as access to reliable 
Internet, a coworking space, and/or quiet meeting areas. To reap widespread regional benefits from 
remote work, communities build up programs, establish coworking spaces, and develop 
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networking opportunities to facilitate and support remote work. I briefly look here at a handful of 
these support mechanisms from my fieldwork.  
 
In 2018, a regional planning and development organization responsible for facilitating the granting 
of state economic development dollars made “mini-grants” available for “community marketing.” 
These community marketing grants were part of the State of Michigan’s Regional Prosperity 
Initiative (RPI), the same initiative that funded the integrated asset management programs I 
discussed in Chapter Three. Started in 2014 and funded through 2019, the RPI was a program “to 
encourage local private, public and non-profit partners to create vibrant regional economies” 
(“DTMB-The Basics”). In 2018, community marketing became a new focus for the regional 
organization responsible for distributing the RPI dollars in Houghton and Keweenaw Counties. 
While communities were able to use these marketing grants for a variety of things, ranging from 
graphic design to social media campaigns, two Villages in my fieldsite chose to use them to market 
their communities to potential remote workers looking to relocate to the region. 
 
Another support mechanism for remote work in the Houghton and Hancock area were two 
coworking spaces, both opened in 2018. Shortly after moving to Hancock, I joined one of the 
coworking spaces as a member and worked there nearly every week for the duration of my 
fieldwork. Most members of the space worked in tech and related industries. About half of the 
people in the space ran their own business, usually working on contracts with companies outside 
of the area, and the other half were remote employees of existing firms. While there were informal 
coworking spaces and plenty of people who worked out of coffee shops and their house, the 
opening of two coworking spaces within just a few months of each in such a remote place was a 
bit of a surprise. But, according to interviews I performed with six members of one coworking 
space, it was a welcome relief to have something like that space to get yourself out of the house 
into a social environment, instead of relying on coffee shops and home offices to get work done.  
 
The founders of the coworking space believed that it offered both a space for remote work and a 
community-driven space that gave people opportunities to explore business ideas. As one of the 
cofounders told me in an interview: 
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“Houghton and Hancock has a tech innovation piece that people can feel and see as spinoffs 
from the university and some of the local employers. But there’s not really an open 
welcoming to everybody kind of incubator, if you will. Everything that’s made for people 
that are interested in either starting businesses or having a place to go to explore different 
ideas is either gated or inaccessible based on price. So, this is trying to remove some of 
those barriers for people that maybe don’t have the next big tech startup idea. Maybe they 
just want to be a really bad ass photographer and they just need a place to go and whiteboard 
out their business plan and stuff like that...” 
In this way, remote work and the other activities that the coworking space supported were offering 
alternatives to the typical entrepreneurial support ecosystem in places like the SmartZone and 
FinnZone that were, in this cofounders words, “gated or inaccessible based on price.” I saw this 
reflected in the community atmosphere of the space, as I spent upwards of 30 hours a week there 
for almost an entire year. There was a solid crew of 10-15 coworkers and a rotating cast of 30-40 
friends, colleagues, and locals who dropped in for events or utilized day passes every once in a 
while. But returning to the argument I made in Chapter Four, about crafting the rural entrepreneur, 
the coworking space largely facilitated the work of Tech-out-of-towners (TOOTs) and the kinds 
of entrepreneurial outsiders that were seen as being so attractive to the region. It was these kind of 
remote workers that organizations seeking to expand remote work in the region wanted to find and 
support. 
 
Expanding remote work in Calumet 
By the time I started my fieldwork in the Keweenaw, attracting remote workers and their families 
was widely being circulated as something like a silver bullet for population decline in rural 
communities. The potential impact of telework on rural communities had already seen a hype cycle 
or two in the past that had not lived up to its expectations (Grimes 2000), but new research on 
remote work (e.g., Gallardo and Whitacre 2018) and resulting state policies to attract remote 
workers had created a new hype cycle. This hype cycle resulted in multiple communities in the 
Keweenaw applying for the community marketing grant explicitly to create campaigns to attract 
remote workers to the region. 
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Main Street Calumet, whose work I introduced in Chapter Three, was one of those organizations. 
The Village of Calumet and the various economic development organizations that served it saw 
its historic downtown, surrounding natural beauty, and proximity to the amenities of Houghton 
and Hancock as an ideal place for new migrants to the region, remote workers, and their families. 
Written into the most recent Master Plan created by the Village of Calumet in 2018 was a mandate 
to attract people who would otherwise migrate to Houghton and Hancock:  
“...housing available may not suit the lifestyles and needs of housing seekers, including 
new residents, young professionals, and an aging population...vacant and underutilized 
downtown buildings can be renovated to fit unmet demands for housing.”  
In other words, the Village of Calumet was working to capitalize on its largely vacant historic 
downtown to attract people migrating to the region, folks that were remote workers or those that 
would typically move to a place like Houghton or Hancock, in some ways acting as a sort of 
bedroom or commuting village. 
 
Main Street applied for and received a community marketing grant in 2018 to develop a social 
media campaign to attract these forecasted families. As Lilith from Main Street would often say 
to me in some variation, “We’re not looking for 100,000 people to move here – we just want 100 
families.” She and other members of Main Street, along with regional economic developers, 
believed that just a handful of new families to Calumet could radically change the feeling and 
outlook of the village, potentially reversing decades of decline. Through the grant, the Village and 
Main Street were able to hire local graphic designers, photographers, and videographers to create 
unique content about the local region. Lilith and the Main Street board used this new content to 
further the Village’s presence on Instagram and Facebook, largely in an effort to attract remote 
workers who were alumni of local universities and who had grown up in Calumet but moved away.  
 
This approach is largely in line with asset-based approaches to development, which argue that rural 
communities need to leverage their local unique assets for valuable development opportunities 
(Mathie and Cunningham, 2003). For Calumet, it was not only the local and tight-knit community 
of people, but also the historic architecture and the Keweenaw National Historical Park 
headquartered in Calumet and focusing on the mining legacy of the region. Though, there is a 
major problem with Calumet following broader trends to attract remote workers through 
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highlighting key rural community assets: competition. There are currently massive programs 
underway across the United States to attract high-tech remote workers to rural communities, 
including right in their backyard. 
 
A town about 30 miles away named Chassell secured a community marketing grant in 2019 and 
was taking the same approach as Calumet, utilizing social media to attract remote workers. Further, 
as I documented in Chapter Four, the SmartZone had their own campaign, Return North, which 
targeted alumni of the local universities, trying to get them to move back as remote workers and 
entrepreneurs. Further, much larger nationwide campaigns were trying to target similar 
demographics. The State of Vermont and the City of Tulsa, Oklahoma both created programs in 
the few years before this that pay tech savvy workers $10,000 to move there. In other words, 
Calumet was facing a whole lot of competition. 
 
Rural economic development and innovation policy, as I have shown throughout this dissertation, 
argue that an assets-based approach to rural development is the best way to go. Rural communities 
have unique assets that are naturally attractive and offer an alternative to city living. The problem 
is that there are only so many people who are attracted to the very specific assets that a place like 
the Keweenaw possesses. And some communities, like Houghton, are much better positioned with 
their resource base than others. Rather than decide that only some communities should grow, a 
growth orientation to economic development and technological innovation tells everyone that 
these are activities they must engage with. The saying in economic development goes, "If you're 
not growing, you're dying." But with all competition to grow, more losers than winners emerge. 
Places like Calumet spend time and energy trying to grow when they may be better situated to 
think critically about their sustainability, and wind up getting trapped in a self-defeating cycle that 
leaves them worse off than before. 
 
Rejecting Technological Advancement 
 
In April 2019, I attended a Keweenaw County Board of Commissioners meeting. Keweenaw 
County is notoriously disconnected. Cell service essentially stops functioning within minutes of 
crossing into the county on Highway 41. This meeting of the Board of Commissioners was 
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supposed to be a momentous occasion. Members of the recently reconstituted county economic 
development committee had met with an internet service provider (ISP) out of Houghton County 
and convinced him to develop WISP, or wireless internet service provider, infrastructure in areas 
of the county where there was no internet available. 
 
WISP is a widely used style of internet infrastructure that frequently takes the form of wireless 
mesh networking. Access points are run to satellites which are fixed on top of structures or towers 
to broadcast a wireless signal across a specific geography, similar to how cellular infrastructure 
works, and antennas are attached to people’s homes and businesses to receive the wireless 
transmission. It is widely used in rural communities because it is too expensive and not profitable 
to run wired broadband infrastructure across large distances for just a few internet customers. 
Keweenaw County residents only had one other ISP, another WISP which only serviced a handful 
of the more populated areas of the county, and satellite Internet was broadly seen as overpriced 
and ineffective, especially during long and snowy winters which often disrupted the service. One 
of the economic development committee members who spearheaded the project lived in a part of 
the county where there was no Internet available and volunteered to do much of the work to get 
the project off the ground. She and her husband had worked closely with the new WISP to negotiate 
the first contract between the county and the company. 
 
The April meeting was supposed to involve the ratification of the first contract, but instead, a 
shouting match between the chair of the Board and the CEO of the new ISP erupted. The CEO 
accused the county of refusing to budge on contract language that would allow for him to more 
easily monitor and maintain his equipment attached to antenna towers the county owned. The chair 
of the board argued that this was the same language that everyone else gets, including another local 
ISP, and that they got along just fine. At this point in time, there had already been a lot of time 
spent figuring out the contract language, in and out of meetings, and neither side was satisfied with 
the outcome. Visibly upset with the lack of movement on his requests, the CEO left the meeting 
abruptly with the problem unresolved. The County Commission decided to table the conversations 
for June.  
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I showed up to the June meeting of the County Board of Commissioners. At the beginning of the 
meeting, the owner of the only other ISP in the county was talking about a grant he was applying 
for that would hopefully aid in 5G infrastructure rollout in the county. Next up was a local woman 
concerned with the loss of the only psychiatrist in the county. A regional committee that dealt with 
mental health was concerned that telehealth appointments, which were more expensive, would not 
be an appropriate solution and weren’t accessible for county residents as many of them didn’t have 
access to the Internet. Last on the agenda was a reignited conversation from the last board of 
commissioners meeting. The chair of the commission spoke at length, stating that the desired 
contract language went against the normal way of doing things, and in doing so the CEO was 
“taking advantage of the small-town nature of this board and of Keweenaw County.” The board 
determined that they were going to reject all contracts offered by the new ISP and they requested 
he remove all of his equipment from county towers and cease operation in Keweenaw County. The 
board failed to understand how each of these agenda items were connected. 
 
Later in the year, I was able to sit down and interview the member of the County’s Economic 
Development Committee (EDC) who had done most of the work behind the scenes the two years 
that lead to this disaster with the County Commission. What she described as happening behind 
the scenes at the County, meaning outside of the meetings, verified some of the thoughts I already 
had regarding the outcome. What at first came across as a typical contract disagreement was more 
complex when you looked to the cultural and social dynamics at play in this scenario. First off, the 
typical way of doing things was left to be understood by the insiders. The Chair of the Commission 
said that everyone else didn’t have any issues dealing with contract language. What he didn’t say 
was that everyone else is one other ISP who happens to be run by a longtime resident and close 
friend of many of the County Commissioners. The contract existed for the new WISP for legal 
reasons, but “everyone else” did what they pleased. And while I was not able to verify this with 
County Commissioners, the EDC member told me that the contract provided to the old WISP was 
not actually the same contract that the County was requesting the new WISP to sign. In effect, she 
believed the County Commissioners were lying purposely to avoid creating competition for their 
friend who owned the old WISP. 
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This likely happened in part because there is a networked basis of trust in tight-knit rural 
communities (some might call it a “good ole boys club” or “old boy network”). The contract wasn’t 
the document that maintained trust between parties, it was the actual knowledge and familiarity 
between parties as members of the same community. The CEO of the new WISP, even though he 
was from Houghton, wasn’t aware of the cultural and social dynamics that governed day-to-day 
County business in Keweenaw County. He was coming into the situation expecting that contracts 
and the resulting contract language would guide behavior and relationships. In other words, the 
contract was a behavioral guide for him. But in the case of the County Commissioners, the contract 
was merely a legal document that was there as a liability. The contract did not actually suggest 
how the parties were supposed to behave in practice. 
 
In the case of Keweenaw County, the many social and cultural dynamics at play resulted in the 
County Commissioners rejecting an opportunity for technological advancement. This opportunity 
should have been an easy sell, as many people in the County were without Internet and the 
problems of Internet access were accumulating right before the Commissioners’ eyes in their June 
meeting. In the June meeting, nearly every agenda item had to do with Internet access, yet the 
Chair could not make the connection between why these needs still exist and the solutions that he 
had in front of him. This rejection was fundamentally at odds with the approach that the same 
Commission took to making asset management data accessible. In rejecting this opportunity, 
Keweenaw County was arguably reinforcing the outside perception of it, and other rural areas, as 
technologically backwards. 
 
Zoning Rural Exceptionalism 
 
What we see here each of these vignettes from my fieldwork, is how regional approaches to 
supporting growing infrastructure, both social and physical, that aid new digital economies break 
down once they leave the better-resourced communities that sit at the center of the region. Through 
my research, I found three primary ways that innovation initiatives breakdown: First, through the 
failure of innovation and development policy to consider the needs of the most remote and low-
resourced rural communities. This came through in the rollout of the Opportunity Zone program, 
where particular urban-centric approaches to entrepreneurship and investment, primarily for the 
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wealthy, were prioritized. Second, regional approaches to innovation break down through models 
of economic success that prescribe growth over sustainability. This came out in the Opportunity 
Zone program, which prioritizes economic growth models of investment, rather than investment 
that seeks to assist communities in developing their own customized community resources. The 
prescription of growth over sustainability also came through in the remote work campaign in 
Calumet. In having to compete with many other campaigns, locally and nationwide, the remote 
work campaigns I discussed prioritized asset-based approaches. In this case, the winner, the 
community on the receiving end of opportunities for expanded innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
ultimately population growth is the community who is best able to market its assets.  Third, 
regional approaches break down through the rejection of opportunities for technological 
advancement when communities are “supposed” to be adopting them. In the case of Keweenaw 
County, the Board of Commissioners actively worked to prevent another ISP from coming into 
the county, an ISP that would have provided Internet to many people who didn’t have access. Rural 
networks of trust and a good ole boy network failed to account for the need of outsiders to intervene 
on some issues, especially in a place with limited technological opportunity and knowledge. 
 
Returning to the literature on zoning that I summarized in Chapter Two, I’d like discuss an effect 
that this breakdown has. In particular, I’d like to show how the breakdown contributes to an 
increased divide between the “rural haves” and the “rural have-nots.” I call this process zoning 
rural exceptionalism, wherein rural communities are able to leverage economic development 
policy and the corresponding opportunities to differentiate themselves as a rural player in the new 
innovation economy. In this section, I’ll first revisit how the practice of zoning creates special 
geographies that encourage specific types of neoliberal economic engagement. Next I will explain 
how this has taken shape in contemporary pushes for innovation through federal and state policy. 
Last, I return to my fieldwork to demonstrate how this shapes economic opportunity in the 
Keweenaw and speculate about what this means for the future of rural development in the 
innovation economy.  
 
As Aihwa Ong (2004) describes them in the context of China, zoning technology (e.g., Special 
Economic Zones) are used by the Chinese state to create what she calls a “variegated sovereignty.” 
Variegated sovereignty is a name for the multiple systems of power and authority that vary 
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between China’s zones and the rest of the country so that certain political entities (e.g., Hong Kong, 
Macao) can be incorporated into a Chinese “axis of trade, industrialization, and gradual political 
integration” (p. 70). This system of zoning technologies also enables China to more readily 
participate in global markets and take advantage of foreign investment and trade. The 
establishment of zones to enable participation in global markets and spur certain kinds of economic 
development and success was practiced heavily outside of China at this point, including with the 
establishment of multiple different kinds of special economic zones in the United States. 
 
The zones in the United States that I discussed in this dissertation were not necessarily designed 
to encourage participation in global trade in the way that Free Trade Zones do in the United States 
and SEZs do in China. Rather, I focus on zones whose purpose it is to spur business investment, 
economic growth, and innovation in communities that are considered to be disadvantaged. In 
particular, I draw out how and why these zones are created and then show how they are leveraged 
to promote certain types of innovation in certain places. In the State of Michigan, I am going to 
focus on the deployment of SmartZones. At the federal level, I return to Opportunity Zone 
legislations and how rural-oriented think tanks are uniting it with US Economic Development 
Administration’s Regional Innovation Strategies Program to target rural innovation.  
 
SmartZone(ing) 
The SmartZone program, whose Houghton-Hancock outpost I have discussed extensively in this 
dissertation, was created in 2001 by the Michigan Economic Development Corporation. Per their 
promotional material:  
“SmartZones provide distinct geographical locations where technology-based firms, 
entrepreneurs and researchers locate in close proximity to all of the community assets that 
assist in their endeavors. SmartZone technology clusters promote resource collaborations 
between universities, industry, research organizations, government and other community 
institutions, growing technology-based businesses and jobs. New and emerging businesses 
in SmartZone technology clusters are primarily focused on commercializing ideas, patents 
and other opportunities surrounding corporate, university or private research institute R&D 
efforts” (“Michigan SmartZones”). 
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SmartZones are partially funded and connected to local municipal interests by local tax capture 
through what are called Local Development Finance Authorities (LDFA). In the case of the MTEC 
SmartZone in Houghton-Hancock, a portion of local property taxes are diverted to the LDFAs of 
Houghton and Hancock who then allocate that to the SmartZone. In this way, the SmartZone is 
held liable to the interests of the cities. According to the LDFA Operating Budget for 2019-2020, 
$1,000,500 was given to the MTEC SmartZone. 
 
Due to the structure of the SmartZone program, its funding sources, and its relationships to 
Michigan Technological University, its focus since its founding in 2003 was bounded by the city 
limits of Houghton and Hancock. As I noted earlier in the chapter, the SmartZone is strategically 
placed in the same buildings as multiple local university offices for technology transfer and 
entrepreneurial support. In this way, the SmartZones have become an essential part of the local 
and regional entrepreneurial ecosystem, offering courses and resources to entrepreneurs with a 
focus on developing new companies in Houghton and Hancock. Looking at MTEC SmartZone’s 
list of clients, you see a list of the “Who’s Who” of innovative companies in the Keweenaw 
Peninsula, mostly concentrated in Houghton and Hancock. 
 
This isn’t by accident. Programs like the SmartZone legislation are explicitly built up in 
communities that already have certain types of resources available to make the SZs as successful 
as possible. By mandating that SmartZones are at the center of collaborations between 
“universities, industry, research organizations, government and other community institutions” and 
then tying the funding and responsibility to specific municipalities, the SmartZone program 
embodies a zoning process that privileges certain geographies over others. In this case, it 
concentrates these opportunities in Houghton and Hancock, alongside the vast majority of the 
economic development organizations in the Keweenaw and the institutions, such as universities, 
that drive much of economic development in the region.  
 
The Center on Rural Innovation and “innovation hubs” 
I briefly introduced the work of the Center on Rural Innovation (CORI) in the Introduction, and 
discussed their rural data dashboards in Chapter Three. I’d like to return to another one of their 
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programs here, their Rural Innovation Initiative, which supports the creation of rural innovation 
hubs in communities throughout the United States. According to their website: 
“Through the Rural Innovation Initiative (RII) we select communities that apply to receive 
intensive technical assistance as they execute an innovation hub strategy: an economic 
development model that works to educate and train local residents in digital skills, employ 
them in new economy jobs, and empower them to launch the startups that will drive their 
digital economy” (“Rural Innovation Initiative”). 
Each year (for the past two years at the time of writing), CORI accepts applications from aspiring 
communities that want to be a part of its program. When selected, CORI begins working with the 
designated entity in each community, often doing multi-day site visits to meet community groups 
and stakeholders. Through this process, CORI provides technical assistance to apply for federal 
grants, particularly the i6 Challenge Grant through the United States Economic Development 
Administration’s Regional Innovation Strategies Program.4 This program’s approach should not 
sound foreign given what I have discussed about regional innovation strategies for building place-
based economies. It essentially is the fund through which non-profits, institutions of higher-
education, economic development organizations, and other organizations focused on 
entrepreneurship and innovation get funded by the federal government to build out regional 
innovation in their respective regions. 
 
Figure 5.1: The Innovation Hub model advocated by the Center on Rural Innovation. Image saved from their website by author in 
2019. 
                                               
4 This federal program is now known as “Build to Scale Program,” but at the time of research was still called the 
Regional Innovation Strategies Program. 
 149 
 
From CORI’s first cohort in 2018, three rural communities, as represented by local non-profits that 
lead their interaction with CORI, were able to secure i6 Challenge Grants which would help 
facilitate this build-out of the rural innovation hub in their respective communities. Among the 
successful CORI-supported communities and organizations was 20Fathoms, a startup incubator in 
Traverse City, Michigan. Traverse City is often viewed as something of a poster-child for rural 
communities in Michigan. The city and the surrounding region were able to pivot away from a 
traditional tourist economy over the past 20 years into a much broader amenity-based destination, 
spurring population growth and support from organizations like CORI. 
 
At first glance, the work of CORI seems commendable: supporting rural non-profits and their 
communities to secure federal grants to promote regional innovation strategies through rural 
innovation hubs that can hopefully transform their communities for the better. They argued that 
innovation hubs needed a combination of certain things: housing for young professionals, 
incubators and spaces for job skills training, and immediate access to cultural amenities. Taking a 
closer look at what is actually required of communities to participate in the CORI program, it 
becomes clear what this program is actually doing: concentrating innovation opportunities in rural 
communities that are already well-resourced. In order to qualify for their program, the 
communities applying need four things: existing high-speed broadband, significant portions of the 
community located in or near Opportunity Zones, a partnership with a 4yr college or university, 
and a local non-profit or government that was prepared to raise the matching funds that would be 
necessary to secure the state and federal grants that would build these innovation hubs. 
 
But as I’ve demonstrated in this chapter, it’s unlikely that most rural communities have all of these 
items. So, what kind of communities are programs like this for? 
 
An inter-rural digital divide for the high-tech economy 
As we progress into the digital economy, I argue that economic policies that focus on economic 
growth, such as the Opportunity Zones, and programs that contribute to the concentration of 
resources in already well-resourced communities, like the Center on Rural Innovation, are causing 
the digital divide to shift. In its current embrace, the digital divide is largely seen as a divide 
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between access to high-speed Internet, information and digital literacy, and the resulting effects, 
and this is amplified by the urban-rural divide. I argue that a new digital divide is emerging, one 
that is created by the ability to participate in new formations of the high-tech economy in the form 
of software start-ups, bioeconomy initiatives, incubators, and the ability to be seen as a viable 
market for a high-tech future. But rather than rural areas being wholly left behind, rural 
communities that have the existing resource base to go after the competitive grants and 
development programs are able to take advantage of their position as rural. 
 
I call this process zoning rural exceptionalism, wherein rural communities are able to leverage 
economic development policy and the corresponding opportunities to differentiate themselves as 
a rural player in the new innovation economy. I call it exceptionalism, in that it creates rural 
communities that themselves become exceptional. They become the poster-children for what it 
means to do successful and progressive future oriented rural development. Meanwhile, the rural 
communities that don’t meet these exceptional standards are not only left behind with respect to 
technological development, but are facing increasing competition from the places where these 
resources keep accumulating. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While rural cities like Houghton and Hancock weren’t on the receiving end of programs like CORI 
(yet), as I have shown throughout this dissertation, they are able to amass opportunity in other 
ways: through Opportunity Zones, through SmartZone programming, through tech transfer from 
local universities. The list goes on and on. What I argue here is that places like Houghton and 
Hancock are on the receiving end of favor when it comes to the process I call zoning rural 
exceptionalism, meanwhile Calumet and Keweenaw County are on the opposite end. 
 
The rural development hub model promoted by the Aspen Institute, and similar to existing 
approaches at the state and federal level (i.e., the SmartZone, i6 Challenge grant), would have us 
believe that a hub and spoke model is the best route forward for rural regions. Pump the resources 
into centralized rural hubs that have the community connections and existing relationships (i.e., 
connecting spokes) with other rural communities throughout the region, and wait for the spillover 
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to occur. Yet, there is something that this model doesn’t consider: most of these regional hubs, 
while much more well-resourced than the peripheral communities in the region, are still 
themselves under-resourced compared to regions they are being pitted against.  
 
I’ve set up Houghton and Hancock here as the sort of well-resourced hub in the middle of the 
Keweenaw. But if we are to look at how Houghton is resourced compared to Marquette two hours 
down the road, there is a disparity. If we look at how Houghton might compete with other centers 
for high-tech innovation in Michigan, such as Ann Arbor, there’s an even greater disparity. This 
is to say, a hub model expects spillover into surrounding regional communities. But when the hub 
is vastly under-resourced compared to many other regions for high-tech innovation and is expected 
to compete for remote workers, entrepreneurs, and outside investment, the spillover is impeded. 
Instead, we get regions like the Keweenaw, where resources and opportunity continue to 
concentrate in Houghton-Hancock while others like Calumet struggle to stay afloat. 
 
This is not a simple story of uneven development that has gone unnoticed. This is a story of the 
failures of intentional rural development initiatives that seek to create regionwide wealth and 
prosperity and, I argue, fail. What I document here are systems of rural development that are built 
up to encourage discourses and tactics of high-tech entrepreneurship and innovation that will 
purportedly result in widespread regional spillover. But rather than doing that, they are 
concentrating opportunity and “progress” in already well-resourced rural communities. In calling 
this “zoning rural exceptionalism” I am working to signal that this kind of progress, embedded in 
the ability to participate in what it means to be enrolled in high-tech futures, is now fundamentally 
a part of processes of zoning that Aihwa Ong and others documented as a result of globalization.  
 
In the following chapter, I return to the overarching theme of this dissertation: rural transformation 
in the face of shifting economic demands in the 21st century. Zoning rural exceptionalism, like the 
other two processes of economization that I’ve documented in this chapter, is essential to the rural 
transformation that I see happening haphazardly in my fieldsite and across the United States.  
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Figure 6.1: A charcoal painting of five copper miners. Hung in the hallway of 101 Quincy. Art by Alyssa Dupuis, photo by 
author. 
 
 
 
Chapter Six: Economization and a “Turn to Assets” in Rural Economic Development 
 
 
“It’s not the same sleepy Finnish town anymore.” 
 
Molly was one of my coworkers at 101 Quincy, the coworking space founded in 2018, just a few 
months before I started my fieldwork. It was located on the busiest corner in downtown Hancock, 
nestled between a Mexican restaurant and an old shoe store where I bought a new pair of winter 
boots when mine proved inadequate for the harsh Keweenaw winter. Molly had grown up in 
Hancock, but moved away as a young adult. When she returned in 2008, 15 years after leaving, 
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she told me that the town had changed and that it took her a couple of years to get reacclimated 
and find community again. Now, as a local entrepreneur, she felt plugged into many of the exciting 
things happening in Hancock, and neighboring Houghton. She told me that something like a 
coworking space would not have been accepted in the town just 10 years ago, brushed off as “big 
city crap.” Now, in 2019 at the time of our interview, there were coworking spaces in Hancock 
and Houghton. These coworking spaces had emerged as there was an increased demand in office 
space for remote workers and start-ups that were spun out from local business incubators and 
universities. While the street signs in Hancock were still written in both Finnish and English, the 
people had changed, Molly told me, “It’s not the same sleepy Finnish town anymore.” 
 
It’s the transformation that Molly told me about, and the various organizations and businesses that 
accompanied it, that have been my focus in this dissertation. But the transformations that had 
already occurred were not enough. Discourses of innovation and rural redevelopment, spurred by 
capitalist markets obsessed with economic growth at all costs, demanded that communities like 
Houghton and Hancock continually work to transform themselves. Recovering from the collapse 
of the mining industry in the 20th century was only the first step, the region now needed to shape 
itself for high-tech intervention and the growing digital economy. And as I show in the chapters 
of this dissertation, the economic development tactics promoted, policy governing, and initiatives 
funding modern development concentrated resources in the most well-resourced communities in 
the region.  
 
The overarching question of this dissertation was, how does the Keweenaw seek to reframe and 
reinvent itself through contemporary modes of innovation and entrepreneurship? I briefly 
summarize each of my findings chapters, before outlining the rest of this chapter.  
 
In Chapter Three, I asked, how do contemporary pushes for rural redevelopment prepare the rural 
to be incorporated into technological futures? I unpacked two specific programs funded by the 
State of Michigan to stimulate infrastructure and real estate development in rural towns across the 
state: Redevelopment Ready Communities and integrated asset management. Through the 
digitization of rural assets, mapping initiatives, and rural data dashboards, I argued that this process 
works to identify the “right” and “wrong” kinds of rural data, in the process reshaping and 
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repackaging rurality and rural communities. I called this process codifying rural readiness, and 
showed how the tools that were supposed to create an “even playing field,” but instead stoked 
competition between rural communities that should have been cooperating.  
 
In Chapter Four, I asked, how does regional culture get taken up in processes of economic 
development? Utilizing the cultural form of the Yooper and the Finnish concept of “sisu,” I showed 
how economic development organizations (EDOs) identify and extract cultural assets from the 
region and transform them into a type of rural capital that can be leveraged by anyone, whether 
they are from the region or not. I demonstrated how these same EDOs marketed regional culture 
to attract the “right” kinds of entrepreneurs and innovators to the Keweenaw, ensuring economic 
growth through normative forms of innovation and entrepreneurship. I called this process crafting 
the rural entrepreneur. 
 
In Chapter Five, I returned to the overarching question of the dissertation now that I had unpacked 
the multiple ways that the region was seeking to reinvent itself. I asked in response to the 
cumulative success of Houghton and Hancock, how do regional approaches to innovation break 
down? I described how technological opportunities continued to concentrate in the better-
resourced places in the Keweenaw, despite policies and practices that are supposed to ensure 
spillover and regional success. I called this process zoning rural exceptionalism, wherein rural 
communities were able to leverage economic development policy and the corresponding 
opportunities to differentiate themselves as rural players in the new innovation economy.  
 
I return to these processes in this chapter, and build with them to consider how our understandings 
of rurality are changing in the current economic landscape. I first look to theories of economization 
to demonstrate their relevance to the transformation of rural regions and people. Second, I look to 
how rural places are simultaneously constructed as geographies of deficits and as being full of 
unrealized assets that are ripe for opportunity. I speculate on what rurality might be in the shadow 
of the high-tech economy. Third, I return to the idea of innovation and ask, when innovation is 
demanded of everyone, what then does innovation mean? Lastly, I reflect on my own struggles to 
balance critique and intervention in this project and where it might take me moving forward.  
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The Economization of the Rural 
 
The transformation of rural culture, land, and other rural “assets” into something to be exploited 
for purposes of economic growth is better understood through theories of economization. Çaliskan 
and Callon (2009) describe economization as the process through which things, people, behaviors, 
organizations, and institutions become part of the economy. In the realm of high-tech 
entrepreneurship, Silvia Lindtner (2020) argues that there are specific tools prescribed to 
entrepreneurs (e.g., prototyping, post-it-note walls) that subsume people and their ideas into 
discourses of technological progress. This process of economization reshapes people so that they 
are both more in line with dominant narratives of technological innovation and more readily 
accessible to investment capital.  
 
Alexander Dobeson (2018) argues that economization transforms rural communities to better fit 
the demands of neoliberal capitalism. In his research with Icelandic fisheries, he argues: 
“the economisation of the small-boat fishers has furthered the economisation of the rural 
as such, with the rise of a new culture of liberal rural capitalism in which private ownership 
structures, individual entrepreneurship and market performance decide who stays afloat, 
rather than collective belonging, community-based forms of solidarity and redistribution” 
(p. 17). 
In this case, Icelandic fisheries were restructured into a new national lottery. The resulting 
processes made it so fishers were freed from their rural locales and no longer had to pool together 
their catch with the other fishers in their communities. Dobeson refers to this process as 
economization because it has both reconfigured how “markets change practices of harvesting and 
production” and the “cultural meaning of small boats as former paragons of rural independence 
that traditionally have spread ownership and risk across communities” (p. 18). In other words, we 
can see processes of economization as altering rural people’s relationship to work and labor that 
were fundamentally part of their constitution of rurality. 
 
What I have shown here in this dissertation, I argue, are three processes of rural economization: 
codifying rural readiness, crafting the rural entrepreneur, and zoning rural exceptionalism. In each 
of these processes, I show how the rural region at the center of my ethnography is being actively 
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transformed to be made more accessible for outside investment and participation in high-tech 
economies. Dobeson (2018) and others (e.g., Gunnoe, 2014; Delvenne, 2020) have sought to 
understand rural economization and financialization largely in natural resource extraction (e.g., 
fisheries, land, soybeans). My research extends this theorization, looking to the economic 
development practices, the people, and region itself as they all go through processes of 
economization. While understanding economization in the rural through natural resource 
extraction is important, rural places worldwide are being called upon to transform their economic 
sectors and steer away from industries such as agriculture. What I’ve demonstrated is that regions 
do not just happen to become known for their entrepreneurship and innovation, and people do not 
just happen to become entrepreneurs and innovators, they are made.  It is this making that I 
document here.  
 
Codifying rural readiness is not only about the process to make rural communities “ready” for 
redevelopment. It is about economic development policies and practices that demand ease of 
access to infrastructure for private interests, performed through digitization and regional mapping 
projects. While these demands, at first glance, were accompanied by privileged participation in 
and funding from unique state programs, such as the sewer and wastewater (SAW) asset 
management grants, the infrastructural issues they uncovered went unfunded. Recall that 
Hancock’s participation in the SAW program resulted in them finding nearly $10 million worth of 
issues. They will have to go millions of dollars in debt to fix the issues revealed. Meanwhile, the 
resulting data is currently being fed into centralized GIS systems in hopes that an industrial 
developer somewhere might stumble upon Hancock and see that it has all the right assets for a new 
facility. Codifying rural readiness, then, is about the process of making Hancock, Houghton, and 
other rural communities, more appealing for capitalist intervention. It is a recognition that the 
communities themselves will not perform the desired interventions. 
 
Crafting the rural entrepreneur, from one perspective, is about EDOs doing their jobs, often at the 
behest of local municipalities and institutions. The EDOs’ goals were to promote entrepreneurship 
and regional innovation, attract talented outsiders, and support economic growth. But in this 
process the EDOs and local leaders simultaneously exploited the Yooper’s reputation as hard-
working and entrepreneurial, while casting aside local Yoopers in favor of outsiders with the right 
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skills and connections. “Sisu” was the calling card of the backwoods, industrial Keweenaw 
resident, and a tool used by economic developers to market the region to others: “This can be yours 
too.” It is this paradox that points us to processes of economization. Yoopers could simultaneously 
be hard-working, entrepreneurial, and dedicated, but too backwards and without the right kinds of 
innovation to exploit. The Yooper could not be transformed into the right kind of entrepreneur, but 
others could. In doing so, I argue that this process points us to how rural culture can be transformed 
and manipulated to serve discourses of innovation and entrepreneurship. 
 
Zoning, as described by Aihwa Ong (2004) and others (e.g., Cross, 2010; Easterling, 2012), is in 
and of itself a process of economization. As Ong (2004) describes the Special Economic Zones in 
China, it is about creating new forms of governance so that national economies can be better 
incorporated into global forms of capitalism. It is about structuring the right kinds of geographies, 
with the right kinds of resources, so they can be brought under the umbrella of technological 
progress. Zoning rural exceptionalism, then, shows how this is done in rural communities, 
particularly in rural communities that adhere to narratives of regional innovation. Zoning rural 
exceptionalism is a process that also shows us which geographies and which regions are worth 
economizing for purposes of regional innovation, and which can be left behind, or economized in 
different ways. In the case of my dissertation, this process aided economic developers and others 
by identifying the places that would be most in line and most opportune for outside intervention. 
This is a project of region-making. 
 
What I have shown here is that it’s not only specific rural commodities that get incorporated into 
processes of economization, it is rural people through processes of self-upgrade (Lindtner, 2020) 
and rural regions through processes of zoning (Ong, 2004). The economization of rural regions 
and rural people, in this case, is about bringing them more in line with the demands of 
contemporary technological capitalism, that demands innovation from everyone.   
 
A Turn to Assets 
 
In Chapter One of this dissertation I documented what I called the “rural deficit narrative.” The 
rural deficit narrative is the story perpetuated by a whole host of think tanks and media outlets that 
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ask questions like, “Can rural America be saved?” They ask this question alongside recommending 
a variety of interventions: from rural innovation hubs to relocating rural talent to urban areas. This 
narrative actively constructs metrics of distress and then points to rural and urban areas that are 
most worthy of the limited government intervention available. In an editorial article in CityLab, I 
argued that this narrative is misleading and mischaracterizes the kinds of opportunities, and efforts 
to exploit those opportunities, that already exist in rural communities across the United States 
(Hardy, 2018). 
 
In fact, the rural deficit narrative stands in opposition to the scholarship in asset based community 
development (ABCD) and rural capitals that argue that rural places are uniquely situated to 
contribute to economic growth. Many rural communities in developed countries turned to amenity-
based tourism and other industries that relied on nature and local culture to respond to the new 
economic realities in the era of post-productivism (Flora et al., 2018; Halfacree, 1993). The 
adoption of amenity-based regional economies has since been lauded as a tool to promote 
population growth and rural resiliency (Ulrich-Schad and Duncan, 2018). Rural development 
scholars and professionals saw these changes and a wave of theorization about the role of local 
amenities and unique regional assets began to emerge in the mid-1990s (Flora et al., 2018; 
Jóhannesson et al., 2003; Slee, 2005). In other words, new rural economies based on unique rural 
assets emerged at the same time that theories of place-based innovation emerged, largely as a result 
of the upending of global markets and financialization of global capitalism that happened in 
processes of neoliberalization (Harvey, 2005). I call this the turn to assets.  
 
The turn to assets then is the period from the mid-1990s moving forward where rural economic 
development theory and place-based innovation theory both encouraged the transformation of non-
tangible rural assets into new commodities. This was supposed to lead to a transformation of 
rurality and its economic capacity. Rather than be known for its economic capacity in agriculture 
and other forms of natural resource extraction, rural communities could (and should) turn to the 
extraction of unique cultures of rurality and experiences of nature. This turn to assets also helps 
describe a genealogical understanding of where today’s focus on rural cultures of innovation 
comes from. In other words, the obsession with rural innovation is just another unrealized asset. 
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So, what does this turn actually do? The turn to assets ensures access for investment while 
simultaneously promising opportunity for economic growth, which is necessary for sustaining 
capitalism. It makes rural communities in the United States and other regions still a resource for 
urban communities even when they are no longer a source of copper, lumber, and food. It 
streamlines rural capitalism and production so it is more in line with the demands of growing forms 
of technological capitalism and the digital economy. It also increases the number and types of ties 
between rural and urban communities. In other words, the turn to assets continues to be a process 
of transforming rurality to respond to global economic changes, from the realities of post-
productivism in the 1980s to the digital economy of the present.  
 
This begs the question, what is rurality in the shadow of the high-tech economy? Recall Cloke and 
Godwin’s understanding of rural change: “a whole series of movements between the differing 
practices and procedures of various strategies of regulation operating at overlapping scales” (1992, 
p. 326-327). They were careful to reject the idea that there was a smooth and linear transition from 
Fordism to post-Fordism, that all rural communities were somehow now in an era of post-
productivism. Rather, they argued, it was necessary to look at the overarching regulations, policies, 
and actors that were working to actively transform the economic capacity of rural communities. 
This transformation was being done so that rural communities could be more in line with the 
demands of contemporary capitalism and the realities of increasing global competition in 
productivist economies such as agriculture. Cloke and Godwin too highlighted the transformation 
that was taking place in rural communities from certain types of productivism to the information 
economy and service economy via amenity-based tourism. But it wasn’t a natural or totalizing 
transformation.  
 
I argue that this is an active and ongoing transformation from productivism  to post-productivism. 
But, I’d like to suggest that my fieldwork demonstrates we are in a new stage of this 
transformation. It is now no longer enough to be merely a source of the idyllic for culture-based 
tourism or mountain biking trails. The rural must now also be a source of technological innovation 
and a home for the people and firms that have come to represent innovation and entrepreneurship 
(e.g., software start-ups, coworking spaces, incubators). While the turn to assets was argued as 
being something that could save rural communities and enhance rural economies through unique 
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place-based rural assets, it has now been used to find rural places that can too be exploited for the 
high-tech economy. This is what I mean when I say that there is a process of zoning rural 
exceptionalism happening in my fieldsite.  
 
Some better-resourced rural communities have been able to continually package and extract their 
unique assets. They were the successful communities that emerged from the waves of growth 
provided by the turn to assets in amenity-based tourism (Ulrich-Schad and Duncan, 2018). Those 
are now the same communities that are being transformed by the likes of the Center on Rural 
Innovation, Opportunity Zones, and regional grants for the purposes of creating new rural spaces 
ready to take part in the digital economy. It is these places that become the poster children for what 
it means to be rural in the 21st century. Their success will be used to demand transformation of 
many other rural communities, in this way creating a new aspirational rural. 
 
An Innovation Crisis 
 
There is an interesting paradox forming, one that I have partially documented throughout this 
dissertation: everyone must be innovative. The promotion of innovation, often as a vague demand 
broadly connected to high-tech and manufacturing industries, has become a massive and ongoing 
project for government programs and public-private partnerships throughout the United States. 
The scholarly literature in rural economic development is overrun with different ideas about 
increasing regional innovation in rural communities and how high-tech innovation could be a 
solution for many of the economic woes facing downtrodden rural communities (Andersson and 
Eklund, 1999; Bock, 2016; Bonfiglio, 2017; Dabson; 2011; Eder, 2019; Stephens et al. 2013). But 
if innovation is supposed to be this totalizing solution, then what does it mean to be innovative 
when innovation is demanded of everyone?  
 
In my own fieldwork, high-tech innovation was most often situated within the SmartZone, the 
FinnZone, and, of course, the Innovation Shore initiative. Like other regional marketing initiatives 
before it (e.g., Silicon Flatirons in Colorado), Innovation Shore sought to promote existing 
entrepreneurs and high-tech firms in the Keweenaw in an effort to attract more and bolster the 
region’s reputation. While Innovation Shore worked to attract innovative outsiders, along with the 
 161 
FinnZone, the SmartZone was ready to train and transform potential innovators through their 
SmartStart business incubator programming. In other words, there was an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem that supported the monetization of high-tech innovation.  
 
This comes as no surprise. I’m not the first to take a closer look at how innovation has been taken 
up in our current historical moment. Others in critical computing (e.g., Avle and Lindtner, 2016, 
2017; Freeman et al., 2018; Irani, 2019; Lindtner, 2020; Lindtner and Avle, 2017) have sought to 
unpack how innovation gets adopted as a development approach around the world, and the role it 
plays in creating specific kinds of actors that serve the spread of neoliberal capitalism. A frame of 
technological innovation driving entrepreneurship and development has been taken up worldwide, 
including in many peripheral economies (Avle and Lindtner, 2016; Freeman et al. 2018). As Avle 
et al. (2017) argue, there is an established “right way” to do innovation advocated, but it’s largely 
dominated by discourses and practices from Silicon Valley: “[The] seductive draw of the SV 
method lies exactly on its universal promise of local applicability, individual and collective 
transformation” (p. 473). It is this universal promise that finds itself in the Keweenaw. These 
discursive demands for innovation help shape what kind of work is possible using innovation. For 
example, Irani (2019) shows how contemporary demands for innovation takes designers who 
aspire to aid NGOs doing development work, and diverts their desire to change the world through 
development into a need to add value to monetizable design projects.  
 
What all of these texts show is the contested locations and purposes of innovation. There is a 
totalizing discourse, but it is resisted and altered. I argue that this totalizing discourse, despite 
efforts to respond and alter, is resulting in conflicting demands and increasing competition. In Anti-
Crisis, anthropologist Janet Roitman (2013) argues that crisis is a “historical and experiential 
condition” (p. 2). She explains that crisis represents a narrative form that has been “mobilized as 
the defining category of historical situations” (p. 3). In other words, crises emerge because we 
name them as such. I am convinced that there is what I am calling an innovation crisis in the 
making. I argue that the universal demand for innovation has in itself created a kind of “innovation 
crisis” where everyone (regions, cities, scholars, firms, organizations) must seek innovation in 
their everyday practice or fear being left behind. In other words, the crisis is created to further a 
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specific economic trajectory in capitalism that demands growth. And in demanding growth, it 
demands new things to create said growth.  
 
This crisis has been a long time in the making. The innovation crisis demands an “innovate or die” 
attitude of many places and people as the tech sector is seen as a last ditch effort to turn around 
economic prospects in a world that is increasingly designed only for the wealthy. Some of this 
crisis has been fueled by the rise of the creative economy in the 1990s and 2000s, alongside the 
dot-com boom and deeply intertwined with the tech economy. As scholars have noted, the tech 
start-up and creative Internet boom of the 1990s lead to the massive casualization of professional 
labor and normalized risk as an inherent and necessary part of being an employee within innovative 
tech and creative industries (McRobbie 2016; Neff 2012). This movement for a creative class was 
pushed by urban planners and academics (Florida 2002) and incorporated into public policy 
throughout the world. The casualization of labor and incorporation of risk taking that became an 
inherent part of the creative and new tech industries (McRobbie 2016; Neff 2012) worked hand-
in-hand with the economic policies I discuss throughout this dissertation that helped incentivize 
real estate speculation and the movement of large corporations into downtrodden rural areas. 
 
I am arguing that what we are seeing is not necessarily a crisis that has already happened, but an 
innovation crisis that is imminent in its arrival. As innovation becomes more widespread as the 
prominent economic development tactic to transform the economic output of rural communities, I 
speculate that it will lead to massive casualization of labor and the transformation, often for the 
worst, of rural communities. This transformation will further exacerbate already severe economic 
inequalities in rural communities, whose often seasonal economies already place rural people at 
risk. The innovation crisis will happen as rural places continually compete with each other for the 
scraps, the opportunities to attract the right kinds of innovative firms and industry clusters, that are 
thrown away from “superstar cities.” The innovation crisis is already visible in the process of 
zoning rural exceptionalism, and it’s only bound to get worst as the United States government 
continually pumps money into regional innovation projects such as the new Endless Frontier Act 
and the Economic Development Administration’s Regional Innovation Strategies Program.  
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Balancing Critique and Intervention 
 
What I have presented in this dissertation is rather critical of the rural economic development 
practices being advocated for and deployed in places like the Upper Peninsula. I found resources 
continually accumulating in the communities that seemed like they were already receiving a 
disproportionate amount of the opportunities. This should come as no surprise, as that is a natural 
function of capitalism: keep the downtrodden exploitable by continually funneling opportunity to 
the wealthiest. Yet, I went into my ethnographic fieldwork hoping that some kind of alternatives 
would come to the surface. After all, this was a very remote and rural region that I hoped would 
have more awareness about the trappings of models of development that advocated for economic 
growth at all costs. But, as an economic developer told me in one of the very first interviews I did: 
“If you’re not growing, you’re dying.”  
 
Despite this, I kept myself open to potential alternatives that might pop up. I began to see that 
intent in some of the work of the Western UP Planning and Development Region (WUPPDR), as 
they sought to create “an even playing field” for all communities in their service area using asset 
management. Yet, even this effort seemed to end in development practices largely centering the 
needs of external investment rather than internal resilience and solidarity for the communities 
being “developed.” One WUPPDR staff member was active in organizing the Western UP Food 
Systems Council alongside the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community in nearby Baraga County, 
faculty and students at Michigan Tech, and other community/tribal organizations. The Council 
sought to unite food growers in the Western UP and help build infrastructure to promote further 
food sovereignty in the region. The Council, and the work of the Keweenaw Bay Indian 
Community in the region, offered potential alternatives to what I was seeing in my interviews and 
observations with traditional economic development entities. But, I chose not to engage with this 
work as I saw it as necessitating a much deeper and meaningful connection with the parties 
involved; a connection that I would not have been able to cultivate in the relatively short time I 
had in the Keweenaw.   
 
As I was in the beginning stages of analysis and writing, I decided to test the waters with my 
critique in venues where I thought there might be people most impacted. Through my CityLab 
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article and behind the scenes policy work with the statewide group of rural economic developers, 
I was noticed by the staff at the Michigan Municipal League who invited me to give a talk at their 
annual forum on technology and policy. The policy forum brought together municipal leaders from 
all over the state and featured keynotes from people like Lilly Shoup, Senior Director of Policy at 
Lyft, and Dug Song, co-founder of Duo Security, an Ann Arbor start-up who had recently been 
acquired for over $2 billion by Cisco. In my talk, I used language that would be familiar to the 
people in the room, such as “the digital divide” and “grow the pie.”1 The talk was a pre-cursor to 
the argument that I eventually made in Chapter Five of this dissertation, that current economic 
development practices were concentrating technological resources in already well-resourced 
communities, actively shaping the ability to participate in the high-tech economy.2 I closed with 
the question, “What exists beyond growth?” and largely expected to get ignored by most of the 
folks in the room (see Figure 6.2).  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Presentation slide from Michigan Municipal League presentation. 
 
I was the third speaker of six that afternoon, all of us coming at technology and policy in Michigan 
from a different perspective. The other speakers even included Jay Teeling from the MTEC 
SmartZone who spoke right before me about rural innovation and start-up incubators. At the end, 
the forum would go into breakout groups led by one of the six speakers. To my surprise, I wound 
up with the largest breakout group, with around 15 participants. I started the conversation by asking 
                                               
1 “Grow the pie” is shorthand in liberal capitalism for economic policies that seek to grow the amount of wealth that 
exists. Rather than taking away from one person’s piece of the pie to make another person’s piece comparable in 
size (i.e., wealth redistribution), these policies argue that we should be increasing the size of the pie so everyone has 
an opportunity to make their piece bigger without making other people’s pieces smaller. 
2 The talk was titled, “Revisiting the Digital Divide: How economic development policy and practice concentrates 
technological resources into the hands of a few.” 
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the people at the table what part of my talk resonated with them. They began introducing 
themselves, many of them were municipal and civic leaders from small communities across 
Michigan. They all felt the pressure to constantly reinvent their towns so that they may finally hit 
it big and attract the hip new start-ups and tech companies they heard about popping up in places 
like Detroit, Ann Arbor, and Grand Rapids. One person from Mason, a small city outside of 
Lansing, told the people at the table about how difficult it was to follow the advice of organizations 
such as the Michigan Economic Development Corporation. She wasn’t sure how to compete with 
bigger cities nearby like Lansing, the state capitol, and East Lansing, the home to Michigan State 
University. Further, even if Mason wanted to become more of a “bedroom community” for techies 
who worked in the larger cities, it’d have to compete with every other small town in the region. 
She, and others at the table, felt frustrated with the demands for constant progress and reinvention. 
 
While my work surprisingly resonated with many of the people in the room, I wasn’t able to 
provide much solace in alternatives to the normative economic growth model. People asked what 
they should do, and all I could do was tell them about different approaches, such as asset-based 
development and the community capitals framework, that sought to do development more 
equitably in rural places. But, as I’ve laid out here in this dissertation, even those approaches still 
perpetuate a growth narrative that doesn’t consider that some communities aren’t going to be able 
to grow, or shouldn’t grow. 
 
While alternatives did not necessarily emerge explicitly from the work of the economic 
development organizations that I followed, throughout this dissertation I have proposed a handful 
of alternatives myself that I believe emerge from the actual lived experiences of people working 
the communities. These realities are often rejected by economic developers as being antithetical 
to the needs of economic growth and high-tech orientations in the 21st century, but what happens 
if policy makers, civic leaders, and economic developers took these lived realities seriously and 
used them to guide their work moving forward? 
 
In “Chapter Three: Codifying Rural Readiness,” I documented how initiatives to promote 
infrastructure data creation was oriented towards capturing externally driven redevelopment 
opportunities, akin to smokestack chasing. Smokestack chasing has largely been exposed as 
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antithetical and damaging to communities (Boothroyd and Davis, 1993) and was a term used to 
disparage certain types of economic development activity among people that I spoke to during my 
fieldwork. I suggest that we need to critically examine new redevelopment opportunities in a 
similar manner and reorient efforts to digitize infrastructural data and other tactics in an 
endogenous fashion. Data dashboards tend to prioritize the creation and display of urban-normed 
data that makes communities more readily accessible to global capital investment. How might 
communities create data that reflects the needs and desires of their community members; 
measuring how tight knit communities are, the kinds of natural beauty present, data that shows a 
slower pace of life, and how places are proximate to wilderness opportunities. These are all things 
demonstrably valued by the people who already live there (e.g., as evident in Keweenaw County’s 
“Blueprint for the Future”). Instead of catering to investors, what does it look like to create data 
that would attract folks similar to those who already live there? 
 
In “Chapter Four: Crafting the Rural Entrepreneur,” I make the argument that the economic desires 
and lived realities of local Yoopers to make a good living and provide for their families and 
communities is rejected as antithetical to the normative demands of economic growth orientations 
to economic development. Rather, entrepreneurship and innovation initiatives sought to attract 
outsiders that were more compatible with their grand visions of the Keweenaw Peninsula as a 
bastion of the high-tech future. What might it look like to focus on sustainability and good jobs 
for all, rather than economic growth that has demonstrably only resulted in success for some? 
 
In “Chapter Five: Zoning Rural Exceptionalism,” I documented how a growth orientation 
concentrated economic opportunity in communities that are already the most well-resourced in the 
region. Despite initiatives being representative of contemporary rural development and policy 
literature that advocated for approaches that were supposed to encourage spillover throughout a 
region (i.e., rural development hubs), the resulting spillover did not materialize from the success 
of a few. Instead, new opportunities continued to accumulate in Houghton and Hancock. Rather 
than starting at the hubs of a region, what would happen if policy makers and civic leaders actually 
started at the periphery, the communities who are most in need of intervention and who don’t have 
the “sexy” ideas and existing businesses? I suggest that rather than spillover, regional economic 
development policies in the 21st century need to advocate for solidarity and mutual aid. The Center 
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on Rural Innovation proposes putting rural innovation hubs in the rural communities that already 
have access to technological partnerships, broadband, and investment. Instead of innovation hubs 
that seek to spin out high-tech businesses and monetizable ideas, rural regions are better positioned 
to think about how technology can be used alongside rural cultural traits (e.g., “sisu”) that 
encourage solidarity, mutual respect, and acknowledge the lived realities and hardships facing 
working people in rural communities. 
 
One place that I have found inspiration to push these ideas moving forward is in theories of 
sustainable economics, particularly that of degrowth. Proposed as an alternative to sustainable 
development, which is still invested in economic growth, degrowth is “a project of voluntary 
societal shrinking of production and consumption aimed at social ecological sustainability” 
(Demaria et al., 2013). It emerged in the early 2000s from sustainability activism in France and 
has been taken up as a potential framework for understanding the future of many rural communities 
around the world (Alcock, 2019; Haartsen and Venhorst, 2010). I appreciate it because it 
recognizes that growth isn’t the solution for all and suggests active interventions for ensuring the 
prosperity of people and communities to choose degrowth over normative alternatives. It is in 
opposition to many types of municipal decline, such as that in the “Rust Belt” narrative that 
constantly seek growth and reinvention while doing nothing to address the issues that are arising 
as industrial cities shrink (Neumann, 2016).  
 
I think there are ways to frame technological interventions as helpful in assisting degrowth. There 
are opportunities for technologists and folks in disciplines like critical computing and science and 
technology studies to develop and study the role of technology as a critical intervention in 
situations like this. Rather than see remote work as a source of population growth and bringing in 
high-tech workers to a rural community, what happens when we think about developing systems 
of remote work that will allow people to stay in communities as they decline? Instead of thinking 
about telehealth as being a last ditch effort at connecting a rural elderly person to health care, we 
should be thinking about how sociotechnical health systems can empower people to access care in 
ways they might not normally be able to using normative forms of healthcare delivery. In other 
words, how can technology be a source of solidarity and sustainability rather than a source of 
economic anxiety? 
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Leaving the Farm 
 
When winter temperatures start to rise and the snow starts to melt around the trunk of maple trees, 
that is nature’s signal that it is time to tap. Tapping maple trees to extract their sap and transform 
it into food products (e.g., sugar, syrup) is something that Indigenous communities in the United 
States have been practicing for hundreds of years.3 In mid-April of 2019, a good friend who worked 
at Michigan Tech invited me to join her to help the maple production of a local Anishinaabe (i.e., 
Ojibwe or Chippewa) farmer. Arriving in the early evening, we worked until it got dark, collecting 
sap in buckets and cutting wood to stoke the fire for boiling the sap down to syrup. The farmer and 
his family were generous hosts, sharing with us their plans for expanding their business and the 
work they did to support Indigenous food systems throughout the Upper Midwestern United States. 
Afterwards, we drove home to Hancock chatting excitedly about what we had learned and making 
outdoor plans for after the snowmelt finished. 
 
The shaft-rockhouse overlooking Hancock and Houghton was not lit up that night,4 instead a nearly 
full moon accompanied us as we snaked along the Keweenaw Bay on US-41. Copper mining was 
like many of the practices that were associated with the mythology of the Yooper, such as hunting, 
fishing, trapping, and making maple syrup. It too was actually something first practiced by the 
Anishinaabeg that was later adopted by white settlers who then transformed the practices into 
sources of capital accumulation (Magnaghi, 2017). Mining, alongside logging, led to the industrial 
development of the Keweenaw in the late 19th and early 20th century, and the resulting slow 
economic collapse. It was in that moment that I made the connection between the Yooper and the 
Anishinaabe farmer whose tribal land we had just left. The Yooper had been constructed around 
traits that had been borrowed or stolen from the Anishinaabeg.5  
                                               
3 Tapping a tree usually involves drilling a hole into it and inserting a specially made “tap” (like a water tap) that 
allows the sap to flow out of the tree, usually collected in buckets. 
4 The shaft-rockhouse is only lit up during the months it’s open to the public (May to October). The historic mining 
facility, like many other attractions in the UP, closes during the winter. 
5 There is no one good source to cite for this claim of theft. Yet, as historians of the Upper Peninsula, especially 
Theodore Karamanski and Russell Magnaghi have written in their own work, the economic legacy of copper mining 
is based in the knowledge of copper deposits that were discovered by the Anishinaabe long before white settlers 
arrived. Further, the backwoods cultural traits that have become associated with white Yoopers (e.g., spear fishing 
and making maple syrup), were likely subsistence activities first shared with fur traders and settlers in the 17th 
century. By calling this out as theft, I am acknowledging that like the land that was taken from the Anishinaabeg, the 
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As Rowe and Tuck (2017) argue, even critically-oriented research with the intent to “challenge 
systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively White enlightenment subject, 
and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed” (p. 7). I knew going into this project that I 
could not justify a deep engagement with the tribal communities located near my fieldsite, who 
were the same communities forced off the land that would become my fieldsite. Yet even with this 
knowledge, my project was still embedded in the erasure of settler colonial legacies in the Upper 
Peninsula, and rural America more broadly. As Panelli et al. (2009) note in their introduction to a 
special issue of The Journal of Rural Studies on race and rurality, rural studies has historically 
treated the rural as “a repository of White values, ideologies, and lifestyles, contrasted with an 
urbanity that is multicultural and cosmopolitan” (p. 357). My own research was embedded in the 
history and economic reality of the Keweenaw and the Yoopers who live there, concerned with 
economic inequality and pushes for development that are, as I argue, inappropriate and 
exclusionary for the region. Yet, I will be the first to acknowledge that my own research, in its 
focus on specific kinds of economic development, continues to reinforce the perceived whiteness 
of Yoopers. Moving forward, the study of rural economic development in the 21st century, 
especially my own, must also center the realities of settler colonialism.  
 
After leaving the farm that evening, I had come to the realization that the handful of tribal 
governments remaining in the UP, who focused on community sustainability rather than economic 
growth, were looked down upon by the same economic developers who saw wasted opportunity 
among the local Yoopers. It wasn’t high-tech remote workers that the Keweenaw needed. Rather, 
moving forward with something like sustainable and equitable development would require the 
centering of the Anishinaabe communities and knowledges that were the basis of regional identity. 
 
  
                                               
cultural practices that are now associated with the white Yooper were once shared in good faith, but have since been 
commodified through processes of settler colonialism. 
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